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Abstract 
 
We explore policy communication documents from the Bank of England as a means of 
understanding how communication can drive policy. This dissertation contributes to the 
literature in three ways. First, using textual analysis of the Bank’s periodical communication, 
we assess if the complexity and tone of these communications are influenced by the 
macroeconomic conditions during which the communication is made: we focus on 
macroeconomic conditions that the Bank closely monitors and, in some cases is assessed by, 
such as inflationary pressures and international competitiveness of the pound. Secondly, using 
a FAVAR model, we assess if communication shocks are transmitted to key macroeconomic 
variables. Our intuition is that if communication is to aid monetary policy, then understanding 
the direction of shock transmission from communication to the macro environment becomes 
important. Finally, we explore volatility transmission from the Bank’s communication to the 
stock-market, and currency and bond markets, based on the complexity and tone used in 
communication.  
We find that inflationary pressure impacts the complexity and tone of the Bank’s 
communication; exchange rate pressures also affect the complexity of communications. 
Specifically, under ‘unfavourable macroeconomic conditions’ (rising inflation accompanied 
by widening inflation gaps and falling pound values), the Bank’s communication displays 
greater complexity, reduced optimism and increased uncertainty. Our findings on the 
transmission of shocks from communication to macroeconomic variables are mixed; however 
we find that optimism shocks impact macroeconomic variables in a similar way to a 
contractionary monetary policy. We also show using Factor Error Variance Decomposition 
(FEVD) analysis that complexity and optimism shocks contribute more to explaining some 
variations in financial markets in the immediate term than the policy rate does. Our results 
regarding the role of communication in market volatility also suggest that rising optimism 
reduces volatility in the stock market and currency markets but complexity has little impact on 
volatility.  Overall, our findings have significant policy implications for the Bank of England 
as it seeks to understand the role of communication in policy making. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction  
Central Bank communication as a monetary policy tool has gained more prominence in 
recent times as the need for transparency and accountability have increased amongst inflation-
targeting central banks. As inflation targeting requires that central banks relate their policy 
actions to their inflation forecasts, there arises a need for precise communication that justifies 
policy actions. Additionally, major central banks have faced a new wave of challenges brought 
about by near-zero interest rates (the zero-lower bound). The major difficulty faced in such an 
environment is how to keep monetary policy going without the option of further reducing rates 
beyond the zero-lower bound. Furthermore, following the global financial crises of 2007/2008, 
communication by policy makers has been under more scrutiny as markets look to the central 
banks for guidance about the future path of policy. This ‘forward guidance’ is now being 
provided by central banks as a central policy theme. Indeed, as more central banks move 
towards inflation targeting as a central policy theme, forward guidance and the communication 
that drives it become increasingly important. 
To highlight the importance of communication in today’s monetary policy tool kit, 
former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, whilst explaining the Fed’s policy on the 60 Minutes 
television show, famously stated that “monetary policy is 98% talk and 2% action.” The choice 
of such a television show, which was the most watched news magazine in the US at the time, 
is also of importance as it underlines the efforts of central bankers to stress communication as 
central to its policy making. On another occasion, Bernanke was quoted as suggesting that “a 
major element of best-practice inflation targeting is the communication strategy.” These 
comments by one of the world’s most successful central bank policy makers affirm the role 
that communication has come to play in today’s policy making and also in the direction of 
monetary policy for the future.  
As monetary policy driven by communication becomes more mainstream today and 
market participation widens, mainly due to technological advancements, central banks continue 
to use their voices via more media outlets. More recently, virtually all central banks have 
become active on social media and are putting out communications about their intentions and 
activities in real time. The implication of this is that every communication by central banks 
therefore becomes a calculated step, an intentional rhetoric. Given these developments, it is 
therefore pertinent that modern day research explores communication from central banks more 
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critically. Indeed, the Bank of England (BoE) through its One Bank research agenda, stressed 
analysing policy communication as one of the frontier research areas it seeks to pursue 
imminently (Bank of England, 2015).  
There is substantial evidence that major central banks around the world have 
traditionally provided the public with relevant information regarding the implementation of 
monetary policy (see Eijffinger and Geraats 2006; Dincer and Eichengreen 2007). In fact, 
according to Fracasso et al.’s (2003) analysis of 20 inflation-targeting central banks, the Bank 
of England was thought to provide some of the highest quality and quantity of information to 
the public. However, what is unclear within the literature is the extent to which the quality of 
such communication varies over time and what factors may drive such changes in the quality 
of communication. Of course, there is no generally accepted measure of the quality of 
communication, but the common assumption is that transparency and accountability are highly 
desirable traits by inflation-targeting central banks and are arguably some of the most important 
factors that enhance effective inflation-targeting policy. The Bank of England in particular has 
worked towards greater transparency and accountability, mainly driven by the concerns of the 
Treasury Select Committee, which suggested that the Bank’s governance ‘needs strengthening 
and that it needs to be more open about its work’ (House of Commons Treasury committee, 
2011; p 3).  
To this end, the first part of our work seeks to address two fundamental research 
questions about the time-varying characteristics of central bank communication using 
information from the Bank of England. We begin by carrying out textual analysis of the Bank’s 
communications, as captured in periodic Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting minutes 
and inflation reports, and use standard software to measure the ‘complexity’ and the ‘tone’ 
(optimism and uncertainty) of these communications. We then test if the trend of the 
complexity and tone of the Bank’s communication have changed significantly over our sample 
period given the increased demand for transparency and accountability during this time. We 
expect that a more transparent and accountable central bank is one that communicates in a less 
complex manner, and whose tone reflects the true state of the economy at the time the message 
is being communicated.   
Second, we explore the extent to which the variations in complexity and tone are 
influenced by the prevailing macroeconomic conditions during which the communication is 
made. We hypothesise that as an inflation-targeting central bank that is required to explain 
significant deviations of its policy actions from its inflation target (i.e. accountable), the bank 
may be ‘less clear, less certain and less optimistic’ when macroeconomic environments are 
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unfavourable. For the purposes of this research, we define unfavourable macroeconomic 
conditions for an inflation-targeting central bank as one in which prevailing inflation is rising 
and is further away from its target, or one in which exchange rate pressures are leading to the 
depreciation of the local currency.  
For a central bank that is seeking to be transparent and accountable, such increasing 
complexity and uncertainty and reduced optimism in the Bank’s communication under 
unfavourable conditions may very well be as a result of the Bank’s openness on its views about 
the economy. Our expectations for perceived transparency are for communication to be 
consistently more complex, uncertain and less optimistic as inflation moves further away from 
the inflation target and as the pound depreciates. Our findings from this section also contribute 
to the ongoing debate as to whether central banks should be fully transparent or whether they 
should limit their transparency. We call this initial section of our work the ‘back end’ analysis 
and the diagram below highlights the framework through which we explore this and why this 
analysis is important. Figure 1.1 below helps elaborate on how analysis of the tone and 
complexity of central bank communication may help understand central bank transparency 
better. 
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Fig 1.1: Back end analysis – Why is it important to understand what drives the complexity 
and tone of central bank communication? 
 
 
 
To further evaluate how a central bank’s response to complexity and tone of 
communication might vary under different circumstances and the potential motivation for these 
variations, we consider four different scenarios in figure 1.2 below, where an inflation-targeting 
central bank may be forced to react in different ways due to the need for accountability and 
transparency. We can categorise scenarios as those in which the outcome is positive or 
negative, and we may have views on the underlying causes that led to these outcomes. For 
instance, the mid-air breakup of NASA Challenger space shuttle in 1986 with the deaths of all 
seven crewmembers was clearly a disaster, but conventional wisdom suggests that the 
underlying cause was relatively simple: the failure of O-rings, a key component (see Romzek 
and Dubnik (1987) for linkage between the disaster and public accountability).  
 
Similarly, most people believe that the 2007/2008 financial crisis triggered by the 
collapse of Northern Rock was a negative outcome, but the underlying causes may have been 
Inflation targeting Central 
Banks should be accountable 
and transparent about their 
policy stance irrespective of 
the macroeconmic pressures 
around them
Transparency and 
accountability can be measured 
by how clear a CB 
communicates and how  much 
its tone reflects the true state 
of the economy
Clarity can be captured by the 
complexity of communication 
using readability statistics while 
tone can be captured using the 
Optimism and Uncertainty 
variables (in the Diction  
software).
By exploring the varying levels of 
complexity and tone over time, 
to what extent can the BoE be 
observed to have varied 
complexity and tone over our 
sample period?
Are the varying levels of 
complexity and tone driven by 
changes in the prevaling 
macroeconomic conditions in 
which the communication is 
made and therefore an indication 
of the Bank's transparency?
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more complex than any specific failure within that institution. Outcomes that are regarded as 
positive may, similarly, be deemed to have simple or complex underlying causes. That the 
outcome of the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum did not cause the economic havoc many had feared 
is a positive outcome, but this ‘better-than-expected’ outcome might have had complex causes, 
ranging from prompt policy intervention to global factors. In other cases, the positive outcome 
may be the result of a simple cause; for instance, an inflationary trend cut off by a timely 
increase in interest rates. This 2 x 2 dichotomy is summarised in the table below.  
In the bottom half of the table, both outcomes are good and therefore whether they are 
complex or not, the central bank is not obliged to detail the implication of the outcomes and 
the consequences of their actions. For instance, with the better-than-expected labour market 
following the EU referendum, a number of complex scenarios could have contributed to the 
relatively positive outcomes; however, the Bank is not widely expected to account for these 
outcomes as they would if the outcomes had been worse. In the top half of the table however, 
both outcomes are worse whether the situation is complex or simple. 
Summarily, poor outcomes warrant an explanation from those whose responsibility it 
is to control those outcomes. In other words, while the BoE is independent, it is required to 
explain deviations from the inflation target. Explaining negative outcomes in terms of simple 
causes would look like dereliction of duty or at least poor performance in any entity that had 
the responsibility of managing the economy and the resources to deliver on the responsibility. 
We would expect the Bank to favour complex explanations over simple ones. When the 
outcome turns out to be good, there is less reason to seek out complex explanations if simple 
ones will suffice. Our premise therefore is that the complexity of communication that we try to 
capture may be driven either by the complexity of the situation, as in the top right corner of the 
diagram, or by the negativity of the outcomes, as in the top left corner of the diagram. 
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Figure 1.2: Complexity of situations vs outcomes 
 
Simple situation and bad 
outcome: 
E.g. the O-ring Space Shuttle 
Challenger disaster. 
 
Complex situation and bad 
outcome: 
E.g. the collapse of the Northern 
Rock Building Society and the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. 
 
Simple situation and good 
outcome: 
E.g. raising interest rates in 
response to inflationary 
pressures in a recovery. 
Complex situation and good 
Outcome:  
E.g. the Brexit vote and the 
subsequent ‘better than expected’ 
economic performance. 
 
 
 
 
Following on from the above, the need to understand whether the complexity of 
communication depends on the context in which the communication is made is also well 
described by Bulir et al. (2013). They consider two scenarios under which a central bank may 
be communicating and present the incentives for a central bank to communicate more clearly 
or otherwise in each scenario. In the first scenario, they describe a situation where persistent 
monetisation of debt has resulted in high inflation, and the expectations are for this to continue. 
In this case, the incentive to communicate clearly is limited because the causes of inflation are 
fairly obvious and likely to continue; furthermore, delivering a clear message is relatively easy. 
In the second scenario, there are several ‘offsetting’ and ‘difficult to measure’ factors driving 
inflation. This presents a difficult challenge for the bank to communicate about, however the 
potential gains (in terms of achieving its policy objective) from communicating clearly, via a 
well-crafted message, are much more than in the first scenario. Therefore, during complex 
economic situations, communication may become more challenging; nonetheless, the 
incentives to communicate clearly also increase. 
It is important to note that when we capture the level of complexity of the Bank’s 
communication using readability statistics, we are simply highlighting the writing style in the 
communication as being clearly written or otherwise. Indeed, scholars such as Klare (1976), 
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who have extensively studied readability statistics, identify that these statistics generally 
capture the ease of understanding or comprehension of words and sentences due to the style of 
writing. This therefore implies that the writing style of communication can be distinct from 
issues such as context and coherence. Thus, the complexity of communication captured by 
readability statistics is in a greater sense an attribute of clarity and does not wholly imply 
clarity. To this end, our use of readability statistics as a yardstick of clarity is limited to 
attributes such as complexity, writing style and structure of communication. Similar to 
complexity, our analysis of tone looks into two dimensions, namely optimism and uncertainty, 
and uses a computer-aided textual analysis tool called Diction to extract values for these. As 
with the complexity of text, our values for optimism and uncertainty simply reflect the semantic 
features of the text rather than provide a full insight into the intentions of the texts. 
Although understanding what drives the transparency of central bank communication 
is vital, there is also the further argument as to the onward effects of time-varying levels of 
complexity and tone of communication on the wider economy. As Blinder et al. (2008) 
highlight, there is a general consensus in the literature that ‘short run’ central bank 
communication (i.e. its views on the outlook for the economy and on monetary policy) have a 
significant impact on financial markets either via ‘creating news’ or ‘reducing noise’.  
Following on from the above, the second section of our work therefore seeks to explore 
the onward effects of the complexity and tone of the BoE’s communication on a number of 
macroeconomic and market variables. Our two main research questions here address whether: 
(i) central bank communication transmits shocks to key macroeconomic and market variables 
environment and; (ii) whether communication significantly impacts volatility in financial 
markets.  
Our null hypothesis was that central bank communication neither transmits shocks to 
key macroeconomic and financial market variables nor has any impact on the volatility of 
financial markets. Our findings on the onward effects of central bank communication are 
mixed. When we consider the effects of communication on financial market volatility, we align 
our work with the strand of the literature which suggests that more complex communication 
calms financial markets (e.g. see Geraats 2007, Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2007)) supposedly 
because market participants are reluctant to act without sufficient clarity from the central bank. 
The idea that that ambiguity calms markets does indeed have support within central banking 
practice. Alan Greenspan, the leading central banker once retorted, “...since I’ve become a 
central banker, I’ve learned to mumble with great incoherence. If I seem unduly clear to you, 
14 
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you must have misunderstood what I said” (Alan Greenspan, as quoted in the Wall Street 
Journal, September 22, 1987).  
We further hypothesised that increased optimism should reduce financial market 
volatility as suggested in the findings of Born et al. (2012). Certain strands of the literature, 
such as Li et al. (2005), that evaluate optimism of CEO communication and company stock 
volatility also present similar findings that suggest that optimism reduces stock price volatility.    
Together, this part of our work which analyses the onward effects of communication 
on financial markets is termed the ‘front end analysis’ and provides an extension to our ‘back 
end’ analysis, discussed above. Figure 1.3 below provides a summary of our overall research 
questions as well as the linkages between the back and front end of our analyses. 
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Figure 1.3: Summary of research questions 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 above contains four quadrants labelled A to D and is colour coded to show 
the groupings and the interlinkages between our research questions. At the heart of our work 
are four fundamental research questions (X1-X4) that seek to address how time-varying 
changes in communication are driven by the macroeconomic environment (back end analysis) 
and separately, how communication can go on to impact the macroeconomic and financial 
Complexity
Is there an observable trend in the complexity of 
the Bank of England’s communication over our 
sample period?  (A1)
To what extent is the complexity of central bank 
communication affected by the prevailing 
macroeconomic environment? (A2)
Complexity
What are the effects of the complexity of central 
bank communication on key macroeconomic 
and market variables? (B1)
What are the effects of complexity of central 
bank communication on the volatility of 
financial markets. (B2)
Tone
How has the level of optimism in central bank 
communication varied over time? (C1)
How has the level of uncertainty in central bank 
communication varied over time? (C2)
To what extent is the level of optimism in central 
bank communication affected by the prevailing 
macroeconomic environment? (C3)
To what extent is the level of uncertainty in central 
bank communication affected by the prevailing 
macroeconomic environment? (C4)
Tone
What are the effects of shocks to optimism in 
central bank communication on key 
macroeconomic and market variables? (D1)
What are the effects of the level of optimism in 
central bank communicationon on the volatility 
of financial markets? (D2)
Transparency & Accountability
Given the increased demand for transparency and accountability, 
is there an observable trend in the complexity and tone of Bank of 
England’s communication over our sample period?(i)
Are the varying levels of complexity and tone of communication 
associated with the prevailing macroeconomic conditions in which 
the communication is made? (ii)
Does central bank communication transmit shocks to key 
macroeconomic and market variables environment? (iii) 
Does central bank communication significantly impact volatility in 
financial markets? (iv)
Complexity 
Tone 
A B 
C D 
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environment (front end analysis). These four key research questions are further broken down 
across the four quadrants labelled A to D. To the left of the diagram (in red) are the research 
questions (A1-A2 and C1-C4) relating to the back end analysis of our work while the front end 
analysis is explored via the research questions (B1-B2 and D1-D2) to the right of the diagram 
and in blue. Finally, the top half of the diagram (in yellow text) highlights the research 
questions related to the complexity of communication whilst the bottom half (in green text) 
highlights research questions related to tone.  
To answer our research questions highlighted above, our work particularly focuses on 
carefully crafted communication documents which are shaped either through deliberation, as 
in the case of monetary policy committee (MPC) minutes, or through internal analysis at the 
bank, as in the case of inflation reports. Understanding what drives the time-varying complexity 
and tone of these documents as well as their onward effects on the macroeconomy not only 
helps provide some insight into the thinking of the Bank at any particular point in time, but 
also creates an avenue to conceptualise how monetary policy decisions may be optimal.  
Our work extends previous research on the role of communication in monetary policy 
(see Blinder et al. 2008 for a foundational survey). First, while a majority (though not all) of 
this literature explores the role of communication for the US Federal Reserve, we focus on the 
Bank of England, which interestingly, was an early proponent of forward guidance. Second, 
we focus on using textual analysis of the BoE’s communications to evaluate and quantify the 
complexity and tone of communication. We draw particular motivation for our study from the 
fact that textual analysis of central bank communication shows promise in terms of shaping 
monetary policy(see Bholat et al., 2015 and Shiller, 2017). 
Our work seeks to contribute to the literature in three main ways. First, by exploring if 
the Bank’s clarity and tone are influenced by the macroeconomic conditions during which the 
communication is made we can highlight how central banks communicate under varying 
macroeconomic scenarios (especially in unique periods such as during a financial crisis and in 
a zero lower bound environment), and contribute to the understanding of central bank 
behaviour in changing macroeconomic environments. Secondly, by exploring whether 
communication shocks are transmitted to these broad macroeconomic variables using a Factor 
Augmented Vector Auto-Regression model (FAVAR), we can contribute to the existing 
literature on the impacts of central bank communication on macroeconomic activity. Our 
intuition is that if communication is deemed to be an integral part of the monetary policy 
toolkit, then understanding the direction of shock transmission from communication to the 
macro environment becomes important, as has been well documented with interest rate shocks. 
17 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
Particularly in a zero lower bound environment, exploring the direction of communication 
shocks and its impact on the macroeconomy become more crucial as central bankers seek 
alternative policy tools to help drive economic policy.  
Finally, by exploring volatility transmission from central bank communication to the 
financial markets based on the complexity and tone used in communication, we can contribute 
to the literature on whether central bank communication mutes or increases volatility in 
financial markets. Understanding volatility transmission from communication is also vital in 
comprehending the onwards effects of communications made by central banks and helps to 
understand the implications of using communication as a policy tool. 
We show that complexity and tone of communication are consistently impacted by 
inflationary pressures, although exchange rate pressures do matter over the longer term.  Our 
main finding in this regard is that when the Bank is faced with what we define as a difficult 
macroeconomic condition, where inflation is rising and the value of the sterling is falling, the 
complexity of both MPC minutes and inflation reports tends to rise significantly. Overall, 
inflationary pressures seemed to be the dominant driver of complexity and tone across both 
MPC minutes and inflation reports, as rising inflation and a widening inflation gap were 
observed to reduce optimism in MPC minutes and increase uncertainty in inflation reports.  
Furthermore, our results on shock transmission from communication to the financial 
and macroeconomic environment suggest that optimism shocks seemed to impact key variables 
in a way similar to interest rate shocks, despite controlling for interest rate changes. 
Specifically, following shocks to optimism in the Bank’s communication, inflation falls, output 
falls, stock market returns fall, the pound rises in value and government bond yields rise. 
However, shocks to complexity were mixed, although these shocks seemed to consistently 
drive down stock and currency market values. Finally, we find that complexity and tone 
generally tend to have a limited effect on the volatility of stock, currency and bond markets; 
however, changes to optimism consistently drive down volatility in the stock and currency 
markets. The intuition behind these results as well as the support for our findings in the 
literature are well described in the latter parts of this work. 
The rest of our work is structured as follows. Chapter two explores the related literature 
on central bank communication, monetary policy and textual analysis; chapter three explores 
our data-generating process in more detail. Chapter four analyses the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions on the BoE’s communication; chapter five explores shock transmission from central 
bank communication to the macroeconomic environment; chapter six explores volatility 
18 
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transmission from central bank communication to the financial markets and chapter seven 
provides a summary and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction to central bank communication 
 Blinder et al. (2008) express that there has been a change in monetary policy thinking 
in both academia and central banking circles and there is now a generally accepted view that 
monetary policy is at least in part about managing expectations through communication. 
Central banks are increasingly using communication as an additional policy making tool. 
According to Woodford (2005), one of the most notable changes to the operation of the Federal 
Reserve occurred during the tenure of Alan Greenspan as Chairman of the Board of Governors, 
whereby there was a steady increase in the Federal Open Market Committee’s desire to talk 
openly about the policy decisions it has made and those it is likely to make in the future. The 
transition from traditional monetary policy to inflation-targeting monetary policy driven by 
communication has been motivated by a number of factors, some of which are highlighted 
below. 
Traditional monetary policy by central banks has always been targeted at keeping 
inflation at a level that the central banks deem acceptable. As Woodford (2011) points out, 
most industrialised countries did a good job of macroeconomic stabilisation through the 1980s 
and realised that by keeping inflation stable, they created a sound basis for real economic 
performance as well. What also became apparent after the 1980s was a new consensus by 
central banks to have monetary policy that was disciplined by clear rules rather than 
discretionary actions aimed at policy making. As Clarida et al. (2000) note, the Fed was highly 
accommodative before the pre-Volker years in the 1970s and only responded to anticipated 
inflation by letting short-term interest rates decline and raising nominal interest rates by less 
than the anticipated rise in inflation. What followed the Volcker/Greenspan years was a 
proactive response to anticipated inflation by systematically raising real and nominal interest 
rates as required. In line with rules-based policy making, more emphasis was given to explicit 
commitments to achieve desired economic outcomes, such as a target rate of inflation. 
Subsequently, many central banks in recent times have adopted a policy rule of inflation 
targeting which is best exemplified by the practices of the Bank of England, the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand and the Swedish Riksbank. 
Most monetary policy rules are interest rate rules in which the central bank adjusts the 
short-term interest rate instrument as a response to the current state of the economy. Taylor 
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(1999) explores a history of such monetary policy rules and concludes that generally monetary 
policy that stays close to the baseline policy rules will be effective. In recent times, there has 
been more exploratory work done on monetary policy rules with most of these relying on 
model-based approaches where private sector expectations enter the model explicitly. Very 
often, such models refer to forward-looking depictions of the economy (e.g. see McCallum and 
Nelson, 1999).  
The main criticism of the Taylor rule is that the component data that go into the rule 
are not known with much accuracy until much later, therefore, the rule cannot be followed by 
the Fed ex-ante. Indeed, studies such as Orphanides (2001) have proven that although the 
Taylor rule rightly describes actual policy rate when ex-post data is used, it does not do so 
when real-time data is used to construct what the rule would have been at the point of policy 
making. Woodford (2001) also summarises a range of limitations to the Taylor type rules and 
policy rules in general, including the idea that they can lead to indeterminacy of the rational-
expectations equilibrium price level.  
Taylor type rules such as the ones discussed above are classified as instrument rules 
and are differentiated within the literature from targeting rules, which allow for more 
judgement in policy making. Svensson (2003) argues that targeting rules have a tendency to 
drive the economy to a more socially optimal equilibrium as they possess the ability to 
incorporate extra model information that is easier to verify than optimal instrument rules.  
Indeed, these arguments against the mechanical nature of instrument rules have a long history, 
with scholars such as McCallum (2000) suggesting that policy decision making under an 
instrument rule could be ‘handed over to a clerk with a calculator’ (p. 21). Svensson (2003) 
sought to bridge the gap between the instrument rules-based policy making and targeting rules-
based policy and proposed a hybrid of prescribed policy guides which incorporates targeting 
rules as well as instrument rules. Furthermore, he argued that a monetary policy framework 
that used more of a targeting rule than an instrument rule would be desirable. 
The most commonly advocated targeting rule is inflation targeting. Central banks such 
as the Bank of England and Riksbank of Sweden have in recent times set simple rules of thumb 
saying that interest rates should normally be adjusted to target a specific inflation forecast over 
a specific horizon (usually two years).  The benefits of such a specific inflation target acting as 
the anchor for monetary policy are fairly obvious. Most importantly, it allows for clear 
accountability and as such an ex-post measure of the monetary policy success with the resultant 
effect of keeping inflation at low levels. However, Svensson (1997) identified the limitations 
to inflation targeting as being difficult to implement as central banks have imperfect control 
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over inflation, as well as inflation being affected by other factors outside monetary policy. 
Using an output stabilisation model, they argue that a simple solution to the problems of 
inflation targeting is to implement inflation targeting as inflation forecast targeting such that 
the central bank’s inflation forecast is treated as an explicit intermediate target.  
As Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) highlight, inflation targeting regimes are 
accompanied by the need for the central bank to publish regular and detailed assessments of 
the inflation situation and of their actions towards achieving the target as a means of ensuring 
accountability. It is within this mandate that communication by central banks has therefore 
become more prominent. In addition, as most inflation-targeting central banks primarily rely 
on their control of the base interest rate to adjust inflation expectations, the existence of a zero 
lower bound – where interest rates can go no lower – means alternative policy options will be 
explored.  A combination of these two issues is the essential driving force behind the rise of 
central bank communications as a policy tool. 
The question of whether communication has been an effective tool for monetary policy 
making has been debated extensively with no general consensus (see Blinder et al. 2008 and 
Svensson 2014 for a review). In fact, studies that go as far back as Barro and Gordon (1983) 
highlight that the reputation of central banks as perceived from their communication is central 
to effective rules-based monetary policy. The effectiveness of any communications-based 
policy will depend on the channels through which the communication is made (e.g. speech, 
policy paper, reports and policy meeting minutes) as well as the ability of the intended 
recipients to be able to obtain and understand the exact message being transmitted. These 
arguments have therefore driven the need to explore the various conduits through which 
effective policy communication can be made. 
In practice, there are potentially a number of barriers to effective communication by 
central banks, but three main arguments have dominated the debate in recent times. First, and 
the most challenging of these, is the notion that there are barriers to transparency from the 
central banks themselves, i.e. the bank may choose to withhold certain information from market 
participants. This notion is further reaffirmed by the statements of Alan Greenspan quoted 
above. The literature on this issue also focuses somewhat on the credibility and reputation of 
central banks. Studies such as Faust and Svensson (1997) argue that increased transparency 
improves central banks’ credibility and transparency; although many of these studies also 
highlight that full transparency may not always be in the interest of the bank despite the 
overwhelming social benefits of transparency.  
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Second is the idea that there are communication intermediaries that may obfuscate. For 
instance, when analysing the Federal Reserve’s communication, Hayo et al (2008) found 
preliminary evidence that financial market news only comes into existence after it goes through 
a filtering process by the media, not necessarily at the time the information is made available 
by the central banks. This therefore implies that it is not enough for central banks to put 
communication out, but financial newswires also play a role in transmitting such information 
to the financial markets. With the rising phenomenon of ‘fake news’ interfering in economic 
and political discourse, this theme is becoming more entrenched in policy debate. Allcott and 
Gentzkow (2017) offer an economic theoretical framework for fake news by suggesting a 
model for media markets where ‘firms gather and sell signals of a true state of the world to 
consumers who benefit from inferring that state’ (p. 213). As customers cannot infer accuracy 
without incurring costs, fake news surfaces in equilibrium because it is relatively cheaper to 
provide than precise signals. Therefore, to the extent that there are costs associated with market 
participants obtaining precise signals from a central bank, there exists the risk of fake news in 
the discourse of central bank policy and subsequently obfuscation of the communication 
channel. 
The third source of complication is that market participants may themselves 
misinterpret the policy message being directly transmitted by the bank due to a lack of clarity 
or misunderstanding of the tone of communication. This body of research deals with detailed 
analysis of the contents of communication using various approaches and tries to make 
qualitative and quantitative inferences from these. Within this school of thought, scholars have 
quantified communication-based on their existence in the first place, for example the number 
of communications released (see Woodford, 2005); or based on their tone, e.g. in terms of 
optimism or negative/positive tone (see Born et al. 2012, Hansen and McMahon, 2016) or 
based on their clarity (see Bulir et al. 2013). The front end analysis of our work mainly draws 
inspiration from this third notion and explores the contents of communication for clarity and 
various tones, including how these go on to impact macroeconomic variables. In line with the 
notion described above, our work argues that variations in clarity and tone in the process of 
transmitting policy communication can have a significant impact within a policy environment. 
Given the multifaceted challenges in using communication as a policy tool as described 
above, and the need to derive an optimal communication policy, central banks have 
increasingly focused on understanding the role that communication plays in their policy toolkit. 
Most modern central banks have evolved in their pursuit of an optimal communication policy 
and the Bank of England is no exception. Therefore, understanding the evolution of central 
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banks over the years is vital in contextualising how communication can shape policy. The next 
section of our literature review thus explores a background to the Bank of England with a 
specific focus on its evolution over time. 
 
2.2 The Bank of England 
Our analysis of central bank communication in this research mainly focuses on the Bank 
of England for a number of reasons. First, the BoE, along with the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand and Riksbank, was one of the earliest central banks to adopt an inflation-targeting 
regime, which therefore required increased use of communication as a policy tool. Secondly, 
most of the research done on central bank communication as policy tool has focused more 
extensively on the Federal Reserve in the US as well as on the European Central Bank (ECB) 
with relatively less attention on the BoE.  
Since the BoE was founded in 1694 to help raise bullion following defeat to France at 
the Battle of Beachy Head, the role of the Bank has steadily evolved over the past few centuries. 
Notably, the postwar era up until 1975 saw a period of rising inflation which particularly made 
the role of the bank in policy making more prominent and questionable at the same time. As 
King (1997) highlights, policy framework during this period reflected the absence of a credible 
monetary regime, which was demonstrated by the instability of the short-run Phillips Curve 
during this period. He argued that during this period, the long-run trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation was absent and neither was there a stable natural rate of 
unemployment. What followed the foregoing over the next 20 years or so was a quest for a 
nominal framework that would provide some credibility for the Bank’s commitment to low 
inflation anchored by a specific price level target. Although some targets for monetary 
aggregates were introduced in the 1970s, these were disbanded in the 1980s due to large and 
unpredicted changes in the velocity of money. 
The next major shift in policy framework for the Bank was the UK’s participation in 
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). A number of events across Europe following 
the UK’s joining the ERM in October 1990, up until its withdrawal in 1992 made the Bank’s 
success within the ERM difficult. Buiter et al. (2001) summarise two major causes of the failure 
of the Bank’s policymaking within the ERM. First were the significant macroeconomic and 
political fundamentals across Europe, such as German reunification, which meant that policy 
changes abroad had a significant impact on local policies. Secondly, the liberalisation of the 
international financial markets under the Single European Act and the subsequent weakening 
24 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
of national policy makers’ resolve to withhold fixed exchange rates following the Danish 
referendum in June 1992 also contributed to the failure of the ERM. 
The departure from the ERM prompted the Bank to focus on domestic targets as a base 
for monetary policy. In October 1992, a new policy framework with two main components was 
introduced. The first required interest rates to be set in order to help attain an explicit target for 
inflation which was initially set at 2.5% and secondly, there were a series of institutional 
measures that afforded the bank more responsibility for setting interest rates. These inflation-
targeting measures started the regime of increased transparency at the Bank, which was 
followed by lower inflation rates. Indeed, in 1993 the BoE was one of the few central banks 
that started openly publishing inflation reports making it one of the leading proponents of 
transparency across the world. The inflation reports were produced to provide a regular report 
on the progress being made towards the government’s inflation objective. Although the Bank 
also experienced somewhat increased independence following these measures, this was still 
limited, given that the Bank still did not have the power to set interest rates; this was set by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. During this period, interest rate decisions were made by the 
Chancellor following a meeting with the central bank Governor after advice had been given to 
the Chancellor by the Governor. 
On the 6th of May 1997 however, the recently-elected Labour government granted full 
operational independence to the Bank. This new macroeconomic policy environment implied 
that the Bank now had full powers to set interest rates and drive macroeconomic policy towards 
the set inflation target. The prerogative for setting interest rates now lay with a nine-member 
monetary policy committee (MPC) which consisted of five members from the Bank itself (the 
Governor, two Deputy Governors, the Chief Economist and the Executive Director for 
financial market operations) and four external members, who were mainly chosen from 
industry and academia. The inflation target, as well as the threshold that triggers a letter to the 
chancellor if the threshold was breached, was still set by the chancellor, however. This new 
monetary policy framework further increased accountability and transparency of decision 
making within the bank and prompted further measures of transparency, notably, the 
publication of MPC members’ voting records and of MPC minutes. Although meeting minutes 
between the chancellor and the Bank of England’s Governor had been published in the past, 
they did not provide as much signal for the future direction of monetary policy as did the new 
MPC minutes. One could understand why this was the case because the Chancellor had the 
ultimate prerogative to change interest rates and as such their moves were less predictable and 
could be politically motivated. This period therefore heralded an era where communication 
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from the Bank became vital as market participants looked to obtain signals from the bank’s 
monetary policy discussions. 
Under the new independent macroeconomic policy framework, these monthly MPC 
minutes included discussions about the Bank’s policy making during the meetings along with 
its perception of its current and future macroeconomic stance. MPC minutes were often 
released no later than six weeks after each monthly meeting. Notably, these minutes also 
included an appendix that was attributed to the Bank’s staff and provided a summary of facts 
and figures providing justification for the Bank’s policy decision making. This added another 
layer of transparency in the sense that justifications of decision making helped market 
participants better understand the thinking of the Bank. However, in December 2004, the Bank 
withdrew this appendix section from the MPC minutes, citing a survey conducted by Bank staff 
that suggested that this section was not useful to market participants.  
As the Bank gained increasing independence, and following the financial crisis of 2008, 
concerns began to arise about the level of accountability and transparency at the Bank. These 
concerns were particularly escalated as the Bank gained increasing responsibility for monetary 
stability, financial stability and microprudential regulation. Notably, in 2014, the Treasury 
Select Committee led by Andrew Tyrie demanded that the Bank review its transparency and 
accountability practices. The foregoing led to the development of a strategic plan by the Bank 
which had ‘openness and accountability’ at the core of the Bank’s mission. Later that year, the 
Bank commissioned Kevin Warsh to carry out an independent review of transparency practices 
at the Bank and a number of recommendations were made that would primarily change the way 
in which the Bank communicated and was governed. The most notable change in terms of 
communication was that the MPC would now publish the full written transcripts of the 
meetings at which monetary policy was decided as well as a policy decision and inflation 
reports (where relevant) at the same time as a policy decision. The aim of this was to remove 
the ‘drip-feed’ news and ensuring that policy decisions are as clear as possible. Other 
recommended changes also included changes to meeting frequencies and governance structures 
In this study, we focus mainly on the monetary policy regime from when the Bank 
became independent in 1997 as this is a significant period where communication began to play 
an important part in policy. Indeed, studies such as Clare and Courtenay (2001) compare the 
market reaction to BoE communication pre- and post-BoE independence and find evidence that 
financial markets seemed to react more to the Bank’s communication following its 
independence. Our sample period ends in July 2015 given that the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Warsh review, which made significant changes in the Bank’s 
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monetary policy framework and transparency, began in August 2015. Over this period, we 
explore 214 monetary policy communications as well as 75 inflation reports. MPC minutes and 
inflation reports often contain in-depth analysis of the factors that drive monetary policy 
including issues surrounding output and demand, money and credit, financial markets and the 
international economy. These documentations are therefore a relatively accurate reflection of 
the BoE’s monetary policy stance at any point in time.  
 
2.2 Central bank communication as a policy tool 
Although the notion of central bank communication becoming an integral component 
of a central bank’s monetary policy tool kit has been around for a few decades, the literature 
on central bank communication is still relatively scant compared to other macroeconomic 
policy tools. There are two main strands which are often identified in the literature. The first 
of these evaluates the impact of communication on financial markets and the macroeconomy 
either through the occurrence of such communication or a content analysis of the 
communication (e.g. see Glick and Leduc, 2012 and Hansen and McMahon, 2016). This works 
mainly through understanding how communication can effectively drive expectations which 
should then optimally drive asset prices and macroeconomic fundamentals. Blinder et al. 
(2008) argue that such expectations are managed by using communication to ‘create news’ and 
‘reduce noise’. The second strand seeks to explore the various communication strategies used 
by central bankers and attribute these to policy making and economic performance (e.g. see 
Eusepi and Prestion, 2010). In understanding these developments in the literature, however, it 
is fundamental to understand the new role of communication in central bank policy making 
and the vast amount of literature that has preceded this. 
Monetary policy involves driving interest rates and yields on financial assets in a way 
that impacts economic activity to desired levels. One conventional way of doing this involves 
central banks changing the short-term policy rate to meet desired expectations. The theory of 
the term structure of interest rates suggests that the longer-term interest rates should reflect the 
expected sequences of future overnight rates (see Cox et al. 1985). Therefore, as a means of 
driving longer-term economic policies, central banks will seek to influence future paths of 
overnight interest rates and not simply their current levels. The model highlights that policy 
expectations about the future path of interest rates are the main determinant of current long-
term interest rates under a rational expectations framework. As is widely argued, few, if any 
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economic decisions are hinged on the overnight rate, therefore explaining the reasoning behind 
the longer-term view of interest rates.  
Generally, it is perceived that to a large extent, short-term changes in interest rates by 
central banks are expected to change expectations about the direction of long-term interest 
rates. However, a problem arises under the zero lower bound situation where lowering the 
policy rate is not feasible any longer. In such a scenario, it has been widely established within 
the literature that central banks should then seek to drive monetary policy by influencing the 
expectations of market participants through communication of the future path of short-term 
interest rates (see Eusepi and Prestion, 2010).  
Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) argue that under these conditions, additional policy 
stimulus can be imparted by offering some form of commitment to the public about the future 
path of the short-term rates. The above mechanism of driving monetary policy through 
expectations of the future interest rate path is what has now become widely known as forward 
guidance. As defined by Levin et al. (2010), forward guidance is simply an approach that 
suggests that policy makers should make announcements on the future path of policy rates.  
To further explain the role of communication within the modern-day monetary policy 
framework, Blinder et al. use a simple macroeconomic framework. Under this framework, they 
assume that aggregate demand in an economy depends on the short-term rate r, the long-term 
rate R and expected inflation (π) amongst a host of other factors which do not need to be 
identified explicitly. Therefore: 
 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐷(𝑟𝑡 −  𝜋𝑡
𝑒, 𝑅𝑡 −  𝜋𝑡
𝑒, … ) +  𝜀2𝑡     … (2.1) 
 
The equivalent aggregate supply relation could resemble the new Keynesian Phillips 
curve: 
𝜋𝑡 =  𝛽𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1) +  𝛾(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡
∗) + 𝜀3𝑡     … (2.2) 
Where 𝜋𝑡 measures inflation, 𝑌𝑡 measures real output and 𝑌𝑡
∗ measures potential real output. 
  
A Taylor rule similar to the one below could then be used to close out the model: 
 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝐺(𝑌𝑡 −  𝑌𝑡
∗, 𝜋𝑡, 𝜋𝑡
∗, … ) +  𝜀4𝑡      … (2.3) 
 
If we assume a scenario where equations 2.1 and 2.2 do not change over time, then this 
will imply that the economic environment is stationary and therefore expectations will be 
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completely rational. In such a scenario, the central bank will be said to be credibly committed 
to following an unchanging policy rule, as in equation 2.3, and therefore communication will 
be totally irrelevant as a policy tool. Under this condition, following the popular definition of 
transparency as the goals of the central bank being fully deducible via available data (e.g. see 
Faust and Svensson, 2001), the central bank can be said to be fully transparent without 
necessarily communicating.  
Blinder et al. (2008), however, identify four scenarios within the above framework 
where central bank communication begins to matter. They identify these as: (i) where non-
stationarity exists, either of the economy or of the policy rule; (ii) where learning within the 
economy disrupts ability to predict the policy rule in some way; (iii) where non-rational 
expectations exist with economic agents; and (iv) where there is asymmetric information 
between the public and the central bank. Given that these realistic scenarios exist in the real 
world, central bank communication begins to matter.  
Using a Ricardian model that associates each possible current inflation rate with a short-
term interest rate and the future short-term interest rate, which is expected to prevail for a 
sequence of time periods into the future, Magill and Quinzii (2014) developed a forward 
guidance rule. They argue that mathematically, the forward guidance rule is similar to the term 
structure of interest rates in that expectations can be analysed in the same way and the same 
conclusions reached. Using a rational expectations framework, a number of researchers have 
also gone on to evaluate the effects of forward guidance policies on long-term interest rate 
expectations (e.g. see Moessner (2013) and Anderson and Hoffman (2009). Theoretically 
therefore, central bank communication replaces short-term interest rate changes and 
expectations under a rational expectations framework and hence its importance as a monetary 
policy tool under zero lower bound environments. 
Despite the popularity of the rational expectations theory of the term structure of 
interest rates as a determinant of long-term interest rates, its validity has often been debated. 
For instance, Shiller et al. (1983) using post-war data on the three-month and six-month 
Treasury Bills, seem to highlight the ‘worthlessness’ of the model whilst suggesting that a ‘tail 
wags dog’ theory in which long-term interest rates tend to overreact to current information is 
more appropriate. They argued for the absence of long-term predictive information in the 
spreads of three-month and six-month rates. Conversely, Mankiw et al (1987) used pre-war 
data to explain that the loss of this predictive ability primarily stemmed from the founding of 
the Fed in 1914 and its role in stabilising the three-month rate by inducing a random-walk 
behaviour. Later studies such as Rudebusch (1995) found disparities in the effectiveness of the 
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spreads of short-term and longer-term rates in predicting future rate changes. The study found 
that overnight spreads and short term interest rates have predictive information while medium-
term and longer-term spreads have no predictive information.  
According to Campbell et al. (2012), forward guidance communications can be 
categorised by the extent to which they are Delphic or Odyssean, in the classical Greek sense. 
Examining public statements of FOMC intentions, they distinguish between Delphic 
communication. Which provides information about the FOMC’s view of the future. And 
Odyssean communication. Which publicly commits them to a future action. They liken Delphic 
communication to instances where the central bank uses uncertain phrases such as ‘an extended 
period’ or ‘some time in the near future’ with no clear time commitment of a policy action. 
Odyssean communication however would replace such phrases with hard deadlines such as 
‘mid-2014’ or ‘the end of 2015’; an analogy similar to Odysseus committing himself to staying 
on his ship by having himself bound to the mast whatever the case. Hansen and McMahon 
(2016) argue that such distinctions are not without controversy and they therefore ignore the 
need for such differentiations in their analysis of the Fed’s forward guidance policy.  
Although the literature in favour of the quantitative justification of a forward guidance 
policy is scant, there is quite a rich literature on its theoretical justification. Using an estimated 
DSGE model, Campbell et al. (2012) find that ‘surprises associated with FOMC policy 
announcements substantially influence Treasury bond rates, corporate borrowing rates, and 
private macroeconomic forecasts’ (p. 51). In some counterintuitive manner, however, they also 
found that communication about substantial monetary tightening raises interest rates as desired, 
but simultaneously increases inflation forecasts and decreases unemployment forecasts, 
somewhat reflecting the forward guidance puzzle. Other studies such as Kool and Thorton 
(2012) have found that forward guidance can be very effective in preserving macroeconomic 
stability and many central banks in developed economies have been quick to adopt this 
mechanism as a means of tackling contractionary demand pressure.  
Hoffman and Anderson (2009) identify that the primary advantage of a central bank 
publishing its own policy path is that it would help steer expectations within the financial 
markets and help reinforce macroeconomic policies being administered. Most of the work done 
on forward guidance has focused on its effectiveness in directing the future path of short rate 
as well as its effects on asset pricing (e.g. see Kool and Thornton, 2012). However, the notion 
that forward guidance is an effective means of monetary policy is primarily borne out of the 
idea of monetary policy being transparent, which is suggested to increase the efficacy of policy 
making (see Geraats, 2002). In line with this, a new raft of literature on the role of transparency 
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as a means of effecting monetary policy is being advanced and, with it, other issues such as 
clarity. 
On the contrary, more recent work such as that of Campbell et al. (2017) which 
evaluates the effectiveness of the Fed’s forward guidance through the 2008 financial crisis 
period, has argued against the effectiveness of forward guidance when compared to a purely 
rules-based policy. Using an estimated medium-scale New Keynesian model to perform a 
counterfactual experiment between 2009q1–2014q4, they found that a simple rules-based 
policy would have delivered a better outcome in the years following the financial crisis. They 
nonetheless argued that with the introduction of the calendar-based communication whereby 
the policy maker communicates that the policy rate will be held at a fixed range irrespective of 
the state of the economy, the Fed was able to move inflation closer to target and boost real 
economic activity.  
McKay et al. (2016) argue that the perceived inefficacy of forward guidance may be 
down to the notion that forward guidance is highly sensitive to the assumption of complete 
markets. They argue that agents may not respond to perceived changes in future interest rates 
so long as they face uninsurable income risks and borrowing constraints. Del Negro et al. 
(2013) highlighted the concern that standard medium-scale DSGE models wholly overstate the 
effects of forward guidance on the economy as the ‘forward guidance puzzle’ identifies. They 
proposed the use of an alternative DSGE model where they constrain the overall impact of 
forward guidance on longer-term rates rather than short-term rates, which forward guidance 
seeks to influence. 
Furthermore, over the past few years there has been some research that has sought to 
explain monetary policy effectiveness using adaptive learning. Under an adaptive learning 
approach, agents are assumed to have only limited knowledge about the structure of the 
economy and therefore run reduced form regressions which, as time goes on and economic 
data changes, make them change their forecasting rule (Gaspar et al. 2006). As Blinder et al. 
(2008) highlight, Bernanke (2004) used this idea of adaptive learning to explain the role of 
communication in monetary policy effectiveness. He argued that given that the public does not 
know and instead must estimate the central bank’s reaction function using publicly available 
information, there is no guarantee that the economy will converge to the optimum rational 
expectations equilibrium.  
To better understand the role of learning, Orphanides and Williams (2005) built a 
theoretical model in which the public is assumed to know the underlying structure of the 
behaviour of economic policy but do not have explicit quantitative magnitudes describing that 
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structure. Under such a model, therefore, private agents are forced to parse the central bank’s 
communication in order to be able to fit quantitative/qualitative information into their models. 
They found that such a model follows a time-varying process and provides useful information 
for the conduct of monetary policy. Eusepi and Preston (2010) argue that under a learning 
economy, expectations are unanchored because all private agents face difficult forecasting 
problems. Therefore to mitigate this, central banks should put out communications to align 
expectations towards the policy rule that agents are learning about and should do so in a clear 
and transparent manner. The following sections of this chapter evaluate the literature around 
the clarity and transparency of central bank communication. 
 
2.3 The role of intermediaries in central bank communication  
Over the years, increased demand for accountability and transparency have driven a 
growing need for communication by central banks, which in turn has intensified news coverage 
of such communication.  With such a flood of information as well as other financial information 
coming through, economic agents have been forced to rely on news sources (often financial 
newswires) to filter communication that is relevant to their financial decisions. An additional 
layer of complexity is the speed and rate at which news is made available to the markets due 
to improved technology. Within the central bank communication literature, most studies that 
explore the impact of central bank communication do not necessarily focus on the primary 
communication from the central banks but on the interpretation and dissemination of such 
stories by newswire services.  
Although there has generally been some focus on information transmitted via financial 
newswires as these are perceived to be closely monitored by active market participants (e.g. 
banks other financial institutions), it is important to note that all information transmitted to the 
public via all sources is vital for policy making. Indeed, Berger et al. (2011) argue that 
information reaching the general public is more crucial than information only reaching 
financial market participants. They highlight that ‘it is the public whose inflation expectations 
eventually feed into the evolution of inflation through wage claims and savings, investment 
and consumption decisions’ (p. 14). 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) identify that as effective communication becomes a 
primary monetary policy tool available for central banks at the zero lower bound, it is important 
that the channels through which these communications reach consumers of the information is 
explored as well. Particularly, when analysing central bank communication, they argue for the 
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use of newswire reporting as provided by newswires such Reuters, rather than direct 
communication from the central banks. They suggest that newswire reporting helps analyse 
central bank communication from a market perspective, i.e. the actual communication that 
market participants receive. Additionally, because guidance typically involves the central 
banks putting out communications that signal the future path of policy rates, the language used 
in these communications is very important. With central banks continuing to explore these non-
conventional monetary policies, the bigger question is whether such policy communication and 
transparency by central banks are effective if the right information does not reach the target 
market participants.  
Hayo et al (2008), whilst analysing the Federal Reserve’s communication, found 
preliminary evidence that financial market news initially goes through a filtering process by 
the media and these items of news often only become available to the public after this process. 
More importantly, he argued that the impact of the news is not necessarily at the time the 
information is made available by the central banks, but at the time the consumer obtains this 
from the newswires. Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012) argue that to cope with the volume of 
financial market news, individual agents simply ignore relevant information, probably because 
it is costly to acquire, and only depend on information filters from newswires. This therefore 
implies that although central banks may seek to publish information for public consumption, 
the filtering process by news intermediaries may distort both the timing and clarity of the 
information being provided.  
These arguments create a vital case for understanding the role of financial newswires 
in policy transmission. In trying to work out how market participants process central bank 
communications, Hayo and Neuenkirch (2015), using a survey of 450 market participants from 
around the world, found that respondents rely more on newswire services to learn about central 
banks communications than self-monitoring the central banks. Lucca and Trebbi (2009) also 
found that financial market participants pay very close attention to the financial market press, 
such as the recurring Wall Street Journal column ‘Parsing the Fed’, which analyses the content 
of each sentence of the statement relative to the most recent one ‘for clues about where interest 
rates may be headed’ (p. 3). Additionally, Berger et al. (2011), using a novel dataset that 
quantified press coverage in the 12 countries of the euro area and internationally, found that 
the media tends to report ECB policy decisions where inflation exceeds the inflation target 
more negatively than the bank intends. They also found that where there exists frequent inter-
meeting communication by the ECB, the media seemed to report with a more positive tone. 
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 There are also several instances where it has been found that central bank 
communication, if not clearly delivered, may transmit the wrong signals to the market and 
hence induce volatility.  Sicilia and Cruickshank (2000) studied Alan Greenspan’s speech, a 
phenomenon they called the Greenspan Effect, and found that his speeches, particularly his 
congressional testimonies, had a significant impact on financial markets and had the ability to 
calm investors as well as stabilise world currency markets. However, they also found that in 
some instances, when Greenspan’s speech was vague, it generated a ripple effect that was 
caused by newswire services misconstruing the true meaning of his speeches, as in the case of 
his 1996 ‘irrational exuberance’ comments, which was parsed into an 18 page discussion from 
his original 31-word sentence. Furthermore, as central bank communication is intended to 
correct faulty expectations whilst reducing misallocation of resources, inaccurate interpretation 
might actually induce such misallocation; ‘e.g., if agents make economic decisions such as 
taking on a mortgage based on the central bank’s communication’ (Blinder et al., 2008). When 
communication is properly transmitted by new channels therefore, these news channels not 
only act as filtering mechanisms but also as a debriefing and interpreting channel.   
 
Some of the previous literature that has discouraged elements of central bank 
communication have done so with the justification that it is susceptible to misinterpretation by 
the public. Mishkin (2004) has argued against fully communicating the future path of central 
bank policy on the grounds that it may complicate the bank’s decision-making process because 
the public may not accurately interpret the conditional nature of the projections. Blinder et al. 
(2008) also argue that central banks often hold back from fully communicating their actions 
because it may be mistaken for commitment. This, of course, is even more accurate if financial 
newswires pick and choose which information they pass on to the general public.  
There is indeed some evidence that central bank communication processed via 
newswires may tend to confuse markets in some ways. Hayo and Nueunkirch (2012) analysed 
the effects of the FOMCs communication on the financial markets and used a database of actual 
FOMC communication to compare the results to those carried out using the database created 
by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007), which uses newswire reporting of FOMC communication. 
They found that regressions using newswire reporting revealed fewer significant coefficients 
and contained unexpected signs, therefore suggesting that actual central bank communications 
were more significant in impacting financial markets. 
In recent times as well, there has been the expanding phenomenon of ‘fake news’ and 
its role in policy communication. Although more common in political satire and press 
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metacoverage within journalism, ‘fake news’ is now a more cross-contextual issue. Within 
journalism, there are valid arguments for advocating fake news as supported by the concept of 
the Stewart/Colbert effect, where political satire (fake news) has been used as a genuine 
transmission mechanism for real news (Amarasingam, 2011). Brewer et al. (2013) also argue 
that regular satire viewers may have stronger opinions on real news issues if they had 
previously encountered it in satire programming.  
Within the context of economics. However, there seems to be a different view on fake 
news which is a relatively newer concept requiring analysis. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) 
define fake news as ‘news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead 
readers’ (p. 213).  As a way of offering an economic argument for the news market, Gentzkow 
et al. (2014) developed a model for media markets where a continuum of consumers and a 
limited number of media firms observe and report independent signals. Their model considers 
fake news to occur as a result of either filtering bias or distortion which are often driven from 
the supply side through internal and/or external pressures. Internal pressures are in the form of 
direct preferences of media owners or preferences of the reporters and editors. On the other 
hand, external pressures may be in the form of pressure from governments, advertisers and 
other third parties. They conclude that when distortions in communication originate from the 
media firms’ incentives to build a reputation for quality, ‘the availability of information from 
competing sources may allow consumers to distinguish true quality more accurately, and so 
reduce bias by softening these reputational incentives’ (p. 25).  In the case of central bank 
communication, supply-side bias in the form of any of the above will have serious implications 
for the transmission of policy news.  
Demand-side bias also exists, where consumers look to obtain news from sources 
whose bias matches their own prior belief. Indeed, the whole basis for physiological utility 
from media consumption as described by various studies (e.g. see Nickerson 1998; Rabin and 
Schrag 1999; Tirole 2002) supports this argument.  
Using a similar economic model to the one above, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) argue 
that fake news arises in equilibrium because it is cheaper to both provide and obtain than precise 
signals. Their analysis extends the market analysis from simply considering the mainstream 
media to also evaluating the role of social media in fake news. They argue that social media 
particularly increases the occurrence of market failures in the media market as the barriers to 
entry are extremely low. The danger of this, therefore, is that a journalist or any other individual 
can supply fake news to the market with significant impact if there is a demand for their biases. 
A simple case of an individual misinterpreting a statement by the central bank, for instance, 
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therefore becomes potentially more dangerous than ever before, especially if their reach is to 
millions of followers, as in the case of Twitter. As Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) highlight, to 
the extent that social costs are created by such demand and supply mechanisms, eliminating 
market failures becomes a priority, especially as social costs in the case of policy misstatements 
may lead to investment losses for small scale retail investors. This is particularly important in 
scenarios where many small-scale investors, such as retail traders, are increasingly obtaining 
their market information from online sources. 
An apposite example of the role of media outlets in policy debate is the events of July 
28th 2017 where the pound surged to a one year high (post-Brexit vote) following comments 
by Mark Carney that ‘Some removal of monetary stimulus is likely to become necessary if the 
trade-off facing the MPC continues to lessen and the policy decision accordingly becomes more 
conventional…’ Given that a few journalists were quick to point out that Mark Carney had 
never voted in the minority (currently the ‘Hawks’), the headlines report across media outlets 
suggested a rise in rates was imminent. Notably, Chris Giles of the FT Larry Elliot of I 
Guardian and Jamie McGeever of Reuters all put out affirmative reporting on Mark Carney 
ready to raise rates. This frenzy in the market was later followed by a clarification from the 
Bank that the same conditions (as has always been stated) in relation to wage growth and Brexit 
would suffice for a rate rise to be imminent, therefore sending the pound value back down. 
This becomes more interesting indeed as Mark Carney had only committed to keeping rates on 
hold a week before with an affirmative statement saying “now is not the time” to raise rates.  
Similarly, in a bizarre turn of events, on the same day the ECB was forced to clarify a 
statement made by Mario Draghi which had been misreported by the media. The ECB 
subsequently stated that ‘… President Mario Draghi intended to signal tolerance for a period 
of weaker inflation, not an imminent policy tightening…’. Nonetheless, the Euro had already 
witnessed a sharp decline as at the time the statement was released. In line with Gentzkow et 
al. (2014), the reporting of these statements showed a media bias from the supply side driven 
by the interpretation of reporters and editors. 
These kinds of events become of great importance to policy makers mainly because 
certain individual market participants do not necessarily need the credibility of the big 
newswires to impact markets. For instance, reporting by media outlets such as MarketWatch,1 
which identifies individuals such as investor, blogger and columnist Jeroen Blockland – who 
has just over 13,000 followers (as at July 2017) – as being ‘on a list of Twitter accounts that 
                                               
1 MarketWatch is a subsidiary of Dow Jones & Company and operates a financial information website that 
provides business news, analysis, and stock market data.  
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investors need to follow’ reinforces the powers of individuals in influencing market opinions. 
Generally, these examples strongly reaffirm the role that the media can play in influencing 
policy communication. 
In summary, there is evidence that communication intermediaries have a tendency to 
both clarify and distort information coming from the central banks and there is no consensus 
on their role in the effectiveness of policy communication. On the basis of the foregoing, it is 
important for studies like ours to explore the original communication from central banks in a 
bid to understand the fundamental drivers and reactions of the original communication. Acosta 
(2015) documents evidence that supports the notion that the public pays direct attention to 
information released by central banks by reviewing Google search results for ‘FOMC 
statements’ and showing that there has been an increased trend in the search for FOMC 
statements on Google. He notes that peaks in interest in the terms coincide with the release of 
the minutes of FOMC meetings. Our findings can contribute to a better understanding of the 
role that communication intermediaries play in central bank policy communication. 
 
2.4 Central bank transparency: theoretical background 
The role of transparency in effective communication, and subsequently effective policy 
making, has been explored via various means. Early works done on measures of transparency 
such as that of Leiderman and Svensson (1995) and Bernanke et al. (1999) focus on the extent 
to which inflation targeting has been met as a measure of transparency.  Other studies such as 
Fry et al. (2000) and Blinder et al. (2001) used surveys of central bank practices to evaluate the 
extent to which central banks are transparent. Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) highlight five main 
types of transparency that can be evaluated in central banks, namely political, economic, 
procedural, policy and operational transparency. To date, there is no generally accepted 
measure of transparency and many of the studies that measure transparency will often do so 
using one of the broad ideas above or a combination of these. Some studies, such as Bernanke 
(2001), simply use an inflation-targeting framework that measures the degree of divergence 
from the central bank’s inflation target as a measure of transparency, whilst studies such as 
Horvath and Vasco (2016) and Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) use a combination of inflation-
targeting measures and provision of information amongst other sub-measures.  
In the simplest terms, the definition of transparency is that of Geraats (2002). It defines 
transparency as the absence of asymmetric information between monetary policy makers and 
economic agents. Simply put, transparency in monetary policy can be defined as the degree of 
37 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
openness exhibited by a central bank in the course of their policy implementation. In practical 
terms, therefore, a transparent central bank is one which seeks to openly communicate its 
thinking and future policy path, and this is why communication dynamics becomes an 
important part of central bank transparency. The broader components of transparency identified 
by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) are arguably the most commonly used definitions of 
transparency and have been used in more recent works such as Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) 
and Hovarth and Vasco (2016). The above variation in definitions is a clear indication that 
‘transparency’ in its broad sense will mean different things to different individuals.  
Furthermore, there is a dichotomy in beliefs on transparency in this regard that should 
be noted here. Many academics call for increased transparency in the form of more 
communication on governing council meeting minutes, reports, voting records, speeches and 
so on as a means of increasing accountability by central banks. On the other hand, 
commentators such as market participants view transparency in the form of providing all 
relevant information that is useful for financial decision making and not necessarily all 
information the bank is capable of providing. Therefore, for some, central banks talk too much 
whilst for others central banks talk too little, hence the need for an optimal level of transparency 
has been argued for in the literature. Whatever side of the divide one is on, however, the quality 
of whatever communication the banks release should be a fundamental requirement for 
effective transparency. Given that communication is a two-way street, a central bank may be 
ranked as highly transparent from their point of view by the basic definition of openness used 
in much of the literature; however, this transparency may not be effective given that the quality 
of openness is poor.  The idea of transparency in action should therefore be distinguished from 
effective transparency.  
Woodford (2005) sought to establish to what extent it is desirable for central banks to 
communicate policy decisions. He argues that communication by central banks often falls 
within two main contexts: first is the signalling effect of the information released through 
monetary policy committee meetings such as the FOMC in the US and the BoE in England, 
and second is the willingness of central banks to share their assumptions on the future course 
of the economy. Our research is more related to the former, i.e. the signalling effect of monetary 
policy communications through channels like minutes and reports. The general notion in the 
literature is that for effective signalling of the future path of policy rate, communication made 
by central banks regarding this must be transparent.  
Generally, extensive transparency of central bank communication has not always been 
seen as desirable within the literature. Studies such as Morris and Shin (2002) have argued that 
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there are socially beneficial limits to central banks putting out public information. They argue 
that although increased public information is valuable to economic agents where no socially 
viable private information is available, the benefits of such public information become 
ambiguous when agents have independent sources of information. Walsh (2007), used a 
quadratic loss function to demonstrate the extent to which information from central banks 
should be made public. He argued for an optimal level of transparency which is driven by costs 
and demand disturbances whereby the banks forecast these disturbances and release 
information as a response. Issing (2014) posits that given that central banks communicate a lot 
of information, ‘If the information is too noisy, too uncertain, and if the risk is high that the 
public might be distracted, it might be better to restrict communication’. He argued that 
information such as underlying uncertainty associated with a forecast has a tendency to be 
misunderstood by the public. 
The idea of an optimal level of transparency is also supported by van der Cruijsen et al. 
(2010), who argue that beyond the optimal level of transparency, agents might attach too much 
significance to the conditionality of their forecasts and could become confused by the 
increasing amount of information they receive. Additionally, from a practical perspective, 
Blinder et al. (2008) highlight that even central banks that publish a good amount of 
communication still often keep internal deliberations secret and often observe a ‘purdah’ period 
before key meetings. As with the arguments for an optimal level of transparency within the 
theoretical literature, there are arguments for limits to transparency in the practical world as 
well.  For instance, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009a) argue that the purdah is necessary around 
meeting days as communication during the purdah has been observed to excessively raise 
volatility within the financial markets. Contrasting purdah day communications with normal 
communication after the FOMC’s meetings, they found that post FOMC statements led to a 
significant drop in market volatility. 
Another interesting perspective on the limits to central bank transparency is the 
argument about whether transparency is a beneficial element in principal-agent relationships 
between the bank and the public. This argument is central to the works of Prat (2005), who 
uses the model of career concepts for experts to highlight the role that career concerns and 
reputation plays in driving transparency. Applied to central bank communication, Prat’s work 
argues that central bankers as agents of the public (who are principals) receive a signal about 
the state of the world (or the economy) and will act based on those signals on behalf of the 
principals with a subsequent consequence. He argues that the principals will benefit 
significantly from information about the action that the agent took and information about the 
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consequence of the agent’s action. In this model, full transparency is linked to fully 
understanding the agent’s actions and the consequences of those actions; direct information on 
the agent’s action thus has a potentially positive effect on the principal (the public).  However, 
he identified a set of circumstances under which ‘committing to concealing a certain kind of 
information can make the principal better off’, therefore suggesting that full transparency is 
not always beneficial. 
Meade and Stasavage (2008) used a theoretical model to explore career concerns and 
the incentive for central bankers to be fully transparent when their deliberation is held in private 
versus in public. They argue that where statements made by committee members during 
deliberations are likely to be made public, there is an incentive for central bankers to hold back 
information when they are unsure about the accuracy of their signals. Their work concludes, 
therefore, that the decision by the FOMC to start releasing transcripts from committee 
deliberations in 1993 altered incentives for dissent and may have reduced incentives for 
individual committee members to be totally transparent about their personal views. 
 
Notwithstanding these limits to transparency, what is also clear in the literature is that 
central banks have generally not reached this optimal limit argued by the aforementioned 
scholars, i.e. no central bank so far has been perceived to be overly transparent. Indeed, some 
move towards more transparency according to one measure of transparency has been found to 
be accompanied by reduced transparency using another measure in some studies. For instance, 
using the post-1993 period at the Federal Reserve where FOMC transcripts were required to 
be published as a means of improving transparency, Hansen et al. (2014) found that such 
increased transparency reduced the amount of deliberation by committee members and 
subsequently reduced the number of statements released by the FOMC. Nonetheless, the 
overall trend across central banks is of increased transparency. Horvath and Vasco (2016) 
constructed a comprehensive index for transparency which included 110 countries between 
2000 and 2011, and found evidence of increased transparency across all countries. 
Furthermore, they found evidence that the more developed countries exhibited more 
transparency, as could reasonably be expected, and that financial stability episodes such as high 
financial stress had a negative effect on transparency. These results are similar to the earlier 
works of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) who had also found increased transparency in central 
banks since the late 1990s as well as more transparency in countries with developed political 
and financial systems. 
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Similar to the issue of optimum transparency is the literature on the role that 
transparency plays in inflations expectations. Levin et al. (2004), using survey results collected 
from market forecasters, argue that for inflation-targeting central banks, transparent 
communication plays a vital role in adjusting inflation expectations of the private sector. 
Similar to their research, van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2007) investigated the link between 
inflation and inflation expectations using the model developed by Levin et al. (2004) and found 
that transparency does improve this link. Using a Rogoff model of a conservative central bank, 
Demertzis and Hallett (2007) explored the effect of economic and political transparency on the 
inflation gap and output gap and found that a lack of transparency does not alter the average 
inflation or output performance of an economy although the stability of the economy is 
impacted through increased inflation variability and output volatility. In line with the above 
studies, Sibert (2006) found corroborating evidence that increased transparency lowers the 
variance of planned inflation, however her work also provided a counter-argument that 
increased transparency can ‘worsen the public’s ability to infer the central bank’s private 
information’. She suggested that as a result of this, such increased transparency can make 
inflation-averse central banks significantly worse-off.  
In practice, inflation-targeting central banks such as the Bank of England (BoE) have 
particularly focused on transparency in their communication in a bid to drive the effectiveness 
of their inflation-targeting policy (Geraats, 2002). The need for greater transparency has also 
been driven to some extent by central banks becoming more independent in terms of policy 
decision making, which therefore requires more accountability from them. As of the turn of the 
new millennium, Fry et al.’s (2000) research suggest that 74% of 94 central banks surveyed 
considered transparency as vital for, or a very important component of, their monetary policy 
framework. Indeed, through its One Bank research agenda, the BoE stresses transparency of 
its policy communication as one of the frontier research areas it seeks to pursue imminently 
(Bank of England, 2015). In 2014, having been prompted by the Treasury Select Committee, 
the Bank commissioned former US Fed governor Kevin Warsh to review its communications 
strategy and eventually acknowledged the changes put forward by Warsh’s (2014) ‘Review on 
Transparency Practices and Procedures’ at the Bank, and has implemented some aspects 
relating to improving its transparency practices through its monetary policy communication 
since August 2015.  
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2.5 Central bank transparency and the linkage between complexity and tone 
Winkler (2000) highlights that for transparent actions of central banks to be fully 
effective, two important considerations need to be met. First, the information they put out has 
to be ‘processed, structured, condensed, simplified and put into context in order to become 
comprehensible’ (p. 8), which he suggests captures the notion of openness. He highlights that 
simply defining transparency of monetary policy in terms of openness is too simple to be of 
practical relevance. Hence, when there are frictions in communications or imperfections in 
processing information, openness by itself does not translate to transparency. He therefore 
argues that the second important element of effective transparency is clarity and suggests that 
the need for clarity is important because of the information processing activity required for 
filtering and interpreting information.  
The need to explore clarity as part of transparency is further driven by the fact that 
policy moves by central bankers may require them to pursue strategic considerations such as 
purposeful distortions or encoding of messages as part of a broader game theoretic framework. 
There has indeed been some evidence that clarity plays a significant role in ensuring 
transparency. Studies such as Fracasso et al. (2003) have shown that openness and the 
predictability of economic decisions can be driven by clearly written communication such as 
inflation reports. Winkler suggests that ultimately, transparency hinges on ‘common 
understanding’ between the bank and its audience which is driven by clarity in communication.  
It is important to highlight at this juncture that our study captures the level of 
complexity of the BoE’s communication using readability statistics, although we argue that 
complexity is an important attribute of clarity. Earlier works on the clarity of communication 
such as that of Klare (1976) identify that these statistics generally capture the ease of 
understanding or comprehension of words and sentences due to the style of writing. We 
therefore identify that the writing style of a communication can be distinct from issues such as 
context and coherence, therefore our measures of clarity simply highlight the writing style in 
the communication as being clearly written or otherwise.  
 
Given that it will be difficult to specify what exactly the internal mindset of the central 
bank is, it may also be useful to evaluate the overall tone of external communication for signals 
of internal sentiments which may not be explicitly dictated in the external communication. To 
this effect, our work therefore seeks to evaluate the tone of central bank communication for 
sentiments relating mainly to optimism and uncertainty. In summary, we therefore seek to 
explore clarity and tone of central bank communication as a basic framework for exploring the 
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transparency of central bank communication. Since what constitutes a transparent policy is 
ambiguous, our argument is that clarity of communication is an important precondition for 
transparency, i.e. it is impossible to have a transparent central bank without putting out 
fundamentally clear and less complex information.  
To begin with, an interesting perspective which is not often explored within the 
transparency vs clarity literature is the view of economic agents on the transparency of central 
banks. The idea that transparency is more important if a central bank is perceived as being clear 
is a fundamental premise that is often ignored in the literature. Van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger 
(2010) attempt to address this issue by analysing data from a Dutch household survey on the 
perceived transparency of the ECB. They found that perceptions of transparency matter for 
inflation expectations and trust in the ECB and that there are weak linkages between perceived 
transparency from an economic agent’s point of view and actual transparency. Importantly, the 
extent to which recipients of information perceive information to be usable is considered a 
fundamental precursor to transparency. 
Although a number of rational expectations studies have explored inflations 
expectations (or perceptions) of economic agents within a monetary policy framework (see 
Ranyard et al. 2008 for a survey), there is little linkage between these issues and perceptions 
of policy transparency. To some extent, our research seeks to address some of these issues by 
looking into the role of clarity in the transparency of central bank communications. Our premise 
is that economic agents can only perceive the central bank to be transparent if they clearly 
understand the communication being put out and therefore any mismatch between a central 
bank’s stance on transparency and the perceived transparency by economic agents may have 
implications for policy makers. Indeed, a number of useful studies have suggested the need for 
more work to be done on the role that clarity and other dimensions play in central bank 
communication. For instance, Ronaldo and Rossi (2010), having found strong evidence of the 
occurrence of central bank communication driving the currency, bond and stock market, warn 
that these results should be interpreted with caution and they propose further research on ‘the 
content, the clarity, the length and complexity of central bank communication and its market 
effects’ (p. 502). 
Perhaps the most valid argument in favour of exploring the clarity of communications 
provided by central banks is the literature on the ability of economic agents to digest 
communications released by the central banks. The basic idea of rational inattention proposed 
by Sims (2003) is central to this strand of the literature. He argues that because economic agents 
have limited cognitive ability, central banks should publish as much detail as possible so that 
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market participants can pick up different pieces of information as they understand it. He further 
argued that how these pieces of information are picked up by individual participant does not 
matter as individual views will cancel each other out in the aggregate.  
Using a stylised OLG model, Gaballo (2013) argues that Sims’ conjecture is true as 
long as the economic agent does not pick up market-generated information as well (e.g. fake 
news). If these findings are indeed valuable and are based on the idea that human cognitive 
capacity is limited, the complexity of communication therefore becomes important for central 
bankers wishing to put out information to a broad audience. Gaballo argues that there are two 
main aspects involved in understanding the central bank’s communication and these are the 
drivers of the quality of the communication. First is the limited cognitive ability of agents in 
understanding language and second is that the central bank itself may set out to intentionally 
include some degree of ambiguity in their communication. Our study argues that no matter the 
level of intellectual capacity of the users of central bank communication, the complexity of the 
communication will always be a fundamental avenue that drives usability of information put 
out by central banks. 
On the contrary, another strand of the literature based on the arguments for bounded 
rationality (see Kahneman, 2003) argues for limits on the amount of unclear information put 
out by the central bank. These mainly argue that the central bank should limit its 
communication on issues which itself is not clear about, such as the evolution of the economy 
as these may transmit noise signals to the public. Morris and Shin (2002) proposed the idea of 
coordination games. They argued that given that the public overreacts to public information, 
any mistaken disclosure can cause great harm. Similarly, the underweighting of private 
information may cause worse harm if the cost of acquiring private information is costly. 
Therefore, central banks have to balance the need to provide clear information with the need 
to withhold private information where necessary. Svensson’s (2006) response to this idea was 
for the central bank to put out as much information as possible but increase its signal-to-noise 
ratio (i.e. clarity) to the extent that this is higher (clearer) than information possessed by private 
agents.  
A final but relatively unexplored argument for observing clarity and tone within central 
bank communication arises from what Blinder (2004) defines as the ‘cacophony problem’. He 
argued that when monetary policy decisions are taken by a group of people, often in a 
committee, rather than by an individual, there is the danger that too many dissimilar voices 
might confuse the public. In such a scenario, the public will look to the overall tone and clarity 
of the joint communication rather than trying to decipher what each member of the committee 
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is saying. Blinder et al. (2008) argue that if there is too much disparate communication from 
members of a monetary policy committee, such uncoordinated communication may lower the 
signal-to-noise ratio. This argument is a fundamental motivation for our approach to evaluating 
the overall clarity and tone of communications such as MPC minutes and inflation reports. 
Despite the foregoing, there is still a dearth in the literature about the role that clarity plays in 
transparency as well as in overall monetary policy and our study seeks to contribute to the 
literature in this area. 
Although there is no generally accepted measure of clarity within the literature, Blinder 
(2009) argues that most measures of clarity used suggest that clearer communications 
presumably have a higher signal-to-noise ratio but his work does not quantitatively capture 
this. Using inflation reports from 19 inflation-targeting central banks, Fracasso et al. (2003), 
using three subjective measures of clarity developed by themselves, highlight that clarity of 
information was found to increase the quality of information provided in the inflation reports 
of these banks as well as the predictive information of the reports. Such increased predictive 
capacity of central bank communication is defined as transparency by Geraats et al. (2002).  
Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher (2009a), proposing press conferences as a clarification tool, 
found that press conferences by the ECB provided substantial additional information to 
financial markets beyond those provided by monetary policy communication. They found that 
press conferences on average had larger effects on asset prices than the corresponding monetary 
policy communication and also led to less volatility in the markets, therefore providing more 
signal-to-noise ratio.  
Other studies have used readability statistics similar to those used in this study to 
capture clarity. Jansen (2011a) uses the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level and the Flesch-Kincaid 
Reading Ease to compare the clarity of congressional testimonies for Greenspan and Volcker 
and found significant differences in clarity in their tenures as Fed chairman. Furthermore, 
Jansen (2011b) using the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level highlighted that volatility in financial 
markets is reduced by increased clarity of the Humphrey-Hawkings testimonies by Fed 
chairmen. In this study, we rely on the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level to measure the clarity of 
MPC minutes and inflation reports in our analyses. Details of our approach are highlighted in 
the methodology section of our work. 
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2.6 Central bank communication: empirical evidence and cross-country variation 
The impact of central bank communication on the financial markets and 
macroeconomic environment has been widely debated with mixed results in the empirical 
literature. Although the notion that transparency should be good for the financial and 
macroeconomic environment seems logical, studies such as those by Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1986), Cukierman (2011), Geraats (2007) and Rhee and Turdaliev (2013) have argued that 
opaque regimes have benefits that outweigh transparent regimes. Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1986) argue that ambiguous scenarios allow central banks to use more ambiguous control 
procedures during periods where objectives are more uncertain. Their seminal work is largely 
based on the premise that opacity enhances monetary policy because a fully transparent 
communication policy cannot lead to surprises. They highlighted that their results present an 
explanation for the Fed’s perceived ambiguity in the years leading up to their research.  
Using the transparency index created by Geraats (2002), Christopher and Meade (2008) 
found that greater transparency in the form of frequent release of forecast increases the use of 
public information by the private sector. Their study compares central bank independence and 
central bank transparency and they found that independence and transparency have increased 
across both emerging and developed markets. Importantly, they argue that the demand for 
transparency is significantly driven by market participants in countries with a developed 
financial market. Previous work on the transparency of the ECB by Cukierman (2011) also 
seems to support this notion.  
Geraats (2007) argues that the optimal communication strategy for central banks is to 
provide transparency on the inflation target but introduce some ambiguity in the 
communication relased to the markets about the output targets and supply shocks. On the 
benefits of ambiguity to the financial markets, they argue that creating a perception of 
ambiguity has the potential to mute market volatility since markets respond more to signals 
that are perceived to be clear. In fact, this argument lends weight to the famous quote by Alan 
Greenspan about mumbling with great incoherence. However, the benefits of increased 
transparency in enhancing central bank credibility, flexibility and reputation is well 
documented within the literature (see Eijffinger et al. 2006 for a review) 
In terms of communication, the long-term goal of central banks is long-term 
predictability, a goal which underscores that members of the public develop a genuine 
understanding of the manner in which a central bank thinks and operates. As Blinder et al. 
(2008) highlight, this means that all the relevant news for financial markets will be obtained 
from the economy and not the central bank as the central bank’s reaction function is so well 
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understood. Indeed, some studies, such as that of Bernoth and Hagen (2004), have shown that 
the predictability of interest rate decisions by the major central banks have improved 
significantly in the few years leading on to their research. In analysing the predictability of 
short-term money market rates within the European Monetary Union (EMU) using the three-
month Euribor Futures rate, they found that euro money markets were able to predict short-
term rates well. Their report thus suggests that ECB communication of monetary policy has 
worked significantly well since the formulation of the EMU. It is important to note that as with 
their work, most studies have relied on short-term predictability rather than long-term and have 
used financial markets responses as a gauge. 
Most of the other literature on the effects of central bank communication on financial 
markets is captured through the monetary policy impact on financial assets and, in a somewhat 
related manner, interest rates. The seminal works of Kohn and Sack (2003), which show 
significant impacts of communication on short- to medium-term interest rates in the US as well 
as the work of Reeves and Sawicki (2007) showing the same for the UK, are discussed 
elsewhere in this literature review (see also Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007(b) and Musard-
Gies, 2006). The main financial markets often considered are the foreign exchange markets, 
the bond markets and the stock markets.  
Fratzscher (2006) argued that central bank communications on exchange rates have a 
significant contemporaneous effect on exchange rates. They found that communication reduces 
exchange rate volatility and uncertainty up to a six-month horizon and in the direction 
anticipated by the central banks. Interestingly, they also found that actual policy intervention 
tends to raise volatility and uncertainty, thereby suggesting that communication is a more 
superior policy over the medium term. Using the case of the Bank of Japan, Gnabo et al. (2009) 
also found that speaking to the markets using statements does reduce some ambiguity in the 
foreign exchange markets. However, they pointed out that oral intervention did have the 
potential to increase volatility in the exchange rate market. Using five-minute returns for spot 
euro-dollar, euro-sterling and euro-yen exchange rates, Evans and Speight (2010), found that 
interest rate decisions announced by the ECB had significant effects on all three rates.  
Similarly, using high-frequency intraday data for five countries, Rosa (2011) found that 
the surprise component of the Fed’s communication amounted for most of the explainable 
variation in the exchange rate’s response to monetary policy. They also found that volatility 
from communications was short-lived and was absorbed by the foreign exchange market within 
30 to 40 minutes of release. With specific reference to the Bank of England’s communication, 
there have been limited studies looking into this. Reeves and Sawicki (2007) explored the 
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BoE’s MPC minutes and inflation reports and found that these increased the variance of asset 
prices with the effect on the short sterling futures being most pronounced.  
A number of other studies that have focused on emerging markets have also found that 
central bank communication has a calming effect on exchange rate volatility (e.g. see Fišer and 
Horvath, 2010 and Goyal and Arora, 2012). There has also been evidence of US monetary 
policy communication impacting financial markets beyond the US. Hayo et al. (2009), using 
an E-GARCH model that explored the effects of the FOMC’s communication on European and 
Pacific markets, found that the Fed’s communication significantly impacted equity markets in 
these regions. Particularly, they found that Pacific markets reacted to US monetary policy 
communication more than European markets did. It is important to note that some other studies 
such as Conover et al. (1999) and Kim (2003) have also considered the effects of US 
macroeconomic policy news on financial markets across the world; however, these did not 
evaluate FOMC communication as a policy tool and therefore are out of the scope of our 
research. 
On the effects of central bank communication on the bond markets, de Goeij and 
Marquering (2006) analyse the effects of monetary policy announcements on the volatility of 
the one-, three-, five- and ten-year US Treasury bond returns and found that announcement 
shocks have a significant impact on the dynamics of bond market volatility. Particularly, in line 
with the expectations theory, they found that monetary policy announcements seem to affect 
short-term bond volatility. Using a more theoretical approach by modelling a high-frequency 
policy rule based on yield curve information and an arbitrate-free bond market, Piazzesi (2005) 
argues that communications from the FOMC improve the fit of the yield curve and present vital 
seasonalities around FOMC meetings. Ronaldo and Rossi (2010) use communications from the 
Swiss National Bank, encompassing monetary policy announcements, speeches and 
interviews, to analyse high-frequency movements in the Swiss currency, bonds and stock 
exchange markets. Similar to a number of studies such as those of Gurkaynak et al. (2005) and 
Kohn and Sack (2003), they also found that the bond markets are the most responsive to the 
central bank communications about monetary policy. These consensus results are not without 
reason as macroeconomic news stories are generally the main price drivers in the bond markets, 
as firm-specific news is in the stock markets. 
In relation to the stock markets, there is a rich literature on the effects of central bank 
communication and most of this focuses on the role of monetary policy surprises on the stock 
market. For the purposes of this research, however, we will focus more on the studies that 
uniquely identify communication as an alternative policy tool. Earlier studies, such as 
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Gurkaynak et al. (2005), identify the need to separate a traditional federal funds rate approach 
from a ‘communication about the future path of policy’ approach. Using a high-frequency 
event study analysis, they tested whether the federal funds rate in itself adequately captures the 
effect of monetary policy on asset prices and found that communication is also required in 
capturing the full effects of monetary policy on asset prices. Due to the increasing policy shift 
towards communications by central banks, their study further justifies the need to explore the 
role communication plays in understanding the effects of monetary policy on asset prices.  
More recent research done by Papadamou et al. (2014) argues that central bank 
communications seem to calm markets down by reducing volatility. Using a comprehensive 
database from 40 countries, they found that countries with a high level of transparency have 
less volatility in their stock markets and vice versa. As an example, Romania, Russia and 
Ukraine were found to have some of the least transparent central banks accompanied by higher 
volatility whilst the UK, Canada and New Zealand were the opposite in both transparency and 
volatility.  
Finally, among studies on the effects of transparency on macroeconomic variables, 
Chortareas et al. (2002) indicate that the disclosure of inflation forecasts reduces inflation, but 
is not necessarily associated with higher output volatility. Demertzis and Hallet (2007) found 
that greater transparency reduces inflation volatility but has a less clear effect on output 
volatility and no effects on the average level of inflation and output. The analysis of Dincer 
and Eichengreen (2007) suggests broadly that increased transparency driven by more 
communication has the tendency to reduce output variables and inflation persistence. Using the 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level, Bulir et al. (2013a) assessed the clarity of seven central banks’ 
communications from inflation reports against inflation outlook. Their study found no 
significant patterns across all central banks but they did find that in three of the cases, the 
financial crisis reduced the clarity of the communication.  
2.7 Capturing central bank communication 
Following on from the above, another significant issue is how to accurately capture 
central bank communication in a manner that allows researchers to empirically evaluate it. As 
Lucca and Trebbi (2009) identify, although there has been a significant theoretical contribution 
to the analysis of central bank communication, there remains a considerable gap in the literature 
regarding empirical research, partly because of the difficulties involved in quantitatively 
measuring central bank communication. There is no generally accepted means of capturing 
central bank communication as data and studies within the field have used a variety of methods 
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ranging from simple to very complex techniques. For the purposes of this study, we identify 
two broad –approaches: studies that have simply attempted to count the number of 
communications released by central banks, and studies that have carried out content analysis 
or textual mining of communication text. 
Given that there is a perceived linkage between transparency and the amount of 
communication a central bank releases, it makes sense that certain studies will look to the 
quantity of communication released by central banks in their analysis of transparency. Studies 
such as those of Kohn and Sack (2003) and Reeves and Sawicki (2007) are examples of 
research that simply relies on quantifying the number of communication documents released 
as a measure of central bank communication. Although the direction of such literature is usually 
only aimed at expressing the relationship between increased numbers of central bank 
communications and their impacts on financial markets and/or policy, the limitations of such 
measures are obvious.  For instance, both studies above detected that an increase in central 
bank communication increased financial market volatility; however, it is not clear from such 
findings if the desired direction of the monetary policy communication was indeed achieved 
by the communication.  
Other studies that do attempt to explore the contents of the central bank 
communications rely on subjective ratings of texts by researchers, which, according to Blinder 
et al. (2008) is similar to a narrative approach to modelling policy making (see e.g. Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher 2007a; Ferrero and Secchi, 2007).  Bholat et al. (2015) provide a detailed 
narrative of the various approaches to textual mining and broadly identify the kinds of textual 
mining techniques that are relevant to the central banking literature. The key methods 
highlighted include Boolean techniques, which use basic search functionalities to quantify text; 
the dictionary technique, which uses frequency of keywords; text weighting techniques, which 
advance dictionary methods by attributing varying weights to different words; vector space 
models, which quantify text using similarity of topics, and finally latent variable models which 
use algorithms to associate documents to certain latent variables.  
Although dictionary methods are quite common in the field of finance and accounting, 
(see Loughran and McDonald, 2016 for a survey), their use in the central banking literature is 
relatively limited. Studies within the central banking field tend to use machine learning latent 
variable techniques. For instance, Lucca and Trebbi (2009) used two classes of automated 
semantic algorithms using Google Semantic Orientation score and the Factiva semantic 
orientation score, both measuring communication by computing scores from FOMC 
statements. Ranaldo and Rossi (2010) also used Factiva scores to measure central bank 
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communication along the same lines while Schonhardt-Bailey (2013) used the Alceste software 
to capture central bank communication. All these approaches generally seek to explore 
attributable traits in communication that will help researchers classify and quantify text.  
For capturing the tone of central bank communication, our study uses Diction®, which 
is a computerised textual analysis software that uses a 10,000-word corpus to quantify text into 
five master variables. The software fits within the definition of machine learning latent variable 
techniques described above. Although widely used in the finance and accounting literature, 
Diction is now increasingly being used in central banking research. For instance, studies such 
as Graddy and Beauchamp (2014) and Born et al. (2012) have used Diction to quantify tone 
such as ‘optimism’ scores of central bank communications whilst assessing the effects of 
central bank communication on financial markets. A more detailed review of the Diction 
software is provided in other sections of this research.  
Given that we also seek to explore the clarity of communication, we borrowed a set of 
tools from computational linguistics to measure clarity in central bank communication. 
Although measuring the clarity of central bank communication is relatively new within the 
central bank communication literature, readability statistics have generally been found to 
contain useful signals for readers interested in assessing public documents. Using Flesch-
Kincaid Reading Ease scores for a group of 120 annual reports from Hong Kong companies, 
Courtis (1998) found lower readability is often associated with bad news and high press 
coverage. Using the Fog index on a sample of over 50,000 firm years, Li (2008) found that 
companies that have lower persistent earnings had more complex annual reports whilst the 
annual reports of companies with higher persistent earning were easier to read. Using the Fog 
index, Biddle et al. (2009) found that firms with better clarity in their financial reporting deviate 
less from predicted investment levels and show less sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions, 
a notion which this research seems to share to an extent.  
Some other similar studies, such as De Franco et al. (2013), have explored the informational 
quality of clearly readable financial reports. Using an extensive database of 356,463 sell-side 
analyst reports, they found that clearer financial reports were associated with a significantly 
higher trading volume around a three-day window. The analyses within these studies are 
similar to those we propose in our study of central bank communication, and these present us 
with a credible background to our analysis of central bank communication. 
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2.8 Optimism and uncertainty in central bank communication 
If we assume that central banks are truly transparent and would openly communicate 
their policy intentions through the various communication channels, then assessing policy 
communication would be the most effective way of determining central banks’ intentions. 
However, in assessing policy communication, relatively few studies have focused on the 
contents of communications while others focus on the occurrence of communication. In this 
research, we argue that complexity of communication and the tone of communication are 
important precursors to transparency and we therefore seek to evaluate these as a basic 
framework for exploring the sentiments expressed via central bank communications. If 
expectations are to be driven by the way in which central banks perceive developments in the 
economy, there is indeed the need to explore the sentiments captured by the public via central 
bank communication. For instance, there is a belief in the financial press that when central 
banks are optimistic about the state of the economy, there may be a rate rise on the horizon, as 
has been demonstrated by responses to some of the comments by central bank governors lately. 
Therefore, understanding the dynamics of optimism in response to the macroeconomic 
environment may be important.  
This idea is also important where central banks, such as the BoE, communicate via a 
policy committee that may be subject to the ‘cacophony problem’ as identified by Blinder et 
al. (2008). Therefore, individual voices may not give a clear picture of the direction of 
communication, but the tone of the collective communication can be captured. This study 
therefore seeks to use the novel techniques of computational linguistics to measure dimensions 
of optimism and uncertainty in central bank communications in a bid to parse the sentiments 
of central banks.  
Optimism in central bank communication is an integral part of the central bank 
transparency literature. According to van der Cruijsen and Eiffenger (2010), perceptions of the 
transparency of central banks are highly influenced by individual characters, certain 
psychological processes and the fact that market participants have imperfect knowledge. They 
argue that the extent to which markets are optimistic matters in the formation of transparency 
expectations. It is frequently argued in central bank communication literature that financial 
markets look up to the central banks for information because they believe that central banks 
have superior information about the state of the economy. Studies such as Effinger and 
Tesfaselassie (2007) point out that central bank forecasts consistently outperform those of the 
private sector whilst Romer and Romer (2000) found that the Federal Reserve does indeed 
possess private information about the future state of the economy that markets are not aware 
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of. The implication is that market participants will seek to observe attributes in central bank 
communication that will then be factored into their own decision making.  
One of the key attributes that market participants look out for in trying to decipher 
central bank communications, and one which has been very popular with researchers, is the 
level of optimism in the communications. Whilst researching components that feed into central 
banks’ perceived transparency, van der Cruijsen and Eiffenger (2010), using their constructed 
transparency knowledge index, found that respondents who perceived the central banks to be 
more optimistic also perceived them to be more transparent; which would imply that such 
central banks are more effective, according to central bank transparency literature.  
Other studies that try to evaluate the effects of central banks’ communication on 
financial markets often evaluate these by measuring optimism in central bank communications. 
An example of such a study is Born et al. (2014), who found that financial markets respond to 
central bank communications through an analysis of optimism or otherwise in central bank 
communication. Their study uses Diction, the same computerised software used in this study, 
to measure optimism in Financial Stability Reports (FSRs) and interviews released by seven 
central banks. They then subsequently evaluated the effect of optimism on financial markets.  
Furthermore, an alternative body of literature exists along the lines of behavioural 
finance, which argues that participants in financial markets are not always rational but also 
seek clues from their surroundings when making financial decisions. Wang (2001) argues that 
non-rational investors would often be influenced by investor sentiments that stem from how 
optimistic they are about the financial market and information coming through. As central 
banks are an essential source of information for financial market participants, it would be 
expected that market participants would therefore be looking to decipher optimism or 
pessimism from central bank communications. In a zero low bound environment in particular, 
the financial press often seeks to parse the level of optimism of the central bank as a measure 
of the likelihood of an interest rate rise. These rationales are motivation for analysing perceived 
optimism in central bank communication as one of our observed dimensions of communication. 
Uncertainty in macroeconomic policy literature, on the other hand, is a very ambiguous 
concept and has been captured in various ways over the past decades. Friedman (1968), in his 
work on the role of monetary policy, was one of the first authors to highlight the immense role 
uncertainty plays in the setting of monetary policies. Bernanke (1980) argued that uncertainty 
is central to economic policy because it is seen to retard investments, independently of the 
common considerations of risks or expected returns. Beyond these initial papers, several 
studies, such as Rodrik (1991), have sought to highlight various issues relating to measuring 
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uncertainty as well as its impact on the various facets of the economy. Similar to Gruner (2002), 
we make the distinction here between uncertainty coming from the central bank regarding its 
objectives and inflation uncertainty, which is brought about by a combination of actions by 
macroeconomic players. To this end, we focus our analysis on capturing uncertainty from the 
BoE’s communication of its objectives.  
Blinder et al. (2008) highlight that uncertainty is a vital part of central bank 
communication that has received scant attention in the past. They argue that uncertainty can 
arise in various forms; first is the scenario where different members of monetary policy 
committees say different things. Along these lines, some studies such as Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2007c) have found that inconsistent voices within monetary policy communication 
have led to less predictability of policy decisions within short- and medium-term horizons. 
Second and similar to this idea is the argument that disparate voting records may signal 
uncertainty of a central bank’s monetary policy direction. Gerlach-Kristen (2004) found that 
voting records of the BoE’s MPC members helped predict future monetary policy changes and 
that minority votes carried much more information than did votes in favour of the majority. 
Although no objective measure of uncertainty exists, many parts of the finance-related 
literature associate uncertainty with conditional volatility, mainly of observable outputs. Juardo 
et al. (2014) identify that the main measures of uncertainty have relied on proxies or indicators 
such as: implied or realised volatility of stock market returns; the cross-sectional dispersal of 
firm profits, stock returns or productivity; the cross-sectional dispersal of subjective (survey-
based) forecasts, or the appearance of specific ‘uncertainty-related’ key words in news 
publications. The limitations in the use of some of the above measures are often intuitive and 
some have been argued to be an inconsistent measure of uncertainty based on research findings. 
For instance, Juardo et al. (2014) argue that implied volatility of stock market returns can 
change over time even if there is no change in uncertainty about economic fundamentals.  
Of all the measures, survey-based approaches and fan charts have become very popular 
over the past few years and one can argue that the use of surveys that draw expectations about 
future economic outcomes in the form of subjective probability distributions (called density 
forecasts) may provide more substantial measures of uncertainty. Such surveys as the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters (SPF) in the US and the Bank of England’s Survey of External 
Forecasters (SEF) are widely used as a measure of uncertainty (e.g. see Lahiri and Sheng; 
Boero et al. 2008; Giodarni and Soderlind, 2002). Although such density functions are often 
perceived as an accurate measure of uncertainty, studies such as Giodarni and Soderlind (2002) 
have questioned the accuracy of such methods. They identified the three main methodologies 
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in this approach as disagreement among forecasters, average individual forecast error variance 
(or standard deviation) and the variance of the SPF’s histogram (similar to the now SEF 
approach). Using a multivariate normal distribution function, they found that disagreement is 
a better proxy of uncertainty and that forecasters generally underestimate uncertainty.  
Studies such as Lahiri and Sheng (2008) also find evidence to support the superiority 
of disagreement in SPF forecasts as a measure of uncertainty but extend the argument by stating 
that in addition to disagreement, uncertainty also contains a component of the variance of future 
aggregate shocks that accumulate over the horizons. They further proposed the use of GARCH 
type models to estimate the ex-ante variability of aggregate shocks as a component of aggregate 
uncertainty. 
In much earlier literature, where standard forecast data and the internet were 
unavailable, econometric approaches were most often used to capture uncertainty and the 
proxies used in these methodologies are, of course, as diverse as the methodologies themselves. 
Earlier works by Bernanke (1980) define uncertainty with respect to a delay in making 
investment decisions and capture uncertainty using a vector model that gives the excess of net 
return over the value of ‘waiting to invest’ in various information states. He argued that the 
reduction in the likelihood of investment in a period is what is meant by ‘investor uncertainty’ 
and this depends to a large extent on the expectations of both very good and bad news.  
Another popular body of economic literature that attempts to measure uncertainty does 
so in relation to inflation, output and unemployment. Several of these studies use the well-
documented methodologies that rely on the rational expectations paradigm and the 
expectations-augmented Philips curve and then focus on modelling the uncertainty surrounding 
the expectations. Bomberger (1996) summarises that the measure of uncertainty in these 
approaches is often based on ARCH models which are a natural extension of the rational 
expectations models. He stated that the estimated conditional variance at each date is assumed 
to reflect the uncertainty of a representative forecaster. Similarly, some studies have attempted 
to measure uncertainty as they relate to units within macroeconomic policy. For instance, 
Giodarni and Soderlind (2002) evaluated uncertainty within macroeconomic policy with 
specific emphasis on inflation and real GDP growth uncertainty. Boero et al. (2008) also 
identified that density functions are sometimes used at a micro level requiring a large-scale 
sample survey of households and firms; however, as this study is concerned with uncertainty 
at the macro level, we discount this approach. 
Although capturing uncertainty using the foregoing empirical econometric time series 
analysis may present robust measures for uncertainty, there are certain limitations that 
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potentially make the use of alternative methods such as those proposed in this study superior. 
For instance, time series methods are significantly constrained when there is a substantial 
structural break within the series which will thus be a major constraint given the occurrences 
during the recent financial crises. In a different example, Giordani and Soderlind (2003) argued 
that the presence of target setting, such as inflation targets, creates a structural break within 
time series used for measuring uncertainty and thus renders time series models an inadequate 
measure in such an instance. There are also issues such as the disagreement in the literature as 
to which time series model best captures uncertainty and the need for actual economic agents 
to be involved in capturing what they perceive to be uncertainty. 
With increased openness in policy makers’ communication about the course of their 
future actions over the past few years, a new literature immersed in measuring policy 
uncertainty through communication channels has evolved. These studies often use dictionary 
methods that evaluate central bank communications and attempt to highlight frequencies of 
uncertainty-related words or phrases. One prominent example of such studies is the work of 
Baker et al. (2013) which developed a new measure of economic policy uncertainty (EPU), 
known as the EPU index, and was based on three components, one of which was the frequency 
of newspaper references to economic policy uncertainty. The other two components focused 
on disagreement on forecasts of future inflation and government purchases, and the number of 
US federal tax code provisions set to expire.  
This first component of the EPU is similar to the approach being proposed to measure 
uncertainty in this study; however, some of the limitations in using the EPU index are projected 
to be transcended.  First, the EPU component that tries to measure uncertainty from newspapers 
uses both automated and subjective measures that may limit the capture of uncertainty. The 
process involves searching for a limited corpus of words which are perceived to relate to 
uncertainty in a number of national newspapers and then drawing up an index based on the 
frequency of search results. The limitation is obvious as the corpus, which is often subjectively 
selected, will most likely be unable to capture all statements relating to uncertainty. This is true 
of most dictionary type approaches both in terms of the ability to capture the scope and also 
the semantics of statements relating to policy uncertainty.  Our study attempts to address this 
in a specific way, by focusing only on macroeconomic policy statements released by central 
banks and aimed at the public. This study also takes this methodology further by using Diction, 
a computerised analysis that not only recognises frequency of associated words but also uses a 
database consisting of 50,000 previously analysed texts to detect tone and semantics within 
text.  
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2.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to review the extant literature on the various aspects of central bank 
communication that are relevant to our study. In the first instance the chapter provides a brief 
introduction to central bank communication by exploring how the literature on central bank 
communication has evolved from the basic tenets of traditional macroeconomic policy using 
conventional policy tools such as interest rates to more modern inflation targeting-regimes that 
focus heavily on communication. Given that the focus of this study is on the Bank of England 
and also given the growing relevance of inflation targeting at the Bank, the chapter then goes 
on to detail the evolution of the Bank of England through its inception to its independence. 
Following on from this, the chapter goes on to explore the literature on central bank 
communication as a policy tool and the importance of evaluating central bank communication 
which our work seeks to carry out. In understanding the importance of central bank 
communication, how communication reaches its intended users should be also considered and 
therefore the literature on the mechanisms via which central bank communication can be 
transmitted by intermediaries was reviewed.   
Integral to our core research question is the role that complexity and tone play in the 
transparency of central bank communication, therefore this chapter goes on review the 
literature on central bank transparency including empirical, theoretical and cross-country 
evidence on central bank transparency. A brief review of the existing methods of capturing 
central bank communication is included; however, these are explored in more detail in chapter 
three below. Finally, the chapter reviews existing literature that helps shed some more light on 
the linkage between transparency and the clarity and tone of communication whilst also 
individually exploring the literature around these dimensions of communication.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0 DATA ON CLARITY AND TONE – READABILITY STATISTICS AND THE 
DICTION SOFTWARE 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the derivation of the data used in our study particularly 
those that relate to our measures of clarity and tone. Given that these measures are derived 
using formulaic approaches which may not necessarily capture the exact spirit of the 
communication made, it is important to highlight the potential weaknesses of these methods of 
quantifying communication. First, we will highlight the method used in deriving the Flesch-
Kincaid score, which is the preferred measure of complexity used in evaluating central bank 
communication within our work and in the literature. We then go on to compare this with other 
measures of clarity for robustness. Secondly, we will detail the process of quantifying the tone 
of communication by exploring the Diction software in some detail. Finally, this section will 
look to highlight the procedure used in the processing of the text used in our various analyses. 
 
3.1.1  Quantifying the complexity of central bank communication: readability statistics 
The need to explore clarity of communication is a relatively new concept within the 
central banking literature, hence very limited studies to date have explored this concept in 
detail. The main question is often how to define clarity of communication within the central 
banking context and some of the various attempts to do so are described in our literature review 
above. One of the earlier studies that assessed the clarity of central bank communication was 
the work of Fracasso et al. (2003), which used a survey of central bankers to assess the clarity 
of individual central banks’ communication on a scale of 1 to 10. The obvious limitation of this 
approach is that it a subjective and the level of clarity would thus be determined by the 
intellectual capabilities of the sample surveyed and not by an objective measure, although one 
could argue that this is a useful approach if the right sample population was surveyed. 
Subsequent works that asses the clarity of central bank communications, such as Jansen 
(2011a) and Bulir et al. (2013), have relied on more objective measures of text complexity that 
use readability statistics. Similar measures of complexity using readability scores have been 
widely used in other subject areas such as the complexity of financial statements in accounting 
(Clatworthy and Jones, 2001), clarity of medical information brochures (Freda 2005) and in 
educational research related to student progress (Betts et al. 2009), to mention a few.  
58 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
In simple terms, readability is defined as the characteristics of a corpus of texts that 
make it easier to read than others. It is important to stress that the level of clarity derived from 
the BoE’s communication in our study mainly highlights the writing style in the 
communication in terms of whether it is clearly written or otherwise. Klare (1976) defines 
readability as captured by readability statistics as ‘the ease of understanding or comprehension 
due to the style of writing’. These definitions clearly highlight that writing style can be distinct 
from issues such as context and coherence. Furthermore, as highlighted by Hargis et al. (1998), 
the ‘ease of reading words and sentences’, as calculated by readability statistics, is in a greater 
sense merely an attribute of clarity and does not wholly imply clarity. To this end, our use of 
readability statistics as a yardstick of clarity is limited to attributes such as complexity, writing 
style and structure of communication. 
To better understand how readability scores can help capture a text’s complexity, 
consider the classic example in table 3.1 below by Duffy and Kabance (1981) of two texts, one 
which has been derived from the other in a bid to adapt it to a lower readability score (i.e. less 
complex text). 
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Table 3.1: Comparison of sample texts with varying degrees of readability (Duffy and 
Kabance, 1981) 
Sample–A - Flesch-Kincaid Score: 11 Sample–B - Flesch-Kincaid Score: 5 
The night was cloudy, and a drizzling rain, 
which fell without intermission, added to the 
obscurity. Steadily, and as noiselessly as 
possible, the Spaniards made their way along 
the main street, which had so lately 
resounded to the tumult of battle. All was 
now hushed in silence; they were only 
reminded of the past by the occasional 
presence of some solitary corpse, or a dark 
heap of the slain, which too plainly told 
where the strife had been the hottest. As they 
passed along the lanes and alleys which 
opened into the great street, they easily 
fancied they discerned the shadowy forms of 
their foe lurking in ambush, ready to spring 
upon them. But it was only fancy; the city 
slept undisturbed even by the prolonged 
echoes of the tramp of the horses, and the 
hoarse rumbling of the artillery and baggage 
trains. At length, a lighter space beyond the 
dusky line of buildings showed the van of the 
army that it was emerging on an open 
causeway. They might well have 
congratulated themselves on having thus 
escaped the dangers of an assault in the city 
itself, and that a brief time would place them 
in comparative safety on the opposite shore. 
The night was cloudy. A sprinkling rain 
added to the darkness. It fell without a break. 
The Spaniards made their way along the 
main street. They moved without stopping 
and with as little noise as possible. The street 
had so recently roared to the noise of battle. 
All was now hushed in silence. The presence 
of a single dead body reminded them of the 
past. A dark heap of the slain also reminded 
them. Clearly, the battle had been worse 
there. They passed along the lanes and alleys 
opening into the great street. They easily 
fancied the shadows of their enemy lying in 
wait. The enemy looked ready to spring upon 
them. But it was only fancy. The city slept 
without being bothered by the rough 
rumbling of the cannons and baggage trains. 
Even the constant sound of the tramp of 
horses did not bother the city. At length, 
there was a bright space beyond the dark line 
of the buildings. This informed the army 
look-out of their coming out onto the open 
highway. They might well have rejoiced. 
They had thus escaped the dangers of an 
attack in the city itself. A brief time would 
place them in greater safety on the opposite 
shore. 
 
As can be observed, sample B, in a bid to improve the clarity of sample A, uses 
relatively shorter words and sentences which then makes it easier to read for individuals with 
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lower reading capabilities. This comparison shows how reducing word length and sentences 
can help improve the clarity of a text and highlights what readability scores aim to capture. 
It should be highlighted that when it comes to readability of central bank 
communications, individuals that should benefit from central bank communications (e.g. 
market analysts) are expected to be highly cognitive and as such should not be affected 
significantly by the readability of published communication. There is nonetheless an argument 
for evaluating the readability of texts irrespective of the intellectual capacity of the reader. This 
argument is in line with the debate in the literature as to whether prior knowledge, interest and 
retention matter when evaluating readability scores. The works of Klare et al. (1985) addressed 
this through an experiment with 989 US Airforce enlistees that simplified the writing style of 
documents (i.e. lower Flesh Kincaid Scores) but retained the technical elements and ensured 
the contents also remained the same. They found evidence that more readable versions resulted 
in greater and more complete retention, greater amount of reading covered in limited time and 
greater acceptance of the material. The evidence above therefore suggests that even with prior 
knowledge and higher cognitive abilities, more statistically readable versions of central bank 
communication provides clearer information for market participants.   
For central bank communication, readability scores are expected to be higher (i.e. more 
complex) than the example in table 3.1 above. Indeed, the lowest readability scores of most of 
the communications explored in our study are in the region of 11 years of formal education and 
the average is about 14 years of formal education. Consider the example in table 3.2 below of 
the lowest and the highest readability scores from the decision making section of a sample of 
MPC minutes. 
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Table 3.2: Comparison of sample MPC decision texts with varying degrees of readability 
Scenario A – Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level: 
11.1 
Scenario B – Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level: 
17.8 
The Committee considered the arguments for 
keeping the repo rate unchanged at 4.75%, to 
which different members gave different 
weights. The August Inflation Report central 
projection, based on the market yield curve, 
had been for CPI inflation to remain below 
the target for the immediate future, picking 
up steadily to meet the target around the two-
year point. The 25 basis points increase in the 
repo rate in August reflected a movement at 
least as fast as that implied by the market rate 
curve on which the August projections had 
been based and the news about economic 
activity was, on balance, slightly weaker on 
the month. Medium-term inflation 
expectations appeared to remain well 
anchored to the target. So there was no case 
for a further rise in rates at this meeting. 
 
Some members also considered arguments 
for raising the repo rate by 25 basis points. 
The economy was, most probably, set to 
continue to grow at or above trend, and so to 
put gathering pressures on supply with little 
or no remaining spare capacity. Inflationary 
pressures would have been increased by a 
lower exchange rate and a shift down in the 
money market yield curve. If the lower level 
of market yields persisted, this might 
rekindle unwelcome strength in the 
household sector. Taken as a whole, the 
Committee did not find these arguments 
sufficient to justify a rise in the repo rate. 
 
September 2004 
In the current exceptional circumstances, the 
Committee agreed that explicit forward 
guidance should be adopted. It provided a 
way to make the existing monetary stimulus 
more effective by conditioning its 
expectations of the future path of Bank Rate 
on a better understanding of the Committee’s 
reaction function, and thereby should reduce 
the risk of an unwarranted rise in market 
interest rates that prematurely tightened 
financial conditions. All members agreed 
that, while it was in place, forward guidance 
should provide the framework and context 
for future monetary policy discussions. 
 
Most members continued to believe that 
further monetary stimulus in the form of 
asset purchases was not appropriate at the 
current juncture; and that the onus on 
monetary policy was to reinforce the 
recovery by ensuring that stimulus was not 
withdrawn prematurely. These members did 
not rule out more asset purchases should they 
judge that more stimulus was subsequently 
required, but there remained a range of views 
as to the benefits of further asset purchases 
relative to their potential costs in terms of 
complicating the transition to a more normal 
monetary policy stance at some point in the 
future. For other members, the case for 
further monetary stimulus remained as 
compelling as in July. But for them, there 
was merit in first supporting the 
implementation of forward guidance and 
waiting to gauge its impact, in particular on 
financial market prices, before reconsidering 
an increase in the Committee’s programme 
of asset purchases. 
 
August 2013 
 
The above examples highlight two different scenarios, scenario A in which, although 
there were significant considerations for a rate change, the bank is clear about holding the rate 
at the current level and scenario B, in which the policy decision is relatively more ambiguous 
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and dependent on a number of analytical outcomes, as with most forward guidance decisions. 
The complexity of the situations is not only observed in the sentence above but also in the 
complexity of the communication in statistical terms.  
Table 3.3 below compares attributes of both texts based on how long the sentences are 
and how many ‘bigger’ words are used in each scenario. 
 
Table 3.3: Comparative analysis of sample text attributes 
 Scenario A Scenario B 
Total number of words 234 239 
Average number of words 
per sentence 
21 30 
Percent of 3+ syllables in text 15% 22% 
Total # of words with 3+ 
syllables: 
35 53 
Examples of words with 3+ 
syllables in text (Considered 
‘harder’ words) 
Committee | considered | 
arguments | different | 
different | Inflation | 
projection | inflation | 
immediate | steadily | 
reflected | movement | 
projections | economic | 
activity | medium | inflation | 
expectations | considered | 
arguments | economy | 
probably | continue | 
gathering | remaining | 
capacity. | inflationary | 
persisted | rekindle | 
unwelcome | household | 
Committee | arguments | 
sufficient | justify   
 
exceptional | circumstances | 
Committee | explicit | 
adopted. | provided | existing 
| monetary | stimulus | 
effective | conditioning | 
expectations | understanding 
| Committee’s | thereby | 
unwarranted | interest | 
prematurely | financial | 
conditions. | framework | 
monetary | policy | 
discussions. | continued | 
monetary | stimulus | 
appropriate | monetary | 
policy | recovery | ensuring | 
stimulus | prematurely. | 
stimulus | subsequently | 
benefits | relative | potential | 
complicating | transition | 
monetary | policy | monetary 
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| stimulus | compelling | 
supporting | implementation | 
particular | financial | 
reconsidering | Committee’s | 
programme | 
 
 
A further analysis of the texts’ attributes in table 3.3 above highlights that although both 
scenarios use approximately the same number of words to communicate, scenario B has 
attributes that make it more difficult to read. Specifically, scenario B contains more words per 
sentence as well as more words with three or more syllables, which may make it more complex 
to read. It is these surface attributes of text complexity that readability scores aim to capture 
and details of how this is done are further described below. 
 
3.1.2 The Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level 
By far the most popular measures of clarity using readability statistics are the Flesch 
Reading Ease score and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level. The Flesh Reading Ease formula was 
developed by Rudolf Flesch in 1948 and it predicts Reading Ease on a scale of 1 to 100 with 
scores around 30 implying very difficult text and scores around 70 being regarded as easy. The 
formula uses a combination of two main variables to help calculate a Reading Ease score, 
namely, the number of sentences per 100 words and number of syllables per 100 words.  
 
The formula for the Flesch Reading Ease score is given as: 
 
FR = 206.835 – (1.015 x ASL) – (84.6 x ASW)    … (3.1) 
 
Where: 
FR = Flesch Reading Ease score on a scale of 0 (difficult) to 100 (easy), with 30 = very difficult 
and 70 = suitable for adult audiences. 
ASL = average sentence length (the number of words divided by the number of sentences). 
ASW = average number of syllables per word (the number of syllables divided by the number 
of words). 
The Flesch Reading Ease statistic became popular in the 1960s due to its deemed 
effectiveness in capturing literacy levels in the United States. However, some modifications 
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were proposed to make it easier to interpret and hence the development of the similar metric 
known as the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level. 
In 1976, the Flesch Reading Ease score was modified by a study commissioned by the 
US Navy so that a Grade Level score that allows for easy comparison is developed. The new 
readability score was called the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level and was also found to provide a 
truer reflection of readability when used in an experiment that incorporated 531 US Navy 
personnel.  
 
The Flesch-Kincaid (FK) Grade Level (GL) is calculated as: 
 
GL = (.39 x ASL) + (11.8 x ASW) – 15.59      … (3.2) 
Where: 
ASL = average sentence length (the number of words divided by the number of sentences). 
ASW = average number of syllables per word (the total number syllables in the sample divided 
by the number of words). 
DuBay (2004) highlights that the Flesch readability scores transformed general 
readability rules across different industries particularly in the print media where Rudolf Flesch 
and Roberg Gunning helped to bring down the readability of front-page news stories (working 
with the Associated Press) from 16th to 11th Grade Level, where they claim it remains. He 
highlights that the development of the Flesch and Gunning formulae marked the end of the first 
30 years of classic readability studies and brought the issue of readability to public attention. 
Their works also helped stimulate new studies that aided new demands for communication in 
plain simple language These have also been the metrics used in foregoing research on central 
bank communication such as Jensen 2011 and Bulir et al. (2013). 
In addition to the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level, which we primarily used in this study, 
our study also calculates readability scores using other widely used readability statistics such 
as the Gunning Fog score, the Coleman-Liau Index, the SMOG Index and the Automated 
Readability Index. We use a subscription-based paid web application called ‘Readable’ to 
automatically calculate the readability scores using the formula above. We found all the 
readability scores to be highly correlated and thus our work only employed the most widely 
used Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level statistics. As the other listed readability statistics are not 
central to our work, we do not go into further detail about how these are calculated; however, 
we depict the trend from these readability statistics along with our core readability statistics 
used in figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1: Graph depicting the similar patterns of all readability scores explored 
 
 
It is important to note that although the graphs show a little variation due, the slight 
variations present in the readability statistics are quite significant. For instance, a variation of 
1 point with the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level actually depicts that an additional year of 
education will be required to comprehend a text and this is indeed significant. When analysed 
in conjunction with other variables, these slight variations also provide further information on 
the effects of clarity on our variables of interest. For better clarity, the Flesch-Kincaid Grade 
Level is plotted on its own in the graph below with clearer variations in the data point. Figures 
3.2 and 3.3 below show the variations in the FK score for our two main central bank 
communication documents explored – minutes of the monetary policy committee meeting and 
Inflation Reports.  Further analysis of the variation in the trend of these are explored in the next 
chapter. 
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Figure 3.2: Graphical depiction of the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for MPC Minutes 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Graphical Depiction of Optimism Scores for Inflation Reports  
 
 
 
3.1.3  Limitations of readability statistics 
Given that readability statistics have been around since the 1920s, their validity has 
been questioned over the past decades, particularly during the period in the 1960s described as 
the ‘plain language movement’ which resulted in legislation around the world requiring that 
public and commercial documents use plain language. As a result, the demise of readability 
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statistics was suggested by a number of scholars (see DuBay, 2004). There were subsequently 
a number of tailored ‘usability’ tests introduced to capture the quality of communication; 
however, these gained little traction and failed to provide the objectivity that readability 
statistics have. Similarly, text levelling, an approach whereby a subjective analysis of reading 
is done via evaluating vocabulary, length, content, format and curriculum, also failed to provide 
consistent and objective measures of clarity. The prevailing advantage of using readability 
statistics as a measure of clarity lies in its objectivity and in the idea that measures of clarity 
are representative of the characteristics of the underlying text. 
Although it is widely accepted that the main benefit of using readability statistics as a 
measure of clarity lies in its objective nature, there are a number of limitations to their use that 
should be highlighted. The most obvious limitation of readability statistics lies in the fact that 
the subjects reading the communication are best placed to determine what is deemed complex 
or unclear. Along these lines, it is often highlighted that interest in the subject matter and prior 
knowledge go a long way in improving cognitive ability on a subject. Given that the audience 
that closely monitors central bank communication is often very well educated, it is important 
to note that they may not necessarily find very complex language to be unclear,– although less 
complexity has been found to be always helpful, as highlighted above.  
A further disadvantage lies in the statistical limitations of the readability formulae. 
Several of the readability formulae require a certain minimum number of words and/or 
sentences to be analysed to be able to achieve statistically significant results. For instance, the 
SMOG index can only calculate readability scores for texts with more than 30 sentences while 
the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease has been suggested to only estimate readability scores 
effectively if the text contains six or more sentences. 
Despite these limitations, the use of readability software as a measure of clarity has 
survived the past 80 years of research in the area of effective communication. As DuBay (2004) 
highlights, the use of these readability statistics show the skeleton of the text and it is from this 
that other contexts such as content, coherence and tone can then be fleshed out. They conclude 
their review of the use of readability software by suggesting that any approach to effective 
communication that ignores the important considerations of readability statistics cannot claim 
to be scientific.  
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3.1.4   Some practical comparisons of text complexity 
To highlight how readability statistics can capture the varying complexity of text, we 
further examine a number of text samples from MPC minutes in table 3.4 that depict this 
variability. We note that generally in the months where policy actions are clearer, the 
complexity of the text used is often lower as well. However, we notice that when policy 
decisions are somewhat ambiguous, as in the months where forward guidance is being used 
(e.g. August 2013), or where committee members have opposing views on the direction of 
policy (e.g. May 2006), more complex communication tends to be used.  
 
Table 3.4: Comparison of MPC decision texts with varying degrees of readability 
Less complex text FK 
Score 
More complex text FK 
Score 
Although it could do little to alter the path of 
inflation in the near term, the Committee could, by 
raising Bank Rate this month, send a strong signal 
that it was focused on inflation and remained 
determined to bring it back to target in the medium 
term. There was a risk that medium-term inflation 
expectations might move significantly away from the 
target. If that were to happen, a more pronounced 
slowing in activity would be needed to bring 
inflation back to target.  
 
However, there were also a number of arguments 
for maintaining Bank Rate at 5.0% this month. The 
Committee had previously signaled that a margin of 
spare capacity would be required to reduce the risk 
of medium-term inflation expectations rising. The 
upside news on inflation during the month had 
made it necessary to have more spare capacity. But 
there had been downside news on economic activity 
during the month too, so it was possible that a 
higher level of Bank Rate would not be needed in 
order to generate that. An increase in Bank Rate in 
the current circumstances, when confidence was low 
and the financial sector fragile, could impart a 
downward momentum to the economy that risked a 
significant undershoot of inflation in the medium 
term. Keeping Bank Rate at 5.0% when the economy 
was slowing was arguably already sending a strong 
signal of the MPC’s commitment to reducing 
inflation. A rate change this month would be a 
surprise at a time when credit and other financial 
markets remained fragile, and any change in rates 
would be better communicated alongside the Bank’s 
August Inflation Report.  
 
July 2008 
11.6 In the current exceptional circumstances, 
the Committee agreed that explicit forward 
guidance should be adopted. It provided a 
way to make the existing monetary 
stimulus more effective by conditioning 
age’ts' expectations of the future path of 
Bank Rate on a better understanding of the 
Commit’ee's reaction function, and thereby 
should reduce the risk of an unwarranted 
rise in market interest rates that 
prematurely tightened financial conditions. 
All members agreed that, while it was in 
place, forward guidance should provide the 
framework and context for future monetary 
policy discussions. 
 
 
Most members continued to believe that 
further monetary stimulus in the form of 
asset purchases was not appropriate at the 
current juncture; and that the onus on 
monetary policy was to reinforce the 
recovery by ensuring that stimulus was not 
withdrawn prematurely. These members 
did not rule out more asset purchases 
should they judge that more stimulus was 
subsequently required, but there remained 
a range of views as to the benefits of further 
asset purchases relative to their potential 
costs in terms of complicating the transition 
to a more normal monetary policy stance at 
some point in the future. For other 
members, the case for further monetary 
stimulus remained as compelling as in July. 
But for them, there was merit in first 
supporting the implementation of forward 
guidance and waiting to gauge its impact, in 
particular on financial market prices, before 
reconsidering an increase in the 
Commit’ee's programme of asset purchases. 
 
August 2013 
17.8 
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The Committee considered the arguments for 
keeping the repo rate unchanged at 4.75%, to which 
different members gave different weights. The 
August Inflation Report central projection, based on 
the market yield curve, had been for CPI inflation to 
remain below the target for the immediate future, 
picking up steadily to meet the target around the 
two-year point. The 25 basis points increase in the 
repo rate in August reflected a movement at least as 
fast as that implied by the market rate curve on 
which the August projections had been based and 
the news about economic activity was, on balance, 
slightly weaker on the month. Medium-term 
inflation expectations appeared to remain well 
anchored to the target. So there was no case for a 
further rise in rates at this meeting. 
 
Some members also considered arguments for 
raising the repo rate by 25 basis points. The 
economy was, most probably, set to continue to 
grow at or above trend, and so to put gathering 
pressures on supply with little or no remaining 
spare capacity. Inflationary pressures would have 
been increased by a lower exchange rate and a shift 
down in the money market yield curve. If the lower 
level of market yields persisted, this might rekindle 
unwelcome strength in the household sector. Taken 
as a whole, the Committee did not find these 
arguments sufficient to justify a rise in the repo rate. 
September 2004 
11.1
3 
Different Committee members attached 
differing weights to the above arguments. 
Most members, however, felt that the risks 
to the central projection for UK GDP growth 
were broadly balanced in aggregate, with 
upside risks to the projections for 
investment and exports and downside risks 
for consumption. Equally, most members 
felt that the risks to the central projection 
for inflation were also broadly balanced. In 
the near term, the risks to inflation were 
likely to be on the upside, related to the 
possibility of higher commodity and energy 
prices. But further out, the inflation risks 
could well be on the downside, related to 
the possibility that inflation could fall back 
as energy prices stabilised. Some 
Committee members also highlighted the 
need to be cautious about the scope for 
using changes in interest rates to fine-tune 
small movements in inflation expectations. 
Finally, most members felt that the 
uncertainty about the degree of spare 
capacity in the economy meant that it was, 
for the moment, sensible to wait for further 
evidence about the likely direction of 
inflationary pressures. 
On balance, most members felt there was 
no need to stimulate demand at this time 
given the signs of a pickup in growth and 
the near-term risks to inflation from higher 
energy prices. Equally, there appeared to be 
no pressing need to tighten policy given the 
continued weakness of domestically 
generated inflation. One member felt that 
the balance of risks to inflation, relative to 
the 2% target, had shifted a little too much 
to the upside for comfort and that 
warranted an immediate increase in rates. 
Another member felt that a small reduction 
in interest rates was warranted to stimulate 
demand and help increase the level of 
domestically generated inflation back 
towards 2%. 
 
May 2006 
14.61 
The arguments for leaving rates at 7.50% were as 
follows. The slowdown in activity and demand so far 
was broadly in line with the Commit’ee's earlier 
forecasts, resolving the earlier uncertainty about 
whether a turning point had been reached. The 
downturn also appeared so far to be somewhat 
more balanced than previously expected. On the 
other hand, the earnings data were clearly worse 
than expected in May, implying that the short-run 
nominal/real trade-off had deteriorated. That would 
probably continue for a while, and was reflected in 
the Commit’ee's forecast. While the risks to inflation 
were on balance on the upside, there were downside 
risks. In particular the forecast of consumption 
growth depended in part on private sector wealth 
and thus on the course of the equity market, which 
had recently become more rather than less 
uncertain. And the recent striking fall in consumer 
and business confidence, evidenced by surveys and 
the Bank's regional Agents, signalled downside risks 
to activity and inflation. These risks might be greater 
than reflected in the forecast. For example, the 
downturn might prove sharp enough to prevent the 
11.8 All Committee members agreed that the 
central message of the February 2014 
Inflation Report guidance remained 
relevant: given the likely persistence of 
headwinds weighing on the economy, when 
Bank Rate did begin to rise, it was expected 
to do so more gradually than in previous 
cycles. Moreover, the persistence of those 
headwinds, together with the legacy of the 
financial crisis, meant that Bank Rate was 
expected to remain below average 
historical levels for some time to come. That 
guidance on the likely pace and extent of 
interest rate rises was an expectation, not a 
promise: the actual path Bank Rate would 
follow over the next few years was 
uncertain, and would depend on economic 
circumstances. 
 
For most members, the outlook for inflation 
described in the August Inflation Report 
meant that it was not necessary to change 
the policy stance at this meeting. In light of 
14.93 
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forecast rise in earnings growth being passed 
through into prices in the short run, although that 
would tend to increase latent price pressures 
beyond the two-year horizon, since margins would 
probably be rebuilt at some stage. In sum, given that 
inflation was forecast to be close to the target in two 
years' time and that the outlook beyond then was 
highly uncertain, the Committee could sensibly wait 
to gather more information before concluding that 
policy needed to be changed. 
 
August 1998 
the reduction in oil prices and appreciation 
of sterling over the past three months, it 
appeared that the increase in inflation over 
the following year would be more gradual 
than had previously been supposed. To the 
extent that the appreciation of sterling 
could be expected to weigh on inflation for 
a persistent period, the corresponding 
pickup in domestic costs necessary to 
return inflation to the target within three 
years would be greater. The data on wage 
growth had surprised significantly to the 
upside over the past quarter, though this 
reflected the more volatile bonus payment 
component. Measured productivity had also 
surprised significantly to the upside, leaving 
the growth of unit wage costs in line with 
the May forecast. They agreed on the 
importance of monitoring developments 
relative to the forecast in particular 
regarding wage growth, productivity, 
measures of core inflation, import prices, 
and the risks to the international 
environment. 
 
 
Some members saw upside risks to the 
inflation forecast, reflecting the likelihood 
of: stronger demand growth, buoyed by 
improved credit conditions and consumer 
confidence; a smaller degree of spare 
capacity than assumed in those projections, 
with commensurately stronger pay growth; 
and faster and less pronounced pass-
through to consumer prices of the 
appreciation of sterling, such that the drag 
on inflation at the policy horizon from 
import prices would probably be less than 
had collectively been assumed. For one 
member, these risks to the medium-term 
inflation outlook were now, on balance, 
sufficiently to the upside to justify an 
immediate increase in Bank Rate. They 
increased the risk of a more significant 
overshoot of inflation following its return to 
the target. For this member, it was unlikely 
that much greater clarity could be achieved 
by waiting to see how the data evolved over 
the next few months, while postponing the 
start of the process of gradually raising 
Bank Rate increased the risk of having to 
increase it more sharply later on. 
 
August, 2015 
 
3.2  Quantifying the tone of central bank communication: Diction Software 
 
To evaluate the tone of central bank communication, we again employ textual analysis 
and explore the two dimensions of communication tone; namely, optimism and uncertainty. To 
analyse these dimensions of tone, we employ a textual analysis software called Diction which 
has been used extensively in the field of finance, accounting and, more recently, in economics. 
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To better understand the conceptual framework through which we aim to explore the tone of 
communication using Diction, it is important to initially evaluate some key literature on the 
use of this software within academia and how this has evolved over time. Subsequent sections 
after this will go on to explain the methodological framework used by the Diction software and 
the limitations of the software. 
 
 
3.2.1  A brief review of the literature on Diction  
Many of the earlier works done using Diction mainly focused on measuring the tone of 
political discourse using its linguistic tools. Of more importance to this study, however, is more 
recent research on the use of the software in economics, finance, and partly in accounting 
discourse. The idea that corporate disclosures through annual reports provide information that 
drives investor sentiments is central to much of the research that uses Diction for content 
analysis. Kearney and Liu (2014) and Li (2008) provide broad reviews of the growing literature 
on using content analysis within a finance and accounting context. Their reviews also argue for 
the importance of understanding textual sentiments in today’s rapidly evolving communication 
landscape. 
Using vocal cues from earnings conference calls with managers, Venkatachalam and 
Mayew (2012) found that Diction-derived sentiments from managers effectively predict future 
earnings two periods ahead. They propose that their findings may present useful research 
opportunities for exploring Federal Reserve communication and investor reactions. Davis and 
Tama-Sweet (2011) used Diction to explore 13,000 firm quarters of management, disclosure 
and analysis (MD&A) sections of annual reports and found a positive relationship between 
optimistic language derived by Diction within the text of MD&A and firm performance. They 
also found evidence that earnings releases by managers tend to be used as an alternative outlet 
to communicate with the markets and are often more optimistic. In contrast, using Diction to 
analyse a large sample of Fortune 500 companies, Patelli and Pedrini (2013) argue that 
optimistic communication is observed for both past and future performance; however, difficult 
macroeconomic environments tend to engage more open and optimistic communication.  
Focusing on the financial statement contents of UK companies, Wisniewski and Yekini 
(2015) argue that the Diction variables ‘Activity’ and ‘Realism’ predict future returns, even 
after they controlled for a number of firm-specific and accounting variables. Similarly, Li 
(2010) also found that even after controlling for other determinants of future performance, there 
is a positive relationship between the tone of forward-looking statements and future 
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performance. Similar to these approaches, Yekini et al. (2016) also used Diction’s user-defined 
dictionary to produce a database of positive and negative sentiments within UK companies’ 
financial statements and then explored market reaction to these. They found that positive 
sentiments communicated via company annual reports led to abnormal returns around the 
disclosure date.  
Barkemeyer et al. (2014) used Diction to explore whether corporate sustainability 
reporting corresponds with corporate sustainability performance as observed in financial 
reporting. Exploring Diction’s certainty and optimism variables, they found that CEO 
communications in sustainability reports do not seem to accurately reflect corporate financial 
performance.  Using a database of 26,000 earnings press releases from S&P 500 companies, 
Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2015) used Diction to explore the linkage between the tone of these 
communications and the firm’s stock price. They argue that the tone of earnings press releases 
tends to be more positive as the portfolio value of managers is more closely tied to the firm’s 
stock price. They further argue that as managers’ equity incentives rise, investors react 
proportionally less to the tone present in the earnings press releases. 
In an attempt to capture the effect of investor news sentiments on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange, Wei et al. (2017) constructed an ‘aggregate news sentiment index’ from Diction’s 
optimism and pessimism variables. They found that their news sentiment variable tended to 
increase the trading value of stocks as well as reduce the investor fear gauge of the Taiwan 
Volatility Index (TVIX). Harford and Schonlau et al. (2017) used Diction to propose a new 
understanding of the corporate debt maturity structure using the software’s measure of 
optimism and certainty as a gauge of overconfidence. They hypothesised that managerial 
overconfidence would increase debt maturity by mitigating the underinvestment problem, 
which is often a concern for long-term debt holders. They found that overconfidence in the 
CEO’s communication reduces the underinvestment problem, which subsequently has an 
impact on debt maturity. Cho et al. (2010) used Diction to evaluate the relationship between 
corporate environmental disclosure and actual firm environmental performance. They found 
that firms that were worse environmental performers used more optimistic language, therefore 
implying that a selective tone is used to compensate for their lack of performance. They also 
found a negative relationship between certainty in communicating environmental disclosure 
and environmental performance, implying that worse environmental performers mask their 
performance by using less certain language.  
Craig and Bennan (2012) used Diction to analyse the links between CEO 
communication and corporate reputation. Using six Diction variables, they found that 
73 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
reputation was positively related to sentiments such as ‘reality’ and that company size played 
a significant role in corporate reputation. Harford and Schonlau (2013) used Diction’s praise 
and blame variables to examine the ex-post quality of acquisitions and found that CEOs were 
generally not penalised for bad acquisitions but were rewarded for good acquisitions in what 
was described as an ‘option-like payoff’. Using the negative words lists from Diction to 
construct a measure of conservatism, Ferris et al. (2012) analysed 1,175 IPO prospectuses and 
found that conservatism was positively related to under-pricing and negatively related to firms’ 
operating profit for three years after the IPO. 
Notably, Diction has also been used within the context of economic theory to explain 
new behavioural economic biases. Hilary et al. (2016) developed a rational economics 
framework to analyse over-optimism and overconfidence in managers of large firms. They 
argued that economic theory suggests that decision making amongst managers begins with 
subjective beliefs about different possible states of the world under a Bayesian approach and 
beliefs are updated as more information is received. Therefore, for each action a manager takes, 
the manager’s prior belief over the likelihood of success is equal to the true probability plus a 
random error, which they argue generates a static over-optimism. Using Diction to capture 
optimism scores, they focus on managerial forecasts of a firm’s quarterly earnings and argue 
that managers become dynamically over-optimistic after a series of recent successes. Some of 
their key findings suggest that managers who have been successful in the past have the 
tendency to be over-optimistic about the future. These analogies relate very much to central 
bank policy makers as well, given that they also put information about their perception of future 
economic performance and in the process may exhibit over-optimism biases if there have been 
past economic successes under their watch. 
Finally, some research has specifically used Diction to analyse central bank 
communication in a manner that is similar to our work.  Born et al. (2012), while evaluating 
the role that central bank communication plays in macroprudential supervision, used Diction 
to capture optimism in financial stability reports (FSRs) and speeches and found that financial 
markets reacted to the tone of optimism in these communications. They found that increased 
optimism tones in speeches and interviews tended to raise volatility in financial markets while 
FSRs reduced market volatility. Similarly Born et al. (2014) used Diction to construct a much 
broader database on the optimism score of 1000 FSRs, speeches and interviews across 37 
central banks and find consistent evidence that increased optimism in FSRs calmed stock 
markets while speeches and interviews seem to increase market volatility. Sections of our work 
are somewhat similar to the above as we also seek to capture the level of optimism in MPC 
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minutes and inflation reports and evaluate amongst other things, its onward effects on the 
macro economy. 
 
3.2.2 Methodology used by Diction 
Diction2 is a computer-aided textual analysis software programme that uses a series of 
integrated dictionaries to examine a text for five semantic features: certainty, activity, 
optimism, realism and communalism. These five semantic features are also called master 
variables and Diction calculates a standardised and raw quantitative value for each of these. To 
analyse a text, the software uses an over 10,000-word search routine of word lists (or 
dictionaries) formulated from 31 sub-variables (or sub-dictionaries) to categorise texts into the 
five main master variables. The master variables are composed by converting all subaltern 
variables to z-scores, combining them via addition and subtraction, and then by adding a 
constant of 50 to eliminate negative numbers. The process of deriving the five main master 
variables from the 31 sub-variables is fully automated, therefore ensuring that all relevant sub-
dictionaries are used in the process. It is important to note that the word lists that make up each 
sub-dictionary cannot be edited, therefore ensuring that the findings of the Diction software are 
consistent across all studies.  
Table 3.5 below shows a list of all the 31 sub-dictionaries. Some of the word lists that 
make up the dictionaries for these are subsequently highlighted in table 3.6. Given that we are 
unable to table all 10,000 words, we highlight some of the texts that make up each of the 
dictionaries of the sub-classifications for information only. Each sub-variable’s dictionary can 
contain as much as 745 words but we will only be highlighting about 20 words per sub-variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 Diction 7.0 was used in this research. 
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Table 3.5: List of Diction sub-variables (sub-dictionaries) 
Numerical Terms Communication Diversity 
Ambivalence Cognition Exclusion 
Self-Reference Passivity Liberation 
Tenacity Special Terms Denial  
Levelling Terms Familiarity Motion 
Collectives Temporal Terms Centrality 
Praise Present Concerns Rapport 
Satisfaction Human Interests Cooperation 
Inspiration Concreteness Hardship 
Blame Past Concerns  
Accomplishment Aggression  
 
In this research we focus mainly on the optimism and uncertainty master variables. To 
provide some context on the size of the word lists associated with our variables of interest, we 
explored the optimism variable in more detail and fond that there were approximately 1,606 
words associated with the optimism variable. This wide-ranging word list provides great 
credibility for our measures of tone used in this research. Specifically, the optimism and 
certainty variables are calculated using the following formulae which incorporate other sub-
variables as shown below. 
 
Optimism = [praise + satisfaction + inspiration] – [blame + hardship + denial] …(3.3) 
 
Certainty = [tenacity + levelling + collectives + insistence] – [numerical terms + 
ambivalence + self reference + variety]           …(3.4) 
 
Diction then converts these variables to z-scores and adds a constant of 50 to eliminate 
negative numbers. Furthermore, to account for homographs (i.e. words that are spelt alike with 
different meanings), Diction implements a statistical word disambiguation technique by 
applying (a priori) statistical norms based on the frequency of homographs differentially 
weighted within its various dictionaries. This controls for the context of word use to some 
extent. Therefore, in a text that is tagged with the ‘business report’ norm, words such as ‘axes’ 
will align towards graphical axes rather than the plural of an axe. Our study uses the ‘business 
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report’ norm for all our analysis due to similarity between reports of this nature and central 
bank policy communications. 
Table 3.6 below shows some examples of word lists contained in the sub-dictionaries 
used in the derivation of our optimism and uncertainty variables as described by equation 3.3 
and 3.4 above. 
 
Table 3.6: Sample word lists listed in Diction Sub-Dictionaries 
Sub-dictionary Sample word lists 
Praise brave; blessed; intelligent; reliable; greater; 
bright; glorious; noted; nice; lovely; 
cheerful; right; favourable; attentive, 
creative; clearer; admirable; favourite; 
exalted; magnificent; entertaining; vigilant. 
Satisfaction cozy; satisfied; havens; thrilled; prouder; 
amazement; parental; entertain; hopefully; 
fortunately; exalting; triumph; pride; thanks 
humour; cordial; favourable. 
Inspiration nobility; reason; probity; purity; enrichment; 
concern; supremacy; sanctity; sacrifice; zeal; 
loyalty; devotion; worth; responsibility; 
commitment; honour, authenticity. 
 
Numerical terms calculated; halves; subtracts; multiplied; 
numeral; thousands, duplicates, numerous; 
bisects; tenfold; discount; geometry; digit; 
ratio; deducts; computation; counts; digital; 
numbers; equation; quotas.  
Ambivalence reputedly; appear; ambiguity; although; 
something; confounded; suggest; doubting; 
partial; presume; alleged; purportedly; could; 
dubious; seemingly; confused; guess; 
hesitating; blurs. 
Self-reference I’ve; I’d; I’ll; myself; mine; me; I’m; my; I.  
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Sub-dictionary Sample word lists 
Tenacity does; have; must; been; has; was; were; are; 
do; had; be; is; did; shall; will; having; 
they’ve; she’ll; he’ll; hasn’t. 
Levelling terms total; inevitable; everyday; everything; 
indisputable; fixed; obvious; evident; 
permanently; entirely, manifestly, fully, 
continuous, unqualified, cornerstone, indeed, 
decidedly; constantly, adamant; utmost; 
assuredly. 
Collectives alliance; congregation; citizenry; council; 
corporation; legislature; syndicate; grouping; 
gathering; government; industry; generation; 
brigade; bureau; hosting; board; 
confederation; system; category. 
Praise brave; blessed; intelligent; reliable; greater; 
bright; glorious; noted; nice; lovely; 
cheerful; right; favourable; attentive, 
creative; clearer; admirable; favourite; 
exalted; magnificent; entertaining; vigilant. 
Satisfaction cozy; satisfied; havens; thrilled; prouder; 
amazement; parental; entertain; hopefully; 
fortunately; exalting; triumph; pride; thanks 
humour; cordial; favourable. 
Inspiration nobility; reason; probity; purity; enrichment; 
concern; supremacy; sanctity; sacrifice; zeal; 
loyalty; devotion; worth; responsibility; 
commitment; honour, authenticity. 
Blame agitated; craziest; threatening; inhuman; 
apprehensive; detrimental; bleak; monstrous; 
uglier; sorrowful; cynical; troubled, sour; 
unnecessary; absurd; vulnerable; silliest; 
despotic; berserk, abrasive. 
78 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
Sub-dictionary Sample word lists 
Hardship threat; folly; mistrusting; sinning; 
indignation; storm; failing; traumas; cyclone; 
conspiracies; hunger; pained; recession. 
Naught; stressing; deaths; panic; stupidity; 
overwhelm; betray; despot; deception; 
troubles; torments; bankruptcy. 
Aggression controlling; bumpy; vetoed; upheaval; 
defended; compete; overturn; aggression; 
knock; conquering; collision; overthrowing; 
defeating; explosions; eradicating; assertive; 
blocking; pre-empts; violated; prodding; 
attacks; confronts. 
Accomplishment occupied; developed; profession; advances; 
creates; managing; duties; producers; 
achieving; locates; effects; purchases; 
capitalise; accomplishing; mould; drove; 
handling; leave; grew; acted.  
  
When a text is entered into the software to analyse its tone, the software aggregates the 
lists of words associated with each of the sub-dictionaries above and then uses the formulae 
highlighted in equations 3.3 and 3.4 above to assign a score to the master variables. Given that 
the software uses a 10,000-word list that has been derived using extensive research, this 
automated method is more effective than studies that use manual word lists. It is important to 
note that Diction® focuses mainly on one-word dictionaries rather than phrases or hyphenated 
words. Therefore, words such as first-quarter are merged as one word and for this reason we 
eliminate hyphens when cleaning up our texts for analysis. 
As Loughran and McDonald (2011) highlight, the use of dictionary methods has several 
advantages, most notably, the fact that once a third-party dictionary is being used, the risk of 
bias being introduced through researcher’s subjectivity is minimised. Although four main 
dictionaries (word lists), namely Henry (2008), Harvard’s General Inquirer (GI), Diction, and 
Loughran and McDonald (2011), have been used in the related field of accounting and finance, 
none of these offers the scale of words available in Diction’s word lists. Similarly, studies in 
economics that have used dictionary methods for research, have used individually constructed 
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word lists which are very limited in the scope of their word lists. Furthermore, most studies 
that use dictionary methods focus on binary variables such as ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ tones 
rather than the array of variables offered by Diction. 
Given that lengths of texts analysed will vary in terms of word counts, Diction 
accommodates for this by creating 500-word average breaks for longer texts and extrapolating 
the data for shorter texts to a 500-word norm. Diction highlights that the choice of 500 words 
as the optimal word length for textual analysis is backed by research which suggests that it 
takes an average of 500 words to get an accurate understanding of a person’s overall style or 
of an organisation’s general language habit.  
There are further aspects of the Diction software that make it a unique textual analysis 
programme and help fine-tune our textual analysis. One such tool is the insistence score, which 
the software uses to measure the extent to which a text stays on topic. To measure this, the 
software prompts the researcher  - at the point when texts to be analysed are being uploaded – 
to identify all the nouns and noun-derived adjectives related to the topic of research. . The 
software then measures the extent to which these identified nouns and noun-derived adjectives 
are heavily repeated in a text. This tool helps researchers ensure that the texts they are analysing 
are fairly similar across the board. For our research, we identified all key nouns and noun-
derived adjectives common to central bank communications such as inflation, growth, interest 
rates, headwinds, committee, trends and economy, to mention a few. We then explored whether 
all the MPC communications and inflation report communications had a similar insistence 
score. We found our insistence scores to be largely similar for all the communications 
documents explored, which therefore signifies that most of the communications stay on topic 
and are discussed within a similar context. The implication of having an outlier with a text’s 
insistence score is that such a text is likely to have been written in a very different context and 
may provide an inconsistent result if analysed along with the other texts, e.g. analysing a poem 
alongside an MPC communication. 
The software also uses a built-in database of over 50,000 texts which have previously 
been analysed over forty years of research to classify texts into norms. For instance, the user 
may apply general text norms or select from about fifty sub-categories which include business 
reports, speeches, newspaper editorials, business reports, scientific documents and telephone 
conversations, amongst others. The norms help the software to contextualise text and also allow 
for a comparative analysis of texts based on the norms used. In this study, we applied business 
report norms given that we assumed substantial similarities between well-written business 
reports and central bank communications.  
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3.2.3  Some practical examples of text optimism using Diction 
To highlight how tone, as captured by Diction, can vary between text, we examined a 
number of text samples from MPC minutes (see table 3.7). For this exercise, we compared the 
most optimistic policy text from April 2004 to the least optimistic policy test from January 
2003 and manually highlighted optimistic and pessimistic statements from both texts using a 
colour code. Optimistic sections of the text are labelled green and pessimistic sections of the 
text are labelled red. The policy deliberation in April 2004 which followed the first rate rise in 
over three years clearly showed that committee members were generally optimistic about the 
outlook of the economy. When we evaluated the January 2003 deliberations, which followed 
concerns from international political tensions and the spillover from the weakening German 
economy, we observed a much less optimistic policy communication. These variations in 
optimism can also be seen clearly from the colour coded tags which we applied to the text, with 
the green outweighing the red in the high optimism text and vice versa in the low optimism 
text. 
 
Table 3.7: Comparison of high optimism and low optimism texts 
 
High optimism text Optimism 
score 
Low optimism text Optimism 
score 
The Committee’s February inflation 
projection at constant interest rates had 
indicated that  CPI inflation was likely to 
be rising at and beyond the two-year 
horizon. The broad economic outlook had 
not changed very much since then: it 
seemed likely that the economy was still 
growing above trend and there was not 
much spare capacity. But that analysis did 
not by itself imply that a repo rate rise was 
necessary immediately.  
 
There were, however, a number of 
arguments for increasing the repo rate this 
month, to which different members 
attached different weights. First, some 
downside risks to inflation had diminished. 
The first rises in rates since February 2000 
did not seem to have had a 
disproportionate effect on household 
consumption and borrowing so far, so the 
argument for caution, which had seemed 
persuasive in November, now appeared 
less relevant. Also, for some members, the 
latest US non-farm payrolls data were an 
indication that the downside risks to US 
consumption growth had diminished. 
Second, a rise this month would not be a 
major surprise in financial markets, so 
54.36 The Committee agreed that, although there 
was a wide range of information to take 
into account this month, the net impact of 
the news was difficult to assess. The world 
economy was on balance slightly weaker. 
The overall news from the United States 
might be slightly on the upside taking 
account of the fiscal package, but the euro 
area, especially Germany, was weaker. 
Some Committee members remained 
concerned that weak confidence in 
Germany might begin to spill over to other 
countries in the euro area. The effects of 
the current international political tensions 
were not clear, although they might be 
having some dampening effect on survey 
indicators of confidence, and perhaps also 
on demand, both in the rest of the world 
and the United Kingdom. In the United 
Kingdom, there had been some signs that 
retail sales growth had been sluggish in 
early December, but it had probably since 
picked up and the recent underlying trend 
in consumption was not yet clear. There 
were some tentative signs that the rate of 
increase in house prices was moderating. 
Both these developments had been 
expected to materialise at some stage. 
Output growth had recently been around 
trend, and there was no sign in the 
46.4 
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there was less danger of triggering an 
upward shift in the sterling yield curve or 
effective exchange rate. Third, a rise in 
rates now might help to discourage 
unsustainable rates of house price 
inflation. That would address an upside 
risk to consumption in the near term and 
also reduce the risk of a sharp correction to 
the housing market and to consumption 
later. Were such a correction to take place, 
that might pose difficulties for the 
Committee in keeping CPI inflation close 
to the 2% target. One member put  
particular weight on possible future 
complications for the Committee arising 
from the increased vulnerability of the 
household sector to shocks due to the 
continuing increase in its debt relative to 
disposable income to historically high 
levels. That member also argued that the 
still-high growth rate of secured and 
unsecured debt pointed to continuing 
robust consumption growth in the near 
term.  
There were also several arguments for 
maintaining the current repo rate this 
month.  First, although it would be 
appropriate to withdraw some of the 
monetary stimulus in due course, it did not 
at present appear necessary to raise rates 
faster than the profile implied by the 
market yield curve in February. The 
February projection on the market interest 
rate assumption had suggested that 
inflation would undershoot its target at the 
two-year horizon, and would be unlikely to 
exceed it by a significant amount further 
out. Since February, UK-weighted world 
demand prospects had weakened slightly, 
but the strengthening UK housing market 
had raised prospective consumption and 
aggregate domestic demand growth. 
Offsetting this had been the rise in sterling, 
which had not fallen back towards its level 
at the beginning of the year and hence 
warranted more weight this month than 
last. Taken together, those factors 
suggested little change to the February 
inflation projection. For some members, 
certain downside risks to inflation had 
increased. For instance, euro-area 
domestic demand showed little sign of 
increasing at the pace that would be 
necessary by the second half of the year to 
be consistent with the Committee’s 
projections. Geopolitical risks to world 
demand might also have increased. 
Second, although the current inflation rate 
was below the target, interest rates had 
already been increased in anticipation of 
rising inflationary pressures. The fact that 
inflation expectations remained firmly 
linked to the target reduced the risks of 
delaying any further move in rates.  The 
Inflation Report next month would provide 
an opportunity to evaluate the mixed 
economic news and reconsider some of the 
monetary or labour data that the economy 
was about to weaken abruptly, despite the 
gloomy tone of some recent 
commentators. RPIX inflation looked 
likely to be a little stronger in the near term 
than at the time of the Inflation Report, but 
this was as a result of factors which 
seemed likely to be temporary.  
Most members had taken the view at the 
December meeting that inflation was 
broadly on track to meet the target in the 
medium term and that the risks around the 
projection were roughly balanced. For 
these members, the information received 
this month, taken together, did not contain 
a clear message about the prospects for 
inflation. Various arguments, to which 
different members attached different 
weights, supported this judgement. First, 
although the balance of indicators on the 
world economy was probably negative on 
the month, the impact on UK inflation in 
the medium term might be relatively 
limited. And in the event that the downside 
global risks were to crystallise, there was 
scope for policy responses overseas to 
support activity. Second, house price 
inflation looked likely to be stronger in 
2002 Q4 than projected, although there 
were some signs of the long-expected 
slowdown. Third, the evidence that 
consumption growth was moderating, as 
had been envisaged in the November 
Inflation Report projections, was still 
tentative, and the monetary data suggested 
that growth in credit would support 
consumption and, possibly, investment. 
Fourth, the depreciation in sterling relative 
to the Inflation Report assumption, and the 
substantial fall in short and medium-term 
interest rates relative to market 
expectations at that time, would support 
activity and tend to increase inflation if 
they were sustained, although the fall in 
equity prices would moderate this to some 
extent. Overall, both monetary and fiscal 
policy were already supportive. Finally, 
the recent diverse news – about the world, 
about the domestic economy, and from 
financial markets – could be assessed more 
fully in the forthcoming forecast round. 
These arguments, taken together, implied 
that no change in the repo rate was needed 
this month.  
Some members, however, continued to 
believe that an immediate repo rate 
reduction was warranted. First, these 
members had and still thought that the 
most likely path for inflation over the next 
two years would be slightly lower than the 
central projection in the November 
Inflation Report, and that the balance of 
risks lay on the downside. Second, the 
balance of news from the world economy 
over the past two months had been 
negative; there were longer-term 
downward pressures on world inflation 
coming from increased international 
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unresolved economic issues, such as the 
reasons for the pickup in house prices and 
the relationship with household spending 
and borrowing. It would also provide a 
better opportunity to explain the 
Committee’s thinking. Overall, most 
members put more weight on the 
arguments, taken together, for not raising 
the repo rate this month.  
 
competition; and there were significant 
downside risks, in particular from the euro 
area, where consumer confidence was 
weak. Third, the upside risks to inflation 
were modest, with labour market 
conditions benign, and consumption and 
house price increases moderating. Finally, 
on this view, the risk of an unsustainable 
build-up in household debt and the current 
account deficit might not be as severe as 
some thought, and, in any case, should not 
prevent a repo rate reduction which was 
needed to support activity and maintain 
inflation close to target in the medium 
term. The current account was around its 
average level of the past four decades, and 
the household sector had been close to 
financial balance in recent quarters.  
 
 
 
Despite the expansive scope of Diction’s word list and the automated nature of the 
software, there are some limitations to employing the software that are worth noting. The most 
obvious of this is that Diction does not provide more information regarding a text beyond the 
output of the master variables analysed; therefore, the software is not capable of further meta-
textual analysis. Other dictionary-based approaches such as WordNet have been found to have 
the ability to explore lexical, syntactic and semantic information and allow researchers to move 
from subjective or contextual groups to more general semantic groups that reflect deeper 
meanings inherent in particular words.  
 
 
3.3 Text processing approach used for textual analysis 
 
This section of our work highlights the process used to process and convert the texts 
we focus on into quantifiable variables. As previously highlighted, the communication 
documents we focus on are mainly MPC minutes and inflation reports from the Bank of 
England. We focus particularly on MPC minutes as they present the Bank with a regular 
opportunity to give insights into its thinking to the general public. As Blinder et al. (2008) 
highlight, ‘Central banks often provide substantially more detailed explanations of monetary 
policy decisions in the minutes of policy meetings’ (p. 32).  For the MPC minutes we focus 
mainly on policy deliberations and therefore eliminate all introductory text and appendices. For 
inflation reports, our text extraction process is much more complex as inflation reports are often 
very extensive and contain several sub-sections with a significant amount of text and diagrams. 
We therefore focus on elements that we deem to provide market participants and other 
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stakeholders relevant information. Specifically, we extracted texts related to the overall 
introductory summary section and the associated summaries related to each of the analysis of 
‘recent developments in inflation’, ‘money and interest rates’, ‘demand and supply’, ‘the labour 
market’, ‘pricing behaviour’ and ‘prospects for inflation’. 
In order to process text from these sections of the communications, once we extracted 
them from the original publications published on the Bank of England website we then 
converted them to plain text (.txt) formats. As with all textual analysis procedures, it is 
important at this stage to explore linguistic processing of text to ensure that as much objectivity 
as possible is achieved with the extracted text. Such linguistic processing involves techniques 
such as lemmatisation or stemming, part of speech categorisation and word disambiguation 
techniques. Some of this linguistic processing, such as alignments of homographs and text 
norms, is automatically carried out by Diction, as highlighted below.  
Before importing the texts for analysis, we manually carried out some further text 
processing primarily aimed at de-hyphenating the texts. We also ensured punctuation was 
correctly specified, thus making text processing more accurate. To do this, we manually 
perused the texts to remove all hyphenated words given the implications of such words for both 
the readability statistics and the Diction software. With readability statistics, eliminated 
hyphens between words reduce the perception of complexity from seemingly complex words 
which are often in reality, two simple words hyphenated together. With Diction, the software 
focuses mainly on one-word dictionaries rather than phrases or hyphenated words so 
eliminating hyphenated words makes our results more reliable.  
Diction automatically stems words by merging words such as say, saying and said into 
the same lexical context. With homographs (words that are spelt alike with different meanings), 
The opportunity to implement word disambiguation techniques by applying (a priori) 
statistical norms based on frequency of homographs differentially weighted within its various 
dictionaries makes the Diction software quite unique in analysing texts. This controls for 
context of word use to some extent. Therefore, as highlighted previously, in a text that is tagged 
with the ‘business report’ norm, words such as ‘axes’ will for instance align towards graphical 
axes rather than the plural of an axe. Our study uses the ‘business report’ norm for all our 
analysis due to the similarity between reports of this nature and central bank policy 
communications. 
There are further aspects of the Diction software that make it a unique textual analysis 
software and help fine-tune our textual analysis. One such tool is the insistence score which 
the software uses to measure if a text stays on topic. To measure this, the software prompts the 
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researcher to identify all the nouns and noun-derived adjectives related to the topic of research 
at the point when texts to be analysed are being uploaded. Once these have been identified, the 
software then measures the extent to which these identified nouns and noun-derived adjectives 
are heavily repeated in a text. This tool/facility helps researchers ensure that the texts they are 
analysing are fairly similar across the board.  
For our research, we identified all nouns and noun-derived adjectives common to 
central bank communications such as inflation, growth, interest rates, headwinds, committee, 
trends and economy, to mention a few. We then explored whether all the MPC communication 
and inflation report communications had a similar insistence score. The evidence from this 
process suggested that the insistence scores for all the communication documents we used were 
quite similar, therefore signifying that most of the communications stayed on topic and were 
discussed within a similar context.  
 For both textual analysis programmes used, there are no restrictions to text structure 
on importing, although Diction automatically restructures texts into 500-word structures before 
analysing texts. Additionally, both Readable and Diction are automatic hard-coded software 
programmes that do not allow the researcher to code their own outputs, rather they have to rely 
on the outputs provided by the software. Once the texts have been cleaned out and converted 
to plain text format and imported into the Readable and Diction programmes, they are 
processed and output in quantitative CSV format. These are then collated as time series data 
and are ready for analysis. As with a number of textual analysis software programmes, the 
software used in our research hardly goes beyond the text nor does it provide any further meta-
textual information; our analysis is instead based on analysis of the outputs in conjunction with 
other variables of interest. The other macroeconomic data and variables used in this study are 
described further in subsequent chapters.  
 
3.4  Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the data on complexity and tone of communication, the 
motivation for using these and how these were derived. In the first instance we explored the 
complexity of text using readability statistics and presented background information about how 
readability statistics are calculated and what they seek to capture. To do this, we explored a 
number of sample texts that showed the characteristic differences between the sample texts. 
We showed that complex text as captured by readability statistics have attributes such as 
increased sentence length and word length that make then inherently more complex to read. 
85 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
We further highlighted that although readability statistics have been popularly used to analyse 
text complexity, there are certain limitations within its use that should be considered.  
We further explored the derivation of our data for the tone of communications, which 
mainly focus on optimism and uncertainty as captured by the computer-aided text analysis 
software Diction® that we used in this research. To highlight the credibility of Diction® in 
academic research we provided background information about some of the studies have used 
this software. We then discussed the working of the software in more detail by highlighting the 
31 sub-dictionaries and the formulae used by the software to derive our variables of interest. 
Examples of the word lists from these dictionaries as well as specific functionalities that helped 
us derive our data such as the stemming, normalisation and insistence techniques were also 
discussed in more detail. As with complexity, we provided some practical examples of what 
the software seeks to capture by comparing texts from optimistic and less-optimistic scenarios. 
We also highlighted the limitations of using the software for textual analysis and obtaining our 
data. Finally, the chapter highlighted the step-by-step approach used to prepare our data for 
analysis as well as the sources of the texts we use. Our work mainly focuses on communication 
from the Bank of England in the form of MPC minutes as well as inflation reports. The specific 
sections of the documents that are extracted for analysis were described and briefly justified. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS ON THE 
COMPLEXITY AND TONE OF CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION 
4.1 Introduction  
This section of our work seeks to explore the role that macroeconomic conditions play 
in driving the complexity and tone of central bank communication and addresses our research 
questions (X1 and X2, in figure 1.2 above) on the time-varying nature of complexity and tone 
of communication as well as our research question on the behaviour of central bank 
communication under varying macroeconomic conditions. Put together, this section covers the 
back end analysis of how central bank communication can be fundamentally impacted as 
described in our model above.  
 In the first instance, we explore the time-time varying characteristics of the complexity 
and tone of central bank communication by deriving quantitative values of complexity and tone 
using the textual analytical methods described above and exploring the trends over our sample 
period. Our first hypothesis tests whether there are any observable trends in the complexity and 
tone of communication over our sample period. Secondly, we test whether there is any 
association between the levels of complexity and tone of communication and the prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions in which the communication is made. Furthermore, we try to 
ascertain if we can infer elements of transparency from the results obtained from our analyses. 
This particular element of our work is exploratory; however, we hypothesise that the time-
varying trends of complexity and tone should reflect the general macroeconomic environment 
at the time of communication. For instance, our hypothesis would suggest that periods around 
the 2008 financial crisis should coincide with more complex statements, more uncertainty and 
less optimism in communication. We hypothesise that as an inflation-targeting central bank is 
required to explain significant deviations of its policy actions from its inflation target, the bank 
may be less clear, less certain and less optimistic when macroeconomic environments are 
unfavourable.  
For the purposes of this study, we propose that for an inflation-targeting central bank, 
an unfavourable economic situation is one where prevailing inflation and forecast inflation are 
further away from the bank’s inflation target, and exchange rate pressures lead to the 
depreciation of the local currency. Therefore, for an inflation-targeting central bank to be 
perceived as being transparent (i.e. communication reflecting the true state of the economy), 
our hypothesis above should hold true and consequently communication should be consistently 
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more complex, less certain and less optimistic as inflation (current and forecasted) moves 
further away from the inflation target and as the pound depreciates. There is also some 
empirical evidence that may support our hypothesis. Using a broad sample of countries, Crowe 
and Meade (2008) show that inflation-targeting central banks tend to exhibit less transparency 
when inflation is rising.  
Specifically, we focus on monetary policy communications (MPC minutes) and 
inflation reports from the BoE which are carefully crafted and describes the bank’s 
understanding of the current macroeconomic conditions. As discussed in chapter 3, our study 
uses readability statistics to capture complexity and we use the Diction software programme to 
extract measures of optimism and uncertainty of communication. Both of these data derivation 
methodologies and the techniques used for converting the text from the MPC minutes and 
inflation reports are by no means trivial and these are well described in chapter 3 above. 
Specifically, our study explores 214 MPC minutes and 72 inflation reports spanning the period 
September 1997 to July 2015.  
Following our analysis, we document several interesting findings that have significance for 
policy makers within the BoE. Generally, we find significant evidence that the macroeconomic 
conditions in which the bank issues communication plays a vital role in the complexity and 
tone of the communication. Our core finding in this chapter is that we find evidence that rising 
inflationary pressures and depreciating sterling value have the tendency to increase complexity 
in both MPC minutes and inflation reports.  In addition,, we also find evidence that rising 
inflation and widening contemporaneous inflation gaps tend to drive down optimism in MPC 
minutes and inflation reports. Finally, we find that uncertainty in communication driven by 
macroeconomic conditions is more evident in inflation reports than in MPC minutes. Both 
inflationary and exchange rate pressures impact the level of uncertainty in inflation reports 
whereas only the 2008 financial crisis impacted the level of uncertainty in MPC minutes. 
Interpreting these results in terms of transparency, we infer that where complexity of 
communication is considered, the BoE reacts in our hypothesised manner, thereby reflecting a 
significant level of transparency. The relationship between tone of communication and 
macroeconomic conditions only partially conforms to our hypothesised behaviour. The 
following sections document the process for obtaining these results as well as more detailed 
explanations of our results. 
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4.2 Analysing complexity of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) minutes and 
inflation reports.  
 
This section evaluates the data on complexity and tone derived from MPC minutes and 
inflation reports from the BoE. We start by evaluating data on the complexity of MPC 
communication over the entire sample period in order to explore longer-term trends in 
complexity of communication. It is important to note that there was a significant change in the 
communication regime in December 2004 after the removal of the annexe section which 
provided information that supported policy making by BoE staff. Our analysis of the 
complexity data on MPC minutes with sections of the annexe included shows that when the 
annexe section was added to MPC minutes, the overall complexity of monetary policy 
communication was reduced, as shown in figure 4.1 below.3  
 
Figure 4.1: Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for MPC minutes with annexe included – 1997 to 
2015. 
 
 
 
Given the obvious structural break in the trend of communication clarity and because 
the focus of our work is mainly on the carefully deliberated sections of the MPC minutes, our 
                                               
3 Despite eliminating parts that we deem not to contain useful information, MPC minutes with annexe included 
still show lower readability scores. 
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work in this study therefore excludes the annexes from the MPC meetings.4 To this end, we 
strip all MPC minutes pre-January 2005 of the annexe section so that we can compare like-for-
like communication and eliminate the apparent structural break in the complexity data. Figure 
4.2 below shows the complexity data for core deliberations from the MPC minutes. To check 
for the reliability of our time series data here, given the potential for a structural break caused 
by a change in the communication regime, we statistically tested for structural breaks in the 
core MPC data using Chow’s structural break test. Based on figure 4.1 above, we identified 
January 2005, when the communication regime changed, as a point of structural break and 
tested the null hypothesis that there was no structural break. Our analysis returned an F value 
of 2.35 which was less than the critical F value of 9.49, suggesting that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that there was no structural break in the core MPC data. Statistically, this 
implies that there is no evidence of a structural break in the core MPC data. 
 
Figure 4.2: Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for core MPC minutes – 1997 to 2015. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 above depicts some trends which may be consistent with our notion that 
more difficult macroeconomic periods may be associated with more complex communication. 
As can be observed, the periods leading to the financial crisis in 2008 showed declining 
complexity of communication while the period following this critical point of the financial 
                                               
4 Some analysis of the minutes with annexes are carried out in the appendix section as a means of exploring if 
they make any significant difference to our analysis. 
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crisis showed increasing complexity of communication. To evaluate this concept further, we 
compared inflationary pressures from the contemporaneous inflation gap (i.e. the difference 
between current inflation and the inflation target) and we observed that widening inflation gaps 
were associated with the post-financial crisis period, where communication complexity is 
increasing (Fig. 4.3). As we approach the period of the financial crisis, readability of 
communication dropped significantly to its lowest level, requiring only about 9.7 years of 
formal education in January 2007, compared to a peak of about 14.8 years in June 2013, after 
the financial crisis . 
 
Figure 4.3: Comparison between MPC minutes complexity and contemporaneous inflation 
gap  
 
We also observed some seasonal patterns in the core MPC minutes which we suggest 
may have been caused by the existence of inflation reports in some quarters. Where the BoE 
releases MPC minutes in the same month as it releases an inflation report, there may be a 
tendency to include more or less complex information in the MPC minutes given that there is 
an alternative communication that month. Our subsequent analyses in other parts of our work 
take this into consideration when analysing the complexity of MPC minutes.  
It may not be a straightforward task to clearly interpret the mechanics of these changes 
in complexity; therefore, we not only focus on the changes in the patterns of complexity as 
discussed above but rather, the variability in clarity in relation to the macroeconomic conditions 
in which the BoE operates. This analysis is carried out in the next sections of our work. 
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Next, we explore the BoE’s inflation reports which, although published less frequently 
than MPC minutes, give a deeper insight into the bank’s thinking. In each inflation report, the 
BoE often notes that the inflation reports serve two main purposes: first, that it provides a 
comprehensive and forward-looking framework which MPC committee members can discuss, 
therefore aiding their decision-making process and second, it serves as a means of putting out 
comprehensive information on the BoE’s thinking to the public and explains the reasons for its 
decisions to those that may be affected. With inflation reports, we explore the same period as 
explored with the MPC minutes, i.e. August 1997 to August 2015. We observed largely similar 
patterns to the MPC communication albeit with lesser variations in the complexity of 
communication. We find some of the highest complexity of communication to coincide with 
the immediate pre-financial crisis period and similar to MPC communication, communication 
becomes somewhat more complex with an upward trend following the financial crisis. 
 
Figure 4.4: Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for inflation reports – 1997 to 2015. 
 
 
A few additional trends emerge from our preliminary analysis of the clarity scores for 
inflation reports. At first glance, the inclusion of forward guidance statements in some of the 
inflation reports seemed to increase complexity. In fact, we found evidence that the inclusion 
of a separate forward guidance section in the August 2013 inflation report increased complexity 
sharply to requiring 14 years of formal education, a level deemed too complex for public 
documents. Some of the trends we observe here are not as clear-cut as those observed with 
MPC minutes and there is evidence that some pre-crisis periods had very high complexity 
compared to some of the post-crisis periods. Nonetheless, we find preliminary evidence that 
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where we observed very high complexity, it may have been driven by underlying 
macroeconomic pressures. Indeed, our highest point of complexity was in the August 1998 
inflation reports which followed the 1998 Russian financial crisis, which the BoE admitted 
caused a spillover effect that included sharp declines in equity prices across industrialised 
countries (including the UK) as well as increased spreads in corporate bonds, to mention a few.   
To put this in context from a linguistic point of view, statements such as ‘Uncertainty 
about, and unwinding of, the exposures of financial institutions, especially after the near-failure 
of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund in September, led to reduced liquidity and 
increased volatility in financial markets’ tend to be complex due to several fragments of 
information contained therein that may confuse readers. From a clarity standpoint, a better 
approach would be to individually highlight the relationships between uncertainty and 
volatility, uncertainty and liquidity, unwinding and uncertainty, and unwinding and volatility. 
The foregoing analysis only describes the patterns of complexity observed with these 
communication documents, subsequent analysis will use more robust regression analysis to 
explore relationships between clarity and the macroeconomic environment in which the 
communication is made. 
Similarly, we explore the trend of optimism scores over our sample period as depicted 
in figure 4.5 below. 
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Figure 4.5 Optimism score for MPC Minutes – 1997 to 2015. 
 
 
On initial evaluation, the graph shows that optimism scores do tend to show some 
correlation with some of the major world events that the BoE seemed to care about in their 
MPC deliberations. First, we observed low optimism scores in (i) 1997/1998, seemingly from 
concerns about the Asian/Russian financial crises and spill-overs from these. There were also 
extremely low optimism scores for part of 2002, which mainly seemed to have been caused by 
concerns about the stock market crash of 2002. Specifically, the introductory section of the 
August 2002 MPC minutes reads:  
‘Over the month since the July MPC meeting, there had been further substantial falls in 
equity prices around the world. In domestic currency terms, the Wilshire index had 
fallen 4%, the Dow Jones Eurostoxx index 8%, the Topix index 7½% and the FTSE 
All-Share index 4%. Major indices (apart from Japan’s) were some 20% below the 
average levels used as a starting point in the May Inflation Report; and some of the 
‘high tech’ indices were 30% or so lower. Indices had been more volatile, too, and 
uncertainty about future prices had risen, judging by the expected volatility implied by 
options prices.’  
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On the face of it, this introductory section of the minutes does seem to capture a pessimistic 
view of the world and this tone is carried on through the various sections of the minute as well. 
We also observed significantly low optimism scores during periods of the 2008/2009 financial 
crisis. Our econometric analyses below help to expand further on these relationships and on 
our observations. 
Figure 4.6 below also shows the graphical trend of certainty captured within the text of 
the MPC minutes.  
 
Figure 4.6: Certainty score for MPC minutes – 1997 to 2015. 
 
The graph shows certainty to be lower (i.e. increased uncertainty) in some of the earlier 
years of our sample but overall, no specific was identified. Interestingly, some of the months 
with the highest certainty seem to cluster around the 2007/2008 period. It is difficult to evaluate 
these data and the resultant trends in isolation without the aid of more analytical work, 
therefore, our analysis section helps provide more insights into what may have been driving 
uncertainty in the BoE’s policy making.  
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4.3 Macroeconomic data  
 
Central bank communication may be sensitive to the economic conditions in which the 
communication is made and hence, when evaluating clarity of communication, economic 
developments should be accounted for. Previous studies such as Jensen (2011a) and Bulir 
(2013a), in evaluating the clarity of central bank communication have suggested that the 
macroeconomic conditions in which communication is made play a significant role in the 
clarity of central bank communication. Inflation-targeting central banks who have a mandate 
hinged on achieving a specified inflation target may particularly be under pressure from 
changes in the inflationary environment.  To this end, the motivation for our choice of variables 
used in the analysis of our work mainly comes from some of the macroeconomic variables the 
BoE focuses closely on, namely variables linked to inflation as well as exchange rate variables. 
As Hendry (2001) highlights, policy makers in the UK are particularly sensitive to a 
depreciating pound as this has historically led to the notion of imported inflation, whereby the 
prices of imported goods and inputs into the production process (e.g. fuel) rise, which 
subsequently leads to inflation in the UK. 
Additionally, through careful dissection of the MPC minutes and inflation reports, it 
can be observed that the BoE’s major concerns often relate to four broad areas, namely: 
inflationary pressures, the financial markets, the international economy and often a section 
which captures issues such as ‘money, credit, demand and output’. The inclusion of inflationary 
and exchange rate pressures as major aspects of the BoE’s policy communication further 
affirms the need to explore the pressures that these key variables place on the bank’s 
communication.  
To capture inflationary pressures, our study uses three inflation-linked variables: the 
month-on-month rate of inflation growth; the absolute deviation of current inflation rate from 
the inflation target, which can be considered to be the contemporaneous inflation gap; and 
finally the absolute deviation of four quarter ahead inflation forecast from the inflation target, 
which can be considered as the forward-looking (ex-ante) inflation gap. To capture the 
exchange rate pressures, we simply use the GDP/USD exchange rate. Section 4.4 below 
explores the regression analysis we used to examine these. 
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4.4 The impact of macroeconomic conditions on clarity and tone 
 
Following an approach similar to that of Bulir et al. (2013), we model complexity and 
tone as a function of the macroeconomic variables discussed above as: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋𝑐|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| + 𝛽𝜋𝑒|𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
| + 𝛽𝛾𝛾𝑡 +  𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅 +
 𝛽𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐶 + 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
           … (4.1) 
Where  𝐶𝑖𝑡 denotes the relevant measure of complexity and tone of the communication 
of interest (i) (i.e. MPC minutes or inflation reports) at time t.  The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level 
score is used to measure complexity of communication, with higher values implying 
communication that is more complex and one in which a reader will require more years of 
formal education to comprehend. Diction scores are used to capture optimism and uncertainty 
tones, where higher values of the optimism score imply a more optimistic communication and 
a higher value of the certainty score implies less uncertainty.  
𝜋𝑡 represents the current month-on-month growth rate of inflation and seeks to capture 
the inflationary pressures from inflation growth. Inflationary pressures from deviating further 
away from the inflation target in current period t is captured by the covariate |𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| and 
this is measured in absolute terms. This variable, which can also be termed the 
contemporaneous inflation gap, further captures the pressure on the bank from an 
accountability perspective given that the BoE’s Governor is required to write an open letter to 
the chancellor if inflation deviates from the above inflation targets by one percentage point or 
more in either direction. The inflation target set by the chancellor’s office was 2.5% between 
September 1997 and December 2003 and 2% from January 2004 to September 2015. Our 
second inflation covariate 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
 captures the forward looking (ex-ante) inflation gap, 
which is the difference between the four quarter ahead inflation forecast and the inflation target.  
𝛾𝑡 is the value of the pound relative to the US dollar and captures the pressures from 
the depreciation of the pound. 𝐷𝐼𝑅 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in a month 
when inflation reports are released in addition to MPC communication and 0 otherwise. The 
reasoning behind the introduction of this variable is that in a month where there is further 
opportunity to put out communication via inflation reports, the bank may tend to reduce 
emphasis on certain issues in the MPC minutes so as to avoid repetition or double emphasis. 
This approach also accommodates for the seasonal trends we observed in our data, which we 
suggest were caused by the presence of inflation reports in certain months.  However, this 
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variable is only included in our analysis of MPC minutes. Finally, the last two variables in our 
model FC and T capture the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the time trend respectively.  
It can be argued that the period of the financial crisis should significantly contribute to 
additional pressures on the clarity of the bank’s communication. As Claride at al. (1999) argue, 
policy makers have been observed to act on instinct and without a theoretical rationale in the 
event of a financial crisis. They state the example of the stock market crash of October 1987 
where the Federal Reserve reduced interest rates with the support of most economists but 
without theoretical justification for the intervention. To account for this effect, we introduced 
a binary dummy variable to capture the effect of the financial crisis in our model. Although 
there is no general consensus on the actual time the financial crisis hit, we used September 
2007, the month in which Northern Rock sought emergency funding from the Bank of England, 
as the onset in our model and we extended this to the end of the last quarter of 2009. Our 
expectations were that the financial crisis of 2008 may have had a significant effect on the 
manner in which the central bank communicated over this period. The low readability scores 
observed for MPC minutes during this period makes a case for further analysis of the impact 
of the financial crisis on the readability of MPC minutes. 
In line with our research questions, we tested two null hypotheses on the basis of the 
model above. In the first instance, we tested the null hypothesis (H0) that ‘there is no change in 
the trend of complexity and tone of the BoE’s communication over our sample period’. The 
null hypothesis – H0 is given as:  
 
 𝐻0: 𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝑇𝑖𝑡 ≠ 0     … (4.2) 
  
                                    
Where Tit is the linear time trend variable in equation 4.1 above. 
 
Given the increased demand for transparency and accountability from the BoE, mainly 
from inflation-targeting practices as well as from the oversight of the Treasury Select 
Committee, our expectations were for communication to reflect less complexity over our 
sample period. This would also be in line with the transparency literature which suggests that 
inflation-targeting central banks have become increasingly transparent over the past few 
decades (e.g. see Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014 and Hovarth and Vasco, 2016). For tone, we 
did not propose an a priori on the trend of communication tone over our sample period. 
In the second instance, we tested the null hypothesis (HO) that there is no association 
between the complexity and tone of the bank’s communication and the prevailing 
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macroeconomic conditions in which the communication is made. The null hypothesis – H0 is 
given as: 
 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝜋 = 𝛽𝜋𝑐  =  𝛽𝜋𝑒 =  𝛽𝛾 = 𝛽𝐹𝑐 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝐻0 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒     …(4.3) 
 
Where, 𝜋 represents current inflation rate, 𝜋𝑐 represents the contemporaneous inflation 
gap, 𝜋𝑒 represents forward looking inflation gap, 𝛾 represents the pound/dollar exchange rate 
and 𝛽𝐹𝑐 represents a financial crisis.  
Our expectations were that given the need to be accountable and transparent, central 
bank communication would be impacted by the macroeconomic pressures around the time in 
which the communication was made. Specifically, as highlighted previously, complex 
situations, such as where there is a macroeconomic or financial crisis, may require the bank to 
put out more complex communication that reflects, to some extent, the complexity of the 
situation. Therefore, where inflationary pressures are rising and exchange rate is falling, there 
might be a tendency for communication to be complex. In addition, we proposed that such 
complex situations may reflect less optimistic and more uncertain language by the BoE due to 
the complexity of the situation. Summarily, as an inflation-targeting central bank is required to 
explain significant deviations of its policy actions from its inflation target, the bank may be 
‘less clear, less certain and less optimistic’ in its communications when macroeconomic 
environments are unfavourable. If we assume that the above hypothesis holds and that central 
banks indeed respond to complex macroeconomic conditions with more complex 
communication, another perspective we explore is that for the BoE to be perceived as 
transparent, their communication should reflect the current complex state of the 
macroeconomy. Therefore, the bank will communicate with more complexity, less optimism 
and more uncertainty where prevailing inflation is further away from its target and exchange 
rate pressures are causing the depreciation of the local currency.  
Given that the BoE’s projections via their MPC minutes and Inflation reports are mainly 
based on current macroeconomic data, we used current (time t) data for our inflation and 
exchange rate variables. However, there is the question of what the MPC already knew at the 
time of deliberation and of writing the MPC minutes. We assumed that at the point of meeting, 
past and current period macroeconomic data were available for the MPC to scrutinise. We 
therefore expected the decision-making process to follow figure 4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1: A stylised model of the UK monetary policy decision-making process 
 
 
 
Our work is mainly concerned with how activities and conditions in t1 above go on to 
impact C1 through the intermediate activities in between these two points. As conditions in t1 
change, deliberations and interest rate decisions need to be carried out and the outcome of this 
is reflected in C1. In summary, this section of our work therefore simply explores the 
association between t1 and C1 and tests whether the activities between the communication cycle 
have any impact on C1. 
4.5  Tests for model misspecification 
 To test that our model above was correctly specified and did not neglect any important 
non-linearities, we carried out Ramsey’s (1969) regression specification error (RESET) test. 
The basic assumption of the RESET test is that an expanded model can be written in an 
alternative and more functional form by taking powers either of the fitted response of the 
independent variables or their first principal components. A standard F test is then carried out 
to determine if the additional variables included in the expanded model have any significant 
influence. Given that the inclusion of non-linear variables has the drawback of using up degrees 
of freedom if there are many explanatory variables in the model, the inclusion of non-linear 
forms has to be justified. Furthermore, as Wooldridge (2013) points out, the inclusion of 
quadratic and interaction variables will not necessarily detect certain kinds of neglected non-
linearities. 
 If our specified model in equation 4.1 above satisfies the multiple linear regression 
assumptions, then non-linear functions of the independent variable from the estimated equation 
should be insignificant when added to the expanded model. Although there is no means of 
detecting how many functions of the fitted variables should be included in the expanded model 
when implementing the RESET test, we included the squared and cubed terms as this has been 
proven to be useful in most applications (Wooldridge, 2013). 
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Let ?̂? denote the fitted OLS values derived from estimating equation 4.1 above. Our 
expanded RESET equation will take the form: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋𝑐|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| + 𝛽𝜋𝑒|𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
| + 𝛽𝛾𝛾𝑡 +  𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑡 +
 𝛽𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛿1?̂?
2 +  𝛿2?̂?
3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        …(4.4) 
 
Our null hypothesis for testing if equation 4.1 is missing non-linear variables is that the 
equation is correctly specified. Thus, the RESET test is the F statistic 𝐻0: 𝛿1 =  0, 𝛿2 =  0 in 
the expanded model 4.4 above.  A significant F test will signify some sort of functional form 
problem. The results of our RESET tests are presented along with the results from the 
respective regression equations below. 
 
4.6  Results   
4.6.1  OLS regression results for MPC minutes 
Table 3.1 below shows a summary of the results from our analysis of the impact of the 
macroeconomic variables of interest on the complexity and the tone of MPC minutes. All three 
models below were tested for model misspecification using Ramsey’s RESET test and we 
found no evidence that our models were missing any non-linear and interaction terms. Our 
results below show that, at least at the 1% significance level, in no case was the null hypothesis 
of correct specification of the linear model rejected. Thus, there was no evidence of functional 
form misspecification in our models below. 
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Table 4.1: Impact of macroeconomic variables on complexity and tone of MPC minutes  
  
Model 1 
(Complexity of 
communication) 
  
Model 2: 
(Tone of 
communication) 
Model 3: 
(Tone of 
communication) 
Dependent 
variable - 
Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level 
Dependent 
variable - 
Optimism 
Dependent 
variable - 
Certainty 
Constant 8.90697*** 
(3.14196) 
57.7254*** 
(3.83727) 
53.6617*** 
(7.91481) 
Current inflation rate 0.0686916** 
(0.0328973) 
−0.0794143** 
(0.0381931) 
−0.0659490 
(0.0789395) 
Contemporaneous 
inflation gap 
0.0369135 
(0.0981066) 
−0.371871** 
(0.186121) 
−0.0654023 
(0.315897) 
Forward-looking 
inflation gap  
−5.06693 
(3.32684) 
12.1695** 
(5.67179) 
0.793871 
(10.8741) 
Exchange rate  −1.26990** 
(0.516608) 
−0.375111 
(0.672698) 
1.65307 
(1.19256) 
Inflation report 
dummy 
0.221404** 
(0.101807) 
- - 
Financial crisis −0.363707 
(0.262423) 
−0.475544 
(0.299756) 
−1.07565** 
(0.450863) 
Time trend −0.0135759** 
(0.00734345) 
0.0206472   
0.00848562 
0.0123470 
(0.0170938) 
     
SE of regression 0.746521 1.202722 2.263324 
R squared  0.263595 0.15327 0.139343 
Durbin Watson 1.565484 1.506351 1.893791 
RESET test for model specification 
Test statistic F (2,205) = 
1.00929 
F(2, 206) = 1.39542 F(2, 206) = 2.19472 
 
P-value P (F (2,205) > 
1.00929) = 
0.366282 
 
P(F(2, 206) > 
1.39542) = 0.25006 
P(F(2, 206) > 
2.19472) = 0.113988 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) in parenthesis5 
                                               
5 Our Durbin Watson test results show the possibility of serial correlation within our macroeconomic data set, 
therefore the HAC standard errors (Bartlett kernel) were used to accommodate for potential serial correlation 
problems (see Muller 2014 for a recent review). 
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In Model 1 we considered the effect of the complexity of communication on the 
inflationary and exchange rate variables of interest. We also explored the role that the existence 
of a financial crisis and the release of inflation reports play in shaping the complexity of 
communication. Finally, we explored whether there was a significant trend in the complexity 
of communication over our sample period. In line with our first research question, we found 
statistically significant evidence that the complexity of communication over our sample period 
reduced by a small amount. The evidence suggests that the documents became clearer by 
requiring 0.01 less years of education to comprehend them. Our result therefore suggests that 
we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no change in the trend of complexity of central 
bank communication over time. Although quite unsubstantial, the evidence is in line with the 
notion within the linguistic literature that public documents have become clearer over the past 
century (see DuBay 2004). By putting out communication that has become increasingly clearer, 
this finding also supports the evidence in the literature that suggests that the BoE is increasingly 
becoming transparent and accountable (e.g. see Fracasso et al. 2003; Eijffinger and Geraats 
2006; Dincer and Eichengreen 2007).  
We also find significant evidence that suggests that the current inflation growth rate 
and the exchange rate have an impact on the complexity of the BoE’s communication. On the 
basis of the foregoing, we therefore rejected our null hypothesis that there is no association 
between the complexity of communication and the macroeconomic environment in which the 
communication is made. Our results suggest that as current inflation rate rises, the complexity 
of MPC minutes rises as well. In the same vein, as the value of sterling relative to the USD 
falls, complexity of communication rises. We found the effects of exchange rate pressures on 
communication to be twice that of the current inflation rate. These results also support our 
hypothesis that complex macroeconomic conditions, depicted by rising inflation rates and 
depreciating sterling, have driven complexity in communication put out in the form of MPC 
minutes. If we assume the BoE to be following the hypothesised behaviour of reflecting the 
true macroeconomic conditions in which the communication is made, it can be inferred that 
the bank is exhibiting transparent behaviour in its MPC communication. 
Finally, on communication complexity, we found evidence that in a month where 
inflation reports were released alongside the MPC minutes, this tended to increase the 
complexity of information released in the MPC minutes. The reason for this may be linked to 
the fact that the existence of an inflation report in the current month means there was more 
information for the MPC to scrutinise and hence the need to put out potentially more complex 
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information. Of significant interest is the role that the financial crisis played in the complexity 
of communication; the evidence suggests that the financial crisis had no impact on the 
complexity of MPC communication.  
Next, we evaluate the results on the impact of macroeconomic condition on the tone of 
central bank communication with particular focus on the level of optimism and uncertainty 
reflected in the MPC minutes. Our results suggest that as inflation rises and as the 
contemporaneous inflation gap widens (i.e. inflation moves further away from the inflation 
target), MPC communication becomes less optimistic. However, we find that as the forward-
looking inflation gap widens, MPC communication becomes more optimistic. Given that only 
our inflation variables were significant in this model, it can be assumed that optimism in MPC 
communication is only impacted by inflationary pressures. Our results on the effect of 
inflationary pressures on the optimism of communication suggest that current inflationary 
pressures in the form of rising inflation and widening contemporaneous inflation gaps were the 
main drivers of reduced optimism in MPC communication whilst future inflationary pressures 
had the effect of increasing optimism.  
Finally, our results show that individual macroeconomic variables have no impact on 
the uncertainty of MPC communication, however, the presence of a financial crisis does. We 
found evidence that suggested that the 2008 financial crises had the effect of reducing the 
uncertainty of MPC communication by as much as one year of education. Given the foregoing, 
we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between the tone of MPC 
communication and the macroeconomic condition in which the communication is made. We 
should note, however, that this can be argued to be somewhat inaccurate when we consider the 
tone of uncertainty in communication as there seemed to be no association between individual 
inflationary and exchange rate variables. Nonetheless, the financial crises did have an impact 
on the uncertainty of communication.   
In summary, our result in this section suggests that there is an association between the 
complexity and tone of MPC communication and the macroeconomic condition in which these 
are made. Specifically, we found evidence that rising inflation tended to increase complexity 
and reduce optimism whilst a widening of the contemporary inflation gap also reduced 
optimism. There was also evidence that falling exchange rates increased the complexity of 
communication and the presence of the 2018 financial crisis may have increased uncertainty 
as well. Put together, the evidence from this section of our work lends some support to the 
notion that more complex macroeconomic conditions, evidenced by rising inflation, widening 
contemporary inflation gap, falling exchange rate and the presence of a financial crisis may 
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have caused the BoE to communicate with more complexity, less optimistic and in a less certain 
manner. 
 
 
4.6.2 Results of the impacts of the macroeconomic environment on the complexity and 
tone of inflation reports 
Our next set of analyses explores the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the 
complexity and tone of inflation reports. Here, we tested the same sets of hypotheses as those 
above for MPC minutes. Our first hypothesis was to test whether the complexity and tone of 
inflation reports changed over our sample period, whilst the second hypothesis tested whether 
there was an association between the complexity and tone of inflation reports and the 
macroeconomic conditions in which they were made. Similar to the models above, we tested 
for model misspecification using Ramsey’s RESET. Our results again showed that, at the 1% 
significance level, in no case was the null hypothesis of correct specification of the linear model 
rejected. Thus, there was no evidence of functional form misspecification in our models below. 
A summary of our results is shown in table 4.2 below. 
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Table 4.2: Impact of macroeconomic variables on Complexity and Tone of Inflation Reports   
Model 1 
(Complexity of 
communication) 
  
Model 2: 
(Tone of 
communication) 
Model 3: 
(Tone of 
communication) 
Dependent 
variable - 
Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level 
Dependent 
variable - 
Optimism 
Dependent 
variable - 
Certainty 
Constant 15.6558*** 
(0.953754) 
55.8062*** 
(7.78519)             
62.4856*** 
(10.9649)      
Current inflation rate  1.6853*    
(0.9.7558)      
−0.0588061 
(0.0767495)    
−0.214557* 
(0.115888)    
Contemporaneous inflation 
gap 
−0.409806*     
(0.214253)       
−0.479710*** 
(0.149974)     
−0.954528* 
(0.530692)    
Forward-looking inflation 
gap  
5.48568      
(4.81625)       
15.7276* 
(8.92200)       
29.8376 
(28.0536)       
Exchange rate  −2.57431*** 
(0.570118)            
−0.427876 
(1.12654)      
−3.01280*  
(1.78514)     
Financial crisis 0.239575     
(0.144431)      
−0.0772009 
(0.359366)     
−0.506390 
(0.688619)    
Time trend 0.0153420    
(0.00937533)    
0.0557999 
(0.0516352)     
0.161739** 
(0.0807289)    
     
SE of regression 0.647455 1.212872 2.336178 
R squared  0.325217    0.065501    0.065927    
Durbin Watson 1.438758 1.747468 1.877011 
RESET test for model specification 
Test statistic F (2,62) = 
1.834561 
F(2, 62) =  
1.31398 
F(2, 62) = 1.3148 
P-value P(F(2,62) > 
1.83456) = 0.168 
P(F(2, 62) > 
1.31398) = 
0.276128 
P(F(2, 62) > 
1.3148) = 0.27591 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) in parenthesis 
 
When we explored whether the trend of the complexity and tone of inflation reports 
changed over our sample period, we found evidence that suggested that the complexity and 
optimism in communication did not follow a significant trend, however, the level of certainty 
portrayed in the inflation reports increased over the sample period. Similar to MPC minutes, 
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we also found consistent evidence to suggest that rising inflation rate and a depreciating sterling 
tended to drive up complexity in the manner in which inflation reports were written. Here, we 
rejected the null that there is no association between the complexity of inflation reports and the 
macroeconomic conditions in which the communication is made. In fact, these results provide 
further evidence for the idea that difficult macroeconomic conditions, evidenced by rising 
inflation and deprecating sterling values, tend to make the BoE’s policy communication (both 
MPC minutes and inflation reports) more complex.  
In contrast to MPC minutes, we found consistent evidence that suggested that pressures 
from inflation targeting had a significant impact on both the tone and complexity of inflation 
reports. When the complexity of communication is considered, inflation moving towards the 
inflation target or otherwise impacted the complexity of inflation reports, albeit in an unusual 
manner. The evidence suggests that as inflation moves closer to the inflation target, there seems 
to be more complex information put out. This behaviour is divergent from our hypothesised 
behaviour that such inflationary pressures should drive up the complexity of communication. 
When we consider both the optimism and certainty with which the inflation reports 
communicate, however, we find behaviour consistent with our hypothesis. As inflation moves 
further away from the inflation target, we found that communication via inflation reports 
became less optimistic and more uncertain.  
Finally, we consider our analysis of the uncertainty of inflation report communication 
in more detail. We found that inflation pressures both from the current inflation rate and the 
divergence from the inflation target led to an increased level of uncertainty in the manner in 
which the inflation reports were written. Interestingly, however, we found evidence that 
depreciating sterling led to an increased level of certainty in the inflation reports. Put together, 
these results may suggest that the BoE is not necessarily motivated to communicate in a more 
complex manner by depreciating sterling as they are with rising inflation. There is some 
intuition to this finding as cheaper sterling has significant benefits for trade and capital inflows, 
and inflation reports focus significantly on these areas of the economy in their analysis.  
There is some support for our findings on uncertainty in the central banking literature 
that may help explain our results. According to Gruner (2002), central banks being uncertain 
in their behaviour may indeed be an optimal strategy by the bank as they argue that more 
uncertainty about the objectives of the central bank leads to more wage discipline and 
subsequently lowers wage inflation (see Rose 1991). This argument holds in so far as 
uncertainty from the central bank’s communication affects trade union behaviour.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the time-varying characteristics of the complexity and tone of the 
Bank of England’s communication as well as the role that macroeconomic conditions play in 
determining the complexity and tone of the BoE’s communication. This chapter is central to 
our fundamental research questions, which seek to explore variability of complexity and tone 
and how these are driven by macroeconomic conditions in which these communications are 
made. Our analysis focused on communication in the form of MPC minutes and inflation 
reports. We used computer-aided textual analysis to derive quantitative values for 
communication complexity, optimism tone and uncertainty tone. Our macroeconomic data 
mainly included variables that captured inflationary pressures and exchange rate pressures, 
namely, inflation rate, the contemporaneous inflation gap, the forward-looking (ex-ante) 
inflation gap and exchange rate. We further included the financial crisis dummy variable to 
control for the important period of the 2008 financial crisis. We then expressed our 
macroeconomic variables as a function of each of these dimensions of communication. Our 
null hypothesis which we sought to test in these models was (i) that there was no noticeable 
trend in the complexity and tone (optimism and uncertainty) of communication over our sample 
period and (ii) that there was no association between the complexity and tone of 
communication and the macroeconomic variables which we used in our model. 
In line with our first hypothesis, we found evidence that the complexity of MPC minutes 
published by the bank decreased over our sample period. By implying that clarity is an 
important precondition to transparency, this finding is in line with recent suggestions in the 
literature that central banks employ every means they can to increase transparency. We did not, 
however, find similar evidence in terms of a decrease in complexity of inflation reports as our 
trend variable turns out insignificant. When we explored the tone of communication, we found 
evidence that the level of uncertainty reflected in the BoE’s inflation reports also reduced, 
signifying that the Bank had grown more assured in its inflation report communications. We 
did not find evidence of any other trends in the tone of communication reflected in the bank’s 
inflation reports.  
We subsequently tested our second hypothesis as to whether there was any association 
between the communication made and the macroeconomic conditions at the time of making 
the communication. We found significant evidence to show that macroeconomic conditions 
had a sizeable impact on the complexity and tone of the BoE’s communication. Our core 
finding in this chapter is that when the BoE is faced with what we define as a difficult 
macroeconomic condition, where inflation is rising and the value of the sterling is falling, the 
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complexity of both MPC minutes and inflation reports tends to rise significantly. We found 
that falling sterling values tended to impact complexity of communication the most, with MPC 
minutes requiring a further 1.3 years of formal education to comprehend the text and inflation 
reports requiring 2.5 years of formal education for every unit 10p fall in value of the sterling.  
Generally, inflationary pressures seemed to be a dominant driver of complexity and 
tone across both MPC minutes and inflation reports. A rising inflation rate was observed to 
reduce optimism in MPC minutes and increase uncertainty in inflation reports. Furthermore, 
we found consistent evidence that as inflation deviated further from the inflation target both 
MPC minutes and inflation reports were significantly less optimistic. Somewhat surprising, 
however, when we explore the forward-looking inflation gap – i.e. the difference between 
current inflation and the inflation forecast for four quarters ahead – a widening of the gap 
seemed to drive up optimism in both MPC minutes and inflation reports. This particular finding 
suggests that the BoE is more optimistic when future inflation is high but less optimistic when 
current inflation is high. This makes intuitive sense; a rising inflation forecast may be evidence 
of future economic growth and increased output, and as such the BoE is reflecting its 
anticipation for the future growth in its current communication.  
Given that we hypothesised that a transparent central bank may communicate with more 
complexity, less optimism and more uncertainty if it is indeed faced with a scenario that is 
more complex, these findings may also support the notion that the BoE exhibits elements of 
transparency through its behaviour. Although rising inflation and falling sterling values may 
be considered difficult macroeconomic conditions, it is important to explore more complex 
scenarios such as the existence of a financial crisis. Of particular note, therefore, is the role that 
a financial crisis plays influencing the complexity and tone of communication. In doing this, 
we found evidence that the 2008 financial crisis significantly increased the level of uncertainty 
observed in MPC minutes but there seemed to be no impact on other measures of complexity 
and tone across MPC minutes and inflation reports. This suggests that the complexity and tone 
of communication is more impacted by changing inflationary and exchange rate environments 
than by a full-blown financial crisis.  
Overall, our findings provide very useful information for central banks in helping them 
understand what drives the clarity and tone with which they make policy communication. 
Although the manner in which central banks often communicate in response to the 
macroeconomic conditions may be unintentional on the part of the banks, the evidence suggests 
that their communications are significantly influenced by the macroeconomic conditions 
prevailing at the time of the communication. Therefore, our findings have significant policy 
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implications for central banks in that they can consciously adjust the clarity and tone of 
communication ex-ante, in response to the existing macroeconomic conditions. For instance, 
particular emphasis can be placed on improving clarity by reducing the complexity of texts 
used in communications where there are economic environments with rising inflation and 
falling sterling values. In many cases, in such difficult conditions, the bank itself may be 
unclear as to how to communicate; however, by eliminating the tendency to communicate with 
increased complexity, and by using more clearly written language, communication will be 
more transparent. Being aware of the tendency for communication to be unclear in such periods 
as our evidence suggests will indeed help banks to improve their transparency practices. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0 EVALUATING SHOCK TRANSMISSION FROM CENTRAL BANK 
COMMUNICATION TO THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
5.1 Introduction  
To further explore the nature of the relationship between central bank communication 
and our economic and financial variables of interest, we carried out a series of analyses that 
sought to analyse the onward effects of the Bank of England’s communication on the 
macroeconomic and financial environment. This chapter seeks to address our research question 
on whether the release of the BoE’s MPC minutes transmits shocks to key macroeconomic and 
financial variables when they are made. Here, we focused on whether the dimensions of central 
bank communication that we explore have an impact on key macroeconomic and financial 
variables in a way that is similar to traditional monetary policy tools such as the policy rate. 
Therefore, we only analysed monetary policy communication via MPC minutes as these 
contain policy communication which inflation reports do not contain, and also, we only 
explored the complexity and optimism reflected in the communication.  
The chapter uses a more traditional approach in evaluating the role of communication 
in monetary policy. Under a traditional view of monetary policy, central banks control nominal 
interest rates at very short horizons and as such, economic agents take a view of impending 
developments. By doing this, economic agents are able to form their own long-term view of 
the central bank’s policy stance. The Taylor (1999) rule has been regarded as a useful monetary 
policy rule that helps explain the path of such monetary policy behaviour, especially in terms 
of the Federal Reserve. In fact, whilst exploring US monetary policy history, Taylor (1999) 
argued that the rule largely reflected US monetary policy at the time when it was deemed to be 
relatively successful in driving the economy. He therefore proposed the rule as a principle for 
behaviour for policy makers. 
To put this in context, let us assume a central bank that follows a simple rule of nominal 
interest rate in the spirit of Taylor, e.g. as highlighted by Hansen and McMahon (2016) below: 
 
𝑖𝑡 =  ∅ ′𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡          … (5.1) 
 
Where 𝑖𝑡 represents the bank’s current stance of the economy at time t which is often depicted 
by the official base rate; 
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∅ captures a vector of reaction coefficients; 
𝜗𝑡  captures economic inputs into the rule at time t, which are also inputs used by central banks 
in their decision making as well as to derive their outlook on current and expected economic 
stance; and, 
𝜀𝑡 captures the bank’s expected deviation from this average rule at time t, also partially 
represented by the bank’s certainty in following a path that may deviate from the average rule. 
The intuition we follow is that when a central bank communicates in an inflation-
targeting environment, it discloses 𝑖𝑡, and economic agents can thereafter make a decision that 
informs their belief on the future path of interest rate 𝑖𝑡 based on their expectations of the inputs 
(𝜗𝑡) to the rule. In a zero lower bound environment, however, 𝑖𝑡 may become redundant as the 
central bank may be unable to reduce this further in response to a policy requirement. Such a 
scenario therefore necessitates the need for a variable that can be used to manage short-term 
policy expectations within a Taylor rule framework, similar to what the International Shadow 
Short Rates developed by Krippner (2015) seeks to achieve. 
A number of works have been done on evaluating the extent to which central bank 
communication adds information to the standard Taylor rule which uses inflation and output 
growth to forecast upcoming interest rate decisions. Using backward-looking Taylor rule 
models, Heinemann and Ullrich (2007), as well as Rosa and Verga (2007), found that 
communication does improve the fit of the standard Taylor rule when communication variables 
are included. However, given that interest rate changes affect inflation and output with a 
significant lag, monetary policy should be forward looking.  Indeed, studies such as Gorter et 
al. (2008) have found that in backward-looking Taylor models, the Taylor principles do not 
hold. Other studies such as Sturm and De Haan al (2011) have argued for the use of a forward-
looking Taylor model to be able to significantly capture the effects of communication within 
the rule. They found that the inclusion of a communication variable into the standard Taylor 
rule adds information that helps predict the future path of policy decision by the ECB. 
 In this study, we explored two dimensions of communication, namely the complexity 
and optimism in the Bank of England’s communication as inputs to the simple rule defined 
above. Similar to our previous analyses, we use the Flesch-Kincaid readability scores as a 
measure of complexity and the Diction software programme to obtain quantitative values for 
‘optimism’. It is important to note that we only focused on complexity and optimism because 
we argue that these dimensions of communication contain vital policy intentions by central 
banks that help drive expectations, as in it in a standard Taylor rule. For instance, from a 
monetary policy standpoint, a rise in optimism in communication at a point when markets are 
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recovering may signal a rise in rates in the near future and may also have the same policy effect 
as an actual rise in rates. The opposite is even more applicable in a zero lower band 
environment, given that there is no accommodation for further reduction in rates. In the same 
way, the central bank may use clarity or otherwise in its policy intention to control market 
expectations, as indeed Alan Greenspan was noted to do with his ambiguous policy remarks.  
Consistent with our previous analyses, we explored communication in the form of 
monetary policy committee (MPC) minutes. Here, we ignored inflation reports as we focused 
mainly on monthly policy communications, as we suggest that these provide a more regular 
outlet for the bank to drive policy. In analysing the effects of these policy communications on 
the economic and financial variables of interest, we followed the seminal work of Bernanke, 
Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) which used a factor augment vector autoregression (FAVAR) 
methodology in assessing the effects of central bank communication. This approach is also 
comparable to Hansen and McMahon (2016), who similarly explored three dimensions of 
FOMC communication using textual analysis in examining the role of monetary policy on 
economic and financial variables. However, rather than focusing on the Fed, we focus on the 
BoE, and also on the complexity and optimism of MPC communication using computational 
dictionary methods rather than topic modelling. 
In general, VAR models use a multivariate methodology in which changes in each of 
the variables are linked to changes in its own lags as well as changes in other variables and the 
lags of these other variables. VAR models have been used extensively in the empirical analysis 
of monetary policy issues (see Bagliano and Favero 1998 for a survey). Where there exists no 
clear specification of a structural model to evaluate certain macroeconomic issues, VAR 
models become very useful in identifying relationships between variables. As is the case in this 
study, despite extensive evidence that central bank communication impacts financial and 
economic variables, it cannot be said for sure what the direction of these impacts will be if the 
complexity or optimism of the bank’s communication varies.  
Although the standard structural VAR approach delivers a substantial amount of 
structural information when used to measure the effects of monetary policy shocks, there are 
significant limitations to using the approach. Notably, as Christiano et al. (1999) highlight, a 
number of researchers have disagreed on the appropriate strategy for identifying policy shocks 
as alternative identifications can lead to varying results. Additionally,, Bernanke et al. (1997) 
suggest that the standard VAR methodology ignores the arguably more important effects of the 
monetary policy rule and focuses mainly on the unanticipated changes in monetary policy. 
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These limitations often revolve around the idea that the standard VAR methodology uses a 
relatively small amount of information to identify monetary policy.  
As Bernanke et al. (2005) highlight, most standard VAR methodologies employ about 
six to eight variables which are in reality unlikely to span the information set used by central 
banks in their decision making. Typically, central banks will explore a wide range of 
information and in the case of the Bank of England, this even extends far beyond the 
information provided by bank staff and includes information from independent reports as well. 
Bernanke et al. identify that the effect of estimating a standard VAR in such a scenario with a 
limited information set is that: (i) the measurement of policy innovations is likely to be 
contaminated, e.g. as in the price puzzle by Sims (1992); (ii) unobserved components of 
observable measures may not be captured, e.g. through measurement errors and; (iii) only 
impulse responses for included variables, which may be only a portion of the relevant variables, 
can be observed. For instance, one might look to capture the theoretical concepts of ‘economic 
activity’ using standard GDP or industrial production measures but there may be unobserved 
components of these data sets that do not wholly capture economic activity. Within a FAVAR 
model, however, one is able to capture the effects of wider variables, such as retail sales and 
employment statistics, within a wider assessment of economic activity. It is important to note 
that simply including additional variables in a standard VAR methodology will severely limit 
the model due to the degrees of freedom problem. 
 It is in the context of these limitations to the standard structural VAR methodology that 
Bernanke (2005) explored the FAVAR models. Hansen and McMahon (2016), using the 
FAVAR methodology, suggest that the approach allows the inclusion and observation of a 
large number of variables without running into the curse of dimensionality. In simple terms, 
the FAVAR approach is a dynamic factor model that summarises the information from a large 
set of time series data by using relatively small sets of estimated indices or factors. The idea of 
a FAVAR is based on the original works of Stock and Watson (2002), which developed a 
dynamic factor model to summarise the information in large data sets using a smaller set of 
data. Given the context of our analysis, where we simply explore a couple of dimensions of the 
BoE’s communication in a bid to explain the bank’s entire policy stance, this model becomes 
eminently appropriate. 
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5.2 Methodology: FAVAR framework 
 In this study we generally follow Bernanke et al.’s (2005) specification of the FAVAR 
model, which uses a two-step principal component approach to identify the unobserved factors.  
The model contains three main dimensions, which are the observed factors, the unobserved 
factors and the observed economic time series. 
Suppose 𝑌𝑡 is an 𝑀 × 1 vector of variables that are assumed to drive the economy and 
are observable. 𝑌𝑡 could contain information relating to a policy variable (e.g. communication 
or short-term interest rate) or other observable measures of real activity and prices that qualify. 
In a standard VAR or structural VAR methodology, 𝑌𝑡 in itself will be touted as the main 
variable driving the economy; however, 𝑌𝑡 data may not fully capture additional economic 
dimensions relevant to modelling the dynamics of macroeconomic policy. Within the FAVAR 
framework, these additional economic dimensions that are unobserved may be captured by a 
𝐾 × 1  vector of unobserved factors 𝐹𝑡, where K is ‘small’. In our model, 𝐹𝑡 may be assumed 
to capture the several other dimensions of communication that we do not explore, are not 
captured by measurement errors or that are perceived by economic agents in a different way. 
The structure of the dynamics between these two factors is given by: 
 
[
𝐹𝑡
𝑌𝑡
] = Φ(𝐿) [
𝐹𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
] + 𝜐𝑡       … (5.1) 
 
The above equation is a standard VAR in (𝐹𝑡
′, 𝑌𝑡
′) and could be estimated if we had 
observable values for 𝐹𝑡; however, in this case, values of 𝐹𝑡are unobservable. Suppose, 
however, that we have a series of informational time series of economic variables denoted by 
a 𝑁 × 1 vector of 𝑋𝑡. The assumption here is that N is greater than the time periods T and is 
also assumed to be greater than the number of factors and observed variables in the FAVAR 
framework. The informational time series 𝑋𝑡 can be expressed as a function of the unobservable 
factors 𝐹𝑡 as well as the observable factors 𝑌𝑡 in the form below: 
 
𝑋𝑡 =  Λ
𝑓𝐹𝑡 + Λ
𝑦𝑌𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡       …. (5.2) 
 
In keeping with Hansen and McMahon (2016), equation 5.2 above is referred to as the 
‘observation equation’ while equation 5.1 is the ‘transition equation’. 
The original baseline FAVAR model by Bernanke (2005) uses only one dimension, the 
Federal Funds rate, as the driving variable affecting the economy (i.e. 𝑌𝑡 =  𝑖𝑡 and a single 
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factor therefore K=1). We primarily propose three dimensions of monetary policy drivers, 
namely, the complexity of communication, the optimism of communication and the policy rate 
variable, as our policy tools and extract four factors (K = 4) to be used in our FAVAR analysis. 
The introduction of a policy rate variable is important to our analysis as it helps us capture the 
fundamental effects that an implied policy rate has on the macroeconomy and as such we can 
control for the bank’s intended policy actions. However, a problem arises given that our 
analysis contains the period 2009 to 2015 where interest rates were at the zero lower band 
(ZLB) and as such the bank could not realistically cut interest rates lower in response to 
economic conditions. Using the interest rate as a policy rate variable may therefore have the 
effect of understating the effects of the bank’s policy making during this period. To alleviate 
this problem, rather than rely on the interest rate variable, we use the international shadow short 
rates (ISSR) developed by Krippner (2015), which was constructed using a lower bound 
framework with two factors and reflects the current stance of monetary policy at the lower 
bound. The ISSR is the actual policy rate above the ZLB but also has the advantage of going 
into negative territory when the policy rate hits the ZLB, as seen in figure 5.1 below. 
 
Figure 5.1: International shadow short rates developed by Krippner (2015) 
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Our multidimensional monetary policy FAVAR is therefore expressed as below: 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  [
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑡
]           … (5.3) 
 
Where 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 denotes the complexity of MPC minutes, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑡 denotes the optimism 
tone of MPC minutes and ISSR is the international shadow short rate. To estimate our FAVAR, 
we follow the original two-step principal component approach by Stock and Watson (2002) 
and cited in Bernanke et al. (2005). The approach involves first estimating the factors using 
principal components - 𝐹𝑡, and then estimate VAR in 𝐹𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡.  
 
5.2.1 Estimating principal components 
In the first step, the approach estimates 𝐾 + 𝑀 principal components of 𝑋𝑡 which is 
referred to as ?̂?(𝐹𝑡, 𝑌𝑡) and are linear combinations of 𝐹𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡. This indicates that the number 
of factors (𝐾) are added to the number of 𝑌𝑡 variables. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) highlight 
that a useful implication of this step is that it allows researchers to deal with data irregularities 
in a systematic way, without necessarily obtaining spurious results. They analyse 𝑋𝑡 in a 
number of scenarios where the data include monthly and quarterly series as well as series with 
missing values or that have been discontinued.  As Hansen and McMahon (2016) point out, 
this process is aimed at identifying the structural shocks to all of the 𝑌𝑡 variables but this cannot 
be done if estimated factors include the effects of 𝑌𝑡. Therefore, the effects of the 𝑌𝑡 variables 
we are interested in shocking will need to be eliminated from ?̂?(𝐹𝑡, 𝑌𝑡).   
We followed the identification assumptions proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005) and 
which have been used extensively in FAVAR models (e.g. see Mumtaz and Surico, 2007; 
Baumeister et al., 2010; and Wu and Xia, 2016). Under the first identification assumption, two 
categories of information variables are identified, namely, slow-moving variables and fast-
moving variables. Slow-moving variables are often identified as those variables that do not 
respond contemporaneously to unanticipated changes in monetary policy (policy shocks). As 
in our previous analysis, some of our macroeconomic variables of interest only include GDP 
growth rate, inflation rate, the pound/dollar exchange rate and the FTSE 100 growth rate, which 
effectively capture key aspects that are communicated by the BoE in MPC minutes and 
inflation reports. In our FAVAR specification, however, we are able to include dozens of 
macroeconomic and financial market variables in our analysis. Put together, our analysis 
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employs up to 71 variables and details of these are shown in our appendix. Variables such as 
GDP growth rate, industrial production, Retail price index etc are identified as slow-moving 
variables that feed into our FAVAR model. Fast-moving variables, on the other hand, are those 
variables that will respond contemporaneously to policy shocks. Variables such as our stock 
market return, bond yields and the exchange rate variables are considered to be fast-moving 
variables that feed into our FAVAR model. 
Next, our approach involved estimating the principal components of the slow-moving 
𝑋𝑡 variables identified above. It is important to note that in the identification assumption above, 
𝑌𝑡 does not react to these principal components. Given this, ?̂?(𝐹𝑡, 𝑌𝑡) can be identified as below:  
 
?̂?(𝐹𝑡, 𝑌𝑡) =  𝛽𝑐?̂?
∗(𝐹𝑡) +  𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑡 +  𝜂𝑡        … (5.4) 
 
Equation 5.4 above is therefore estimated using standard OLS with principal 
components as regressors. Subsequently, 𝐹𝑡 can be defined as:  
 
𝐹?̂? =  ?̂?(𝐹𝑡, 𝑌𝑡) −  𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑡          … (5.5) 
 
 A potential problem of the above approach is that the factors we extract could be subject 
to sampling errors, therefore equation 5.2 above may be spuriously estimated (see Koop and 
Korobilis 2010 for details). Nonetheless, as with previous research using the two-step 
approach, we proceeded with this methodology while carefully identifying this caveat. The 
next section details the second step of our FAVAR model using a standard VAR methodology 
that incorporates the factors estimated in this section. 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Standard unrestricted VAR 
 The second step of the two-step FAVAR approach involves estimating a standard VAR 
in 𝐹𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡 of the form: 
 
𝑍𝑡 =  [
𝐹?̂?
𝑋𝑡
𝑌𝑡
]           … (5.6) 
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With the reduced form being: 
 
𝑍𝑡 =  𝐴𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡            … (5.7) 
 
Although the standard VAR has been widely used in the traditional monetary policy 
literature to analyse the effects of macroeconomic policy shock (see Bagliano and Favero 1998 
for a review), the limitations of the methodology have been well discussed above. Our inclusion 
of 𝐹?̂? in the standard VAR helps significantly improve the information content of our standard 
VAR model. The idea behind the standard unrestricted VAR model is quite simple and has the 
advantage of avoiding the need to specify a structural model for the economy. The basic idea 
is that the impact of monetary policy in a standard VAR is defined by the structural model 
below: 
 
𝐴 (
𝑋𝑡
𝑌𝑡
) = 𝐶(𝐿) (
𝑋𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
) + 𝐵 (
𝑣𝑡
𝑋
𝑣𝑡
𝑌 )       … (5.8) 
 
Where 𝑋𝑡 represents a vector of macroeconomic (non-policy) variables such as those 
highlighted in our list of 71 macroeconomic variables (𝑋𝑡) that we specify in the appendix; and 
𝑌𝑡 represents the policy variables controlled by policy makers, such as interest rate, and which 
in our case are the dimensions of policy communication we explore (i.e. complexity and 
optimism) and the ISSR.  
Matrix A represents the contemporaneous relationship between the variables. C(L) is a 
matrix finite-order lag polynomial, while 𝑣 is a vector of structural disturbances to the 𝑋𝑡 and 
𝑌𝑡 variables. In standard VAR models, the policy variables are assumed to be endogenous and 
therefore accommodate for the weakness of structural models where policy variables are 
assumed to be exogenous and as a result render the model invalid if monetary policy reacts 
endogenously to the macroeconomic variables. The main advantage of such a model as 
highlighted above is that the transmission mechanism is estimated to provide empirical 
evidence about the response of macroeconomic variables to monetary policy impulses rather 
than describe theoretical monetary policy. 
The empirical starting point for analysing the standard VAR model is the estimation of 
the reduced form of the structural model (5.8) above in the form: 
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(
𝑋𝑡
𝑌𝑡
) = 𝐴−1𝐶(𝐿) (
𝑋𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
) + 𝐵 (
𝑢𝑡
𝑋
𝑢𝑡
𝑌 )     … (5.9) 
 
Where 𝑢 represents the VAR residual factor. The relationship between 𝑢 (the VAR 
residuals) and 𝑣 (the structural disturbances in the equation (x) above) is given by: 
 
𝐴 (
𝑢𝑡
𝑋
𝑢𝑡
𝑌 ) = 𝐵 (
𝑣𝑡
𝑋
𝑣𝑡
𝑌 )        … (5.10) 
 
To identify the structural parameters within the reduced form model, some important 
restrictions need to be imposed on some elements of A and B. Bagliano and Favero (1998) 
summarise these restrictions as: “(i) assuming orthogonality of the structural disturbances; (ii) 
imposing that macroeconomic variables do not simultaneously react to monetary variables, 
while simultaneous feedback in the other direction is allowed; and (iii) imposing restrictions 
on the monetary block of the model reflecting the operational procedures implemented by the 
monetary policy maker” (p. 5). The baseline VAR models used in monetary policy analysis 
assume that policy variables react contemporaneously to non-policy variables whilst the 
reverse does not hold.  
Our model follows a new strand of literature that identifies communication as a policy 
variable and seeks to evaluate the reaction of non-policy macroeconomic variables to these 
communication shocks. Traditionally, the VAR framework identifies a simple policy rule that 
proposes a solution to the endogeneity of the policy variable and focuses mainly on the 
deviations from that policy rule. Given that we have assumed that communication takes on the 
role of 𝑖𝑡 (the policy variable) in our simple Taylor rule model described above in equation 5.0, 
our analysis allows us to explore the responses of macroeconomic variables that are not 
expected by the market. These communication shocks are vital in understanding monetary 
policy in the age of inflation targeting and forward guidance where communication is now 
being used as a policy tool. 
As is common within the FAVAR literature, we followed the restrictions that translate 
to the ordering of variables as proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005). The impulse responses are 
estimated by means of a Cholesky factorisation with 𝑌𝑡 which captures the dimensions of 
communication in our model ordered last. We therefore assumed a recursive structure whereby 
all the factors entering into the VAR system respond with a lag to change in the dimensions of 
communication (𝑌𝑡). This implies that no further restrictions are required in our equation 5.7 
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above and the policy shocks from communication can simply be identified as in a standard 
VAR model. The Cholesky factorisation orthogonalises the residuals from our non-policy 
factors Xt in the identification of our impulse responses. 
 
5.3  Estimation and data 
To assess the impact of macroeconomic policy communication, we explored monthly 
monetary policy communication from minutes of the MPC meeting. Our rationale for selecting 
these communication avenues are well described in the introductory and literature review 
sections of our work.  Our sample period extends from the point where the BoE attained 
independence in 1997, and therefore obtained a greater mandate for inflation targeting, up until 
2015, when the bank overhauled its communication and transparency practices. Using the 
FAVAR methodology, we estimated the effects of 214 MPC minutes on 71 macroeconomic 
and financial variables all sourced from Bloomberg. Specifically, we explored variables 
covering inflation, the financial market, the currency market, output and other macroeconomic 
aggregates.6 Most of these variables were carefully selected on the basis that they either (i) 
formed part of the input data going into the MPC’s decision-making process as identified in 
the minutes or (ii) were a part of the Bloomberg monthly economic data releases that are widely 
followed by market participants.  
In addition to the above, one further motivation for selecting our 𝑋𝑡 (macroeconomic) 
variable was to follow the broad range of data categories used by Bernanke et al. (2005) which 
include: (i) real output and income variables; (ii) employment and hours variables; (iii) 
consumption variables; (iv) housing and sales variables; (v) real inventories, orders and 
unfulfilled orders variables; (vi) stock price data; (vii) exchange rate data; (viii) interest rate 
data; (ix) money and credit quantities aggregate data; (x) price indices; (xi) average hourly 
earnings; and (xii) other miscellaneous data. We replicated all 12 categories of data for the 
United Kingdom and explored them from the period where the bank gained its independence 
in 1997 until 2015. We used a total of 71 macroeconomic variables in our FAVAR analysis; 
details of these as well as their descriptions can be found in the appendix. 
As required by the FAVAR methodology, we identified the price level and output 
growth type variables as slow-moving variables as these do not react contemporaneously to 
policy changes. On the other hand, we identified the financial markets and currency market 
                                               
6 A list of the variables used are available in the appendix.  
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type variables as fast-moving variables. Our data series were transformed as required using 
codes 1 to 5 (see appendix). 
We estimated FAVAR in the EViews software programme. Similar to a number of 
studies, including Bernanke et al. (2005) and Hansen and McMahon (2016) which we followed 
closely, our analysis used seven lags, although using up to 13 lags did not significantly change 
our results. As with the aforementioned studies, these lags were selected arbitrarily rather than 
using standard information criteria for selecting lag length. The confidence intervals for the 
models were generated using a two-step bootstrap method with 1000 bootstrap replications. As 
described above, in the first step, we estimated the unobserved factors of our financial and 
microeconomic data using principal components, as per Bernanke et al. (2005). In the second 
step we used the estimated factors along with our communication variable of interest to 
estimate a standard structural VAR model. Our study uses four factors (K = 4) to estimate our 
standard VAR, and as with Bernanke et al. (2005), using three or five factors did not 
qualitatively change our results. Following on from their study, using four factors within our 
FAVAR model was assumed to be sufficient for our analysis given that they found that only 
one factor substantially increased the quality of the standard VAR model and even eliminated 
a considerable part of the price puzzle documented by Sims (1992). 
Our policy variable (𝑌𝑡) explored the various dimensions of monetary policy 
communication that we propose to be drivers of the macroeconomic environment, namely 
complexity, optimism and the ISSR. Before proceeding with the FAVAR analysis, we explored 
the effect of the complexity and tone variables on the ISSR (the BoE’s monetary policy stance) 
using impulse response functions (IRF). This analysis is essential for capturing any additional 
effects on the policy rate that complexity and tone of communication may have. As per the 
previous sections of our work, we again used the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (Kincaid et al. 
(1975) as our measure of complexity of communication. The measure is one of the traditional 
methods of determining the readability of financial disclosure documents and has been used to 
capture clarity of central bank communication in the past (e.g. see Loughran and MacDonald 
2014; Jansen 2011b; Bulir et al. 2014; Jansen and Moessner 2016b).  For tone of central bank 
communication, we explored the ‘optimism’ variable which was obtained the Diction software 
programme.  
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5.4  Results  
As detailed in previous sections, our analysis explores the effects of two broad 
dimensions of central bank communication, namely complexity and optimism on both the 
macroeconomic environment and financial markets. We sought to explore the effects of shocks 
to these dimensions on the macroeconomic and financial variables analysed. Our analysis used 
a FAVAR methodology which allowed us to extensively explore the effects of these shocks on 
as many as 71 variables, thereby giving us a comprehensive view of the effects of 
communication shocks. The results from our analyses are detailed below. 
 
5.4.1 The effects of a change in the policy rate (ISSR) 
In the first instance, we explored the effects of a change in policy rate as measured by 
the international short shadow rate (ISSR) on the other communication variables. We then 
explored the effects of policy shocks from the ISSR on our financial and macroeconomic 
variables of interest. As highlighted above, the inclusion of a policy rate in our analysis of the 
effects of communication allowed us to capture both traditional monetary policy shocks and 
other policy shocks that may come from our communication variables. Figures 5.2 to 5.6 below 
show the impulse responses to the policy variable. 
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Figure 5.2: Impulse response of policy variables to policy rate (ISSR) shocks 
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The results suggest that shocks to the ISSR tend to drive down optimism and 
complexity over the short to medium term as shocks were not persistent beyond the six-month 
mark. The implication of this is that in figure 5.2, shocks to the policy rate drove down all the 
financial markets indices we explored (i.e. the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 350 and the FTSE 
All Share), irrespective of the size of the constituent companies. The shocks here are persistent 
and the indices exhibit a steady decline towards negative territory. A combination of factors 
was highlighted to cause a decline in financial market indices following contractionary shocks 
to the policy rate. One dominant argument is that the cost of capital rises and thus makes 
investment difficult for investors and a second argument is the role that such shocks play in 
encouraging savings over investments. These two combined effects have the effect of putting 
downward pressure on the financial markets and are in line with the expectations of economic 
theory. These results are further consistent with several previous studies which have found that 
tightening of monetary policy leads to declines in financial markets (e.g. see Rigobon and Sack 
(2004). Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2009), for instance, found that contractionary monetary policy 
could account for as much as a 10% decline in equity values in the US. 
 
We also observed that following policy rate shocks, sterling rose in value against most 
of the major currency pairs that we explored (with the exception of GBP_EUR), although these 
rises are of relatively little importance in the first couple of months. Subsequently, we found 
that sterling depreciated gradually from around the four-month mark onwards. Similar to the 
classic prize puzzle where contractionary shocks lead to a rise in prices, some previous findings 
have also documented the exchange rate puzzle, whereby a contractionary policy leads to a 
depreciating local currency value (e.g. see Kim and Roubini, 2000). We found some evidence 
of such a price puzzle in latter periods of our impulse response graphs. Nonetheless, our results 
with these major currencies are consistent with both economic theories as well as studies that 
use the more robust methodologies that account for the exchange rate puzzle such as Ivrendi 
and Guloglu (2010) and Barnett et al. (2016). 
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Figure 5.3: Impulse response of currency and financial market variables to policy rate 
(ISSR) shocks 
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Figure 5.4 below shows the responses of our bond market variables to the policy rate. 
We found that the SGI bond indices, which mainly constitute corporate bonds, reacted in a 
different manner to the UK government bonds. Shocks to the policy rate had an initial negative 
impact on corporate bonds yields for up to four months, this was then reversed and bond yields 
tended to rise gradually from this point onwards. We found that the bonds with a longer tenor 
tended to exhibit a more negative response compared to the shorter bonds which have six 
months to maturity. In contrast, we found that the impacts on government bond notes tended 
to be slightly positive initially followed by a very slight fall in yields that are less persistent 
than corporate bonds. The initial rises in yield demonstrated following policy rate shocks are 
consistent with macroeconomic theory.  
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Figure 5.4: Impulse response of bond market variables to policy rate (ISSR) shocks 
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Impulse responses of inflation variables, as shown in figure 5.5 below, show that prices 
tended to rise briefly before then falling following shocks to the policy variable. The initial rise 
in prices documented here is perhaps consistent with the classic ‘price puzzle’ as identified by 
Sims (1992), where a contractionary policy leads to an increase in inflation as opposed to a 
decrease. However, inflation reverts to expected behaviour (a fall) with a lag of about two to 
three months. Some subsequent work in the literature, such as Henzel et al.’s work (2009), still 
document the price puzzle, albeit with mostly American macroeconomic data, and have tried 
to explain the possible channels for this anomaly with little luck. Our results are nonetheless 
consistent with more recent studies that use the FAVAR methodology to significantly reduce 
or eliminate the prize puzzle (e.g. see Korobilis 2012) as well as studies such as Ivrendi and 
Guloglu (2010) which uses a structural vector error correction model.  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Impulse response of inflation and output variables to policy rate (ISSR) shocks 
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Our results for construction, industrial, services and manufacturing output in figure 5.5 
above show that shocks to output variables faded out quite quickly, with the effects wearing 
out in as little as four months. We therefore found little evidence of the policy rate used in this 
study having a significant effect on output variables over the longer term.  
 
Figure 5.6: Impulse response of other macroeconomic variables to policy rate (ISSR) shocks 
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Finally, for policy rate shocks, we examined selected macroeconomic variables shown 
in figure 5.6 above. We found that shocks to the policy rate drove up unemployment in the long 
run with the effects taking about three months to kick in. The initial reaction to policy rate 
shocks, which firstly saw unemployment reduce, is inconsistent with economic theory. A 
potential explanation for this may be the delay in the time it takes for the employment market 
to react to policy, especially as there are labour laws in place to protect employees. The timing 
of the positive consistent rise in unemployment is also interesting, as it perfectly matches the 
results of Bernanke and Blinder (1992), who found that the unemployment rate responded to 
shocks in the federal funds rate in the desired manner only about nine months after the shock. 
Similar to our analysis which shows unemployment rising from about eight months until about 
twenty-eight months, they also found that shocks to the policy rate raised unemployment from 
about nine months until it stagnated at around twenty-four months. Effects on business 
investment and retail sales were almost non-existent and wore out very quickly. As expected, 
policy rate shocks led to an immediate reduction in consumer credit supplied as well as public 
sector net cash requirement borrowed but again, most of these shocks were not very persistent 
beyond the fourth period.   
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5.4.2 The effects of a change in optimism  
The role of optimism in central bank communication is very important in a zero lower 
bound environment as this sentiment can play a vital role in driving short-term expectations in 
the desired direction of the bank, similar to policy rate changes. Particularly, the financial press 
over the past few years has often been very critical of the level of central bank optimism 
communicated via policy documents as it supposedly helps them parse the potential for a 
central bank’s rate rise. Reports often tend to discuss optimistic news from economic 
fundamentals such as financial market gains and GDP growth as a signal that the bank will be 
looking to act on interest rates. Generally, an increase in optimism is often seen as a sign of 
movement in the direction of an interest rate rise and along the lines of a contractionary 
monetary policy. In this analysis, we therefore explore the impact of optimism shocks on a 
number of macroeconomic and financial variables, similar to our analysis for the policy rate. 
To begin with, we explored the effects of shocks to optimism on our other policy 
variables, namely the policy rate and the complexity of communication. Figures 5.7 to 5.12 
below show our results for these interactions. 
 
Figure 5.7: Impulse response of policy variables to optimism shocks 
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Figure 5.7 above shows some confirmation that optimism shocks led to a rise in the 
policy rate, although this increase may be considered to be somewhat measured and largely 
insignificant in parts. Complexity also tended to increase over the longer term but the 
immediate response of communication was to be less complex in the period immediately 
following an optimism shock. A positive shock to optimism is therefore by our interpretation, 
similar to a contractionary monetary policy move. 
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Figure 5.8: Impulse response of currency and financial markets variables to optimism 
shocks 
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In the next set of analysis, we explore the effects of optimism shocks on the currency 
markets and stock markets (Fig. 5.8). Particularly, we explored how optimism shocks drive the 
value of the pound (GBP) relative to the US dollar (USD), the Japanese yen (JPY), Swiss franc 
(CHF) and the euro (EUR). For the major currencies, including the EUR, the USD and the JPY, 
our results consistently showed an initial increase in the value of the pound following shocks 
to optimism, although these took a couple of months to be significant in some cases. If we 
assume optimism shocks to impact the currency markets as a policy rate would, our results 
suggest some evidence of a ‘price puzzle’ with our GBP/CHF values which document negative 
reactions to shocks in optimism. Similar to the prize puzzle in policy rate analysis on inflation, 
some previous findings have documented the exchange rate puzzle, whereby a contractionary 
policy leads to a depreciating local currency value (e.g. see Kim and Roubini, 2000). 
Nonetheless, our results with the major currencies are consistent with both economic theories 
as well as studies that use the more robust methodologies that account for the exchange rate 
puzzle such as Ivrendi and Guloglu (2010) and Barnett et al. (2016). 
For the financial markets, we explored the effect of optimism shocks on the FTSE 100, 
the FTSE 250, the FTSE 350 and the FTSE All Share indices. Our results show that most of 
the financial indices with the exception of the FTSE 250, which is insignificant, initially reacted 
negatively to shocks in optimism, with most of these shocks lasting several months following 
the communication. Similar to our price level analysis, the behaviour of the financial markets 
seems to reflect a contractionary monetary policy. The intuition here is that with increased 
optimism in policy communication, firms’ expectations are for a rise in interest rates and they 
respond by reducing or postponing investment due to the increased cost of raising capital. 
Similarly, on the consumer side, in a contractionary environment, investors will prefer savings 
in anticipation of higher interest rates rather than investing. These two combined effects will 
have the effect of putting downward pressure on the financial markets and are in line with the 
expectations of economic theory (e.g. see Rigobon and Sack 2004).  
The insignificance of the FTSE 250, which is an index of the next largest 250 publicly 
listed companies (and much less significant effects of the FTSE 350, which combines the 
FTSE100 and the FTSE 250), suggests that the size of the companies matters when it comes to 
reacting to central bank optimism. The larger FTSE 100 firms exhibit a negative and significant 
response to central bank communication while the indices with smaller firms do not 
significantly react. This makes sense as it is likely to be investors in these larger firms, such as 
institutional investments and larger funds, that tend to be more sensitive to central bank 
communication. Furthermore, these findings are consistent with studies in the literature that 
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suggest that smaller firms are less impacted by monetary policy shocks (e.g. see Thorbecke 
1997). The hypothesis behind this evidence is that monetary policy only matters in part because 
it affects a firm’s access to credit. Indeed, where smaller firms are included, as in the case of 
the FTSE All Share, the negative effects of the shocks wear out more quickly, lasting about 
eight months before the negative trend is reversed, whereas the negative effects of optimism 
shocks to the FTSE 100 last twice as long – about 16 months – before returns start to pick up 
again.  
 
Figure 5.9: Impulse response of bond yields to optimism shocks 
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Next, in figure 5.9 above, we consider the reaction of bond yield to shocks in optimism 
using four government bond yield maturities as well as four Société Générale Bond indices 
(SGI) that contain a range of bonds (corporate and government) with similar maturities. For all 
the government bond indices which include maturities from one year to ten years, we observed 
that shocks to optimism led to increased yield, which is consistent with monetary policy theory 
expectations for contractionary policy shocks. Similar to studies such as Rigobon and Sack 
(2004) who found that the shorter-term maturities reacted more to shocks than longer-term 
maturities did, we found evidence that the reactions to the one-year and three-year maturities 
were more significant than those of the five-year and ten-year maturities. With the SGI bond 
index, however, we uncovered mixed results which may suggest that certain elements within 
the index react in different ways. We observed that only the ten-year maturity reacts as expected 
by showing a positive response. The short-term six-month maturity as well as the five-year 
maturity both show an immediate decline in yield. Generally, it is difficult to infer a pattern of 
direction with bond indices due to the unique nature of each of the constituent bonds, which 
may vary widely in terms of credit ratings and individual issuer reputation. Our key finding 
here has to do with the behaviour of government bonds which is largely consistent with the 
theoretical expectations of a rate rise.  
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Figure 5.10: Impulse response of inflation variables to optimism shocks 
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Figure 5.10 above shows the responses to the various measures of inflation explored to 
optimism shocks. We noticed that overall, shocks to optimism in the BoE’s communication 
seemed to lead to an immediate fall in inflation as measured by the CPI after the communication 
was made. The declining effects of these shocks on inflation seemed to persist for up to ten 
months, after which inflation started to rise again. The effects of these shocks are different 
when we consider inflation from the demand side (consumers) as opposed to the supply side 
(producers). We found that optimism shocks led to an increase rather than a decrease in the PPI 
variable, implying that input prices respond to optimism shocks in a different manner. It could 
therefore be suggested that optimism tone in central bank communication drives down prices 
via the consumption channel but drives up prices via the investment channel. The observation 
that house prices also fall sharply following shocks to optimism further supports our argument 
that prices are mostly affected via the consumption channel (assuming house purchases are 
driven by consumption rather than investment motives). 
The rationale for this may lie in the fact that optimism drives expectations of a rate rise 
and, as such, consumers hold back on spending and therefore demand falls with the subsequent 
result of a fall in inflation. Producers, on the other hand, seem to be increasing investment 
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inputs in anticipation of a rate rise due to increased optimism, which then drives up the prices 
of inputs.  
 
Figure 5.11: Impulse response of output and real economic activity variables to optimism 
shocks. 
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Finally, we explored the effect of shocks to optimism in the bank’s communication on 
certain output and economic variables which cover GDP, construction output, industrial 
production, and the index of services variable which measures value added for the services 
industry. The latter three components highlighted above contribute significantly to the overall 
GDP value and are therefore important in understanding the role that policy shocks play in 
influencing output. Consistent with our previous analysis, the responses of these variables were 
similar to those under a contractionary policy. We found evidence that shocks to optimism had 
a cooling effect on economic activity by driving negative responses in these variables. With 
GDP, the effects of the shock were insignificant after eight months, after which a negative 
response was observed. More definitive were the responses of construction output, industrial 
production, and the index of services, which all showed a sharp decline following shocks to 
optimism. These patterns of responses are very similar to those expressed in the monetary 
policy literature as to how output reacts to contractionary shocks. Particularly, the literature on 
the ‘credit channel’ of monetary policy transmission suggests that real output such as 
construction, industrial and services production reduces following perception of a 
contractionary policy, because the external finance premium which is the cost of raising outside 
capital by firms rises (see Bernanke and Getler 1995). Overall, all the impulse responses 
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generally support the theoretical argument that contractionary shocks to monetary policy have 
the effect of reducing aggregate output levels.  
Furthermore, we explored the effect of optimism shocks on aggregate credit availability 
and sales variables. We found further evidence that optimism shocks lead to reduced credit 
availability and a fall in sales synonymous with a rate rise. The consumer credit supplied, the 
mortgage approval rate and the money supplied all suddenly declined following shocks to 
optimism. We also documented evidence of a sharp decline in retail sales following shocks to 
optimism. The fall in retail sales was significantly sharper than the response of aggregate output 
variables above, and this may be due to the argument that durable goods seem to react faster 
and stronger to contractionary monetary policy than non-durable goods, as evidenced by Erceg 
and Levin (2006). The main reason for this is the direct impact of an interest rate rise on the 
cost and availability of credit, which was observed to be significant in our study and which 
subsequently impacts consumers’ purchasing ability significantly. Along these lines, we also 
noticed a sharp fall in weekly earnings within the economy, which again tallies with our 
analysis of the effects of a contractionary policy.  
Interestingly, we did, however, observe a potential anomaly with the unemployment 
variable as measured by the claimant count. Here, optimism shocks tended to reduce 
unemployment initially in a manner that as inconsistent with economic theory, although this 
was subsequently reversed. We observed that although unemployment fell immediately after 
an optimism shock, it rose after three months as expected and fell again for a further two months 
before continuing to rise, as one would expect, for another eighteen to twenty months.  
 
5.4.3 The effects of a change in complexity 
As highlighted in previous sections of our work, the role of clarity (and complexity) of 
communication in macroeconomic policy making has become very important due to the 
increased need for transparency and accountability especially among inflation-targeting central 
banks. As Bulir et al. (2013) highlight, central banks have an incentive to vary the clarity of 
their communications to suit their policy objective. It is this potential behaviour and ability of 
central banks to tailor communication to achieve their aims that makes the evaluation of the 
clarity of central bank communication necessary. Given that there is some evidence that the 
clarity of central bank communications affects markets (e.g. see Jansen 2011b), there is 
therefore an incentive to explore how shocks to clarity influence macroeconomic and other 
financial variables.  
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To this end, we extended our analysis using the FAVAR methodology to explore the 
effects of shocks from the complexity of communication to our macroeconomic and financial 
variables of interest. Our intuition here is that if central banks do indeed vary the complexity 
of their communication to meet their policy objectives, then complexity can be explored within 
a macroeconomic policy framework alongside other policy variables. In our analysis below, 
we explored how innovations from communication complexity were transmitted across our 
macroeconomic and financial variables of interest. Similar to our previous analyses, we first 
explored the effects of shocks to complexity on our other policy variables, namely the policy 
rate and optimism. Figures 5.12 to 5.16 below show our results for this interaction. 
 
Figure 5.12: Impulse response of policy variables to complexity shocks 
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On the effects of complexity on other policy variables we explored, we found that 
shocks to complexity impacted the level of optimism in communication the most (Fig. 5.12). 
More complex communication seems to significantly drive down the levels of optimism in 
policy communication. 
 
Figure 5.13: Impulse response of currency and financial markets variables to complexity 
shocks 
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Figure 5.13 above compares impulse response functions from shocks to complexity of 
communication on major currencies relative to the pound as well as the major stock market 
indices. Generally, we found evidence that shocks to complexity tended to lead to a depressed 
pound value. Although the pound demonstrated an immediate and sharp decline in value 
relative to most of the major currencies, in some cases, these effects were not significant until 
a couple of months later. The GBP-USD, GBP-EUR and GBP-GPY, for instance, showed 
significant lags in the time it took for the negative effects to kick in. The idea that the pound 
falls in value following shocks to clarity can be explained by an analysis similar to the stock 
market. More complexity in communicating policy by the bank leads to lesser foreign 
investment in the UK and subsequently a sell off of the pound that will trigger a decline.  
Next, we explored the impulse responses of financial markets returns to complexity 
shocks. We found here that the largest firms, as captured by the FTSE100, demonstrate the 
most significant responses to the complexity of the BoE’s communication. Following shocks 
to complexity, we found evidence that the FTSE100 returns fell sharply but only for about five 
months, after which the market returns started to rise. The reasoning here is that where the bank 
becomes more unclear about its policy decision, the financial markets react with falling stock 
market prices and subsequently returns. Indeed, if the bank is perceived to have more 
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information and the financial market participants look to the bank for clarity, if they then do 
not get satisfactory clarity from the bank, this will trigger a selloff of assets that will then lead 
to a stock market decline. What is also interesting is that when we consider the smaller 
companies as captured by the FTSE250, we find lesser evidence of a response to 
communication as the larger FTSE100 companies do. In fact, when we consider the inclusion 
of much wider range of smaller companies as captured by the FTSE All Share, complexity of 
communication as a whole loses its significance.  
Figure 5.14: Impulse response of bond yields to complexity shocks 
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Table 5.14 above shows the impulse responses of bond yields to shocks in complexity 
of communication. We observed that across all the bonds considered, yields fell following 
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shocks to complexity. In particular, we noticed that the effects of the shocks on falling yields 
were more significant with the longer term five- and ten-year government bond yields. For the 
one- and three-year government bond yields, we found evidence of a delayed significance of 
the falling yield in response to clarity shocks. The two-year and ten-year SGI bond indexes 
also showed a decline in bond yields over the longer term with a delayed response in 
significance. We argue that the main channel through which yield falls after a clarity shock is 
through falling inflation as we have demonstrated above. Bond investors tend to hold on to 
bond coupon payments when they anticipate inflation will fall as this will push down yield 
values (via increasing demand and bond prices). Since complexity shocks lead to an instant fall 
in inflation, the effect of the falling inflation means that bond yield will remain lower following 
shocks to complexity. In simple terms, when the bank communicates its policy decision in a 
complex manner, the resulting lower inflation from such a scenario may also lead to bond yield 
falling as demonstrated above. 
 
Figure 5.15: Impulse response of inflation variables to complexity shocks 
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Figure 5.15 above shows the impulse response functions of complexity shocks to the 
inflation level. Generally, we observed that shocks to complexity tended to reduce inflationary 
pressures as measured by the above inflation variables. Particularly, the CPI measure fell 
sharply over the first ten months and this was then followed by a smooth decline in prices that 
eventually levelled off after a further eight months. The idea that complexity shocks reduce 
inflation is therefore conceivable given that when markets are unclear about the direction of 
policy from the central bank, they would hold back on spending and consumption, which will 
lead to reduced inflation.  
 
Figure 5.16: Impulse response of output and real economic activity variables to optimism 
shocks 
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Finally, we explored the effects of shocks to key output variables as well as other 
relevant macroeconomic variables. For output, we found evidence that GDP, industrial 
production and services output fell immediately after shocks to complexity, although GDP only 
became significant with about a five-month delay. Shocks to industrial output tended to wear 
out relatively quicker and then stabilise after about twelve months. These indicate that with 
more complexity on policy direction, output falls in accordance with our previous arguments 
that such increased complexity reduces domestic investment as producers and consumers are 
relatively unclear about the policy path of the bank. Construction output, on the other hand, 
was found to increase following shocks to clarity, implying that construction output rises 
following more communication complexity. This may be due to the construction industry 
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requiring more time to adjust to policy decisions since, generally, construction decisions are 
taken considerably in advance of their implementation. We did indeed observe that after five 
months following the communication, construction output then seemed to respond negatively 
with more complexity. 
For other macroeconomic measures that we explored, we noticed mixed results on the 
response of complexity shocks. Credit availability as measured by the amount of consumer 
credit supplied rose slowly, whilst mortgage approval rates also rose but only became 
significant when the approval rates fell after about fifteen months. As expected, however, 
earnings, business investment and the money supply all seem to respond to more complexity 
in policy communication by declining. Furthermore, in line with this, unemployment as 
measured by the claimant count rose but then fell after six months. These patterns tie in very 
well with our argument that more complex communication leads to reduced economic activity. 
Perhaps an anomaly here is the response of retail sales, which seemed to rise rather than fall 
following complexity shocks, given that unemployment rose and output, earnings, business 
investment and money supply all fell. We argue that this may have been mainly driven by rising 
credit availability, especially within the consumer markets. Indeed, given that our evidence 
shows that consumer credit supplied rose, there is a strong case for the growth in retail sales 
being driven by the rising consumer credit supplied. Another obvious supporting argument for 
this is also the fact that the retail sales rises were only temporary and fell sharply after just six 
months.  
 
5.4.5 Analysis of forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) 
To evaluate the magnitude of the impact of innovations in our policy variables, 
especially the communication variables on the macroeconomic and financial variables, we 
carried out an analysis of the forecast error variance decomposition derived from our FAVAR 
analysis. There is some evidence in earlier studies, such as Campbell and Ammer (1993), that 
news about future stock excess return and news about future inflation are the main drivers of 
innovations in the stock and bond markets respectively. Their study shows that the impact of 
news on innovation in these markets is significantly more than the impact of policy rate on 
innovations. Similar to the above study, our FEVD analysis basically highlights the 
contributions of each of the policy variables to the variance of macroeconomic and financial 
variables over 24 periods (i.e. 24 months). Tables 5.1 to 5.5 below show the results of our 
FEVD analysis. 
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Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the magnitude of the shocks of each of the policy variables on 
the variance of the currency and stock markets. The column labelled ‘total’ shows the combined 
magnitude of ISSR, optimism and complexity shocks on the overall variance of the variables, 
whilst the last three columns show the relative contribution of each of the policy variables to 
the variance of monetary shocks when combined together.
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Table 5.1: Analysis of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) for currency market variables 
 
Horizon Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) in % Share of monetary shocks 
ISSR Optimism Complexity Total ISSR Optimism Complexity 
GBP_USD 1 month 0.45 0.28 0.11 0.84 0.54 0.33 0.13 
12 months 3.77 4.69 0.14 8.60 0.44 0.55 0.02 
24 months 3.62 5.33 0.18 9.13 0.40 0.58 0.02 
GBP_JPY 1 month 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.51 0.47 0.34 0.19 
12 months 1.24 0.57 4.19 6.00 0.21 0.10 0.70 
24 months 0.86 0.46 4.90 6.21 0.14 0.07 0.79 
GBP_CHF 1 month 0.54 0.06 0.24 0.84 0.64 0.07 0.28 
12 months 2.47 0.02 0.36 2.85 0.87 0.01 0.13 
24 months 1.72 0.01 0.46 2.18 0.79 0.00 0.21 
GBP_EUR 1 month 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.18 0.81 
12 months 0.14 0.90 0.08 1.13 0.12 0.80 0.07 
24 months 1.22 0.94 0.10 2.25 0.54 0.42 0.04 
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Table 5.2: Analysis of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) for stock market variables 
 
Horizon Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) in % Share of monetary shocks 
ISSR Optimism Complexity Total ISSR Optimism Complexity 
FTSE 100 1 month 0.07 0.11 0.57 0.75 0.10 0.14 0.76 
12 
months 
0.34 0.70 2.13 3.17 0.11 0.22 0.67 
24 
months 
2.86 0.93 2.49 6.28 0.46 0.15 0.40 
FTSE 250 1 month 0.11 0.04 0.61 0.76 0.14 0.05 0.80 
12 
months 
3.58 0.41 3.75 7.74 0.46 0.05 0.48 
24 
months 
22.14 0.26 4.33 26.73 0.83 0.01 0.16 
FTSE 350 1 month 0.09 0.06 0.65 0.80 0.11 0.07 0.81 
12 
months 
0.78 0.35 2.78 3.91 0.20 0.09 0.71 
24 
months 
6.20 0.55 3.30 10.05 0.62 0.06 0.33 
1 month 0.09 0.05 0.64 0.77 0.12 0.06 0.82 
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FTSE All 
Share 
12 
months 
0.81 0.28 2.82 3.91 0.21 0.07 0.72 
24 
months 
7.07 0.48 3.38 10.92 0.65 0.04 0.31 
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For the currency and stock markets, we found that the combined effects of the policy 
variables increased over time with the effects of policy variables at the 24-month mark, 
explaining up to 26% of variations in the FTSE250 index. We found these policy variables to 
have significantly more effect on the variations in the stock market than they did with the 
currency market. Our results on the relative importance of the communication variables were 
mixed but we found evidence that innovations in the ISSR increasingly explained the variations 
in the stock market over time. Interestingly, we also found that shocks to complexity of 
communication accounted for a significant amount of variation in the stock markets in the 
immediate period after the communication, with 70% to 80% of all policy shocks being 
accounted for by complexity of communication. We observed that as the effects of complexity 
wore out, the ISSR began to drive variations in the stock market more, which may suggest that 
as markets get more clarity over time, the effects of complexity wear out and the intentional 
policy rate takes more of an effect. 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 below show the importance of policy shocks to the bond markets as 
well as to inflation and output variables. Again, we found evidence that innovations in all three 
monetary policy variables increasingly explained variations in the bond markets with the 
effects on the shorter-term corporate bonds being the most significant. We found that our policy 
variables were up to 30 times more likely to impact corporate bond indices than government 
bonds. As much as 62% of the variations on the six-month SGI bond index was explained by 
the combination of policy variables by the 24th month. In terms of how important each of the 
policy variables were in explaining variations in the bond market, we found consistent evidence 
that optimism shocks accounted for the largest variations in the bond indices in the first few 
months but this fell over time and the ISSR became the dominant influence on variations by 
the 24th month, sometimes explaining up to 95% of policy variations, as with the 10-year 
government bonds. 
Similarly, with inflation and output variables, the combined policy variables tended to 
grow in influence over the period and generally accounted for between 5% and 10% of all 
variations by the 24th month. We found interesting evidence that optimism shocks accounted 
for most of the variation in inflation variables; the exception was that house price indices were 
instead affected by the ISSR, which is in essence the policy rate. When we turned to real output 
variables, the ISSR became the most significant policy variable affecting these variables.  
Finally, we explored the impact of innovations in our policy variables to a select number 
of macroeconomic variables. Generally, all our variables showed that innovation in the 
combined policy variables had an increasing influence in explaining variability over the longer 
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term and we observed some interesting findings on the relative importance of our policy 
variables in explaining these variations. We found that over the longer term, the ISSR explained 
variations in unemployment, weekly earnings and public sector borrowing significantly more 
than any of the other policy variables, whereas optimism explained variations in retail sales 
and consumer credit more than any other policy variable. There is some intuition to these 
findings as these may suggest that optimism drives variables that can respond much quicker to 
policy changes, such as retail sales and consumer credit, whilst the ISSR impacts variables such 
as unemployment, earnings and government borrowing, all of which may take longer to evolve. 
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Table 5.3a: Analysis of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) for bond market variables 
 
Horizon Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) in % Share of monetary shocks 
ISSR Optimism Complexity Total ISSR Optimism Complexity 
SGI 6M BOND 1 month 0.03 0.45 0.02 0.50 0.06 0.89 0.05 
12 months 16.78 0.99 1.33 19.10 0.88 0.05 0.07 
24 months 55.67 3.57 3.65 62.89 0.89 0.06 0.06 
SGI 2YR 
BOND 
1 month 0.05 1.03 0.00 1.08 0.05 0.95 0.00 
12 months 7.38 1.01 0.51 8.90 0.83 0.11 0.06 
24 months 37.08 2.29 1.48 40.86 0.91 0.06 0.04 
SGI 5YR 
BOND 
1 month 0.09 0.90 0.12 1.11 0.08 0.81 0.11 
12 months 1.31 0.56 0.20 2.07 0.63 0.27 0.10 
24 months 9.34 0.45 0.24 10.02 0.93 0.04 0.02 
SGI 10YR 
BOND 
1 month 0.20 0.53 0.20 0.93 0.22 0.57 0.21 
12 months 0.47 1.24 1.00 2.70 0.17 0.46 0.37 
24 months 3.89 1.30 1.36 6.54 0.59 0.20 0.21 
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Table 5.3b: Analysis of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) for bond market variables 
 
 
Horizon Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) in % Share of monetary shocks 
ISSR Optimism Complexity Total ISSR Optimism Complexity 
GOVT BONDS 
1YR 
1 month 0.34 0.76 0.00 1.11 0.31 0.69 0.00 
12 months 2.11 0.75 0.45 3.32 0.64 0.23 0.14 
24 months 1.58 0.68 0.64 2.90 0.55 0.24 0.22 
GOVT BONDS 
3YR 
1 month 0.09 0.53 0.03 0.65 0.14 0.81 0.05 
12 months 0.45 0.10 0.15 0.69 0.65 0.14 0.21 
24 months 0.32 0.06 0.22 0.60 0.53 0.10 0.37 
GOVT BONDS 
5YR 
1 month 0.12 0.75 0.01 0.87 0.13 0.86 0.01 
12 months 0.67 0.29 0.03 0.99 0.68 0.29 0.03 
24 months 0.60 0.23 0.04 0.87 0.69 0.26 0.05 
GOVT BONDS 
10YR 
1 month 0.37 0.35 0.01 0.73 0.51 0.48 0.01 
12 months 4.08 0.20 0.13 4.41 0.93 0.04 0.03 
24 months 6.82 0.18 0.15 7.15 0.95 0.03 0.02 
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Table 5.4a: Analysis of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) for inflation variables 
 
 
Horizon Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) in % Share of monetary shocks 
ISSR Optimism Complexity Total ISSR Optimism Complexity 
UK RPI 1 month 2.62 3.49 0.05 6.16 0.43 0.57 0.01 
12 months 3.75 4.54 0.13 8.41 0.45 0.54 0.02 
24 months 4.19 4.53 0.13 8.84 0.47 0.51 0.01 
UK HOUSE PRICE 
INDEX 
1 month 0.46 0.01 0.24 0.71 0.65 0.02 0.33 
12 months 4.43 1.08 3.70 9.21 0.48 0.12 0.40 
24 months 3.96 1.17 4.17 9.30 0.43 0.13 0.45 
UK CPI 1 month 0.44 2.74 0.02 3.20 0.14 0.86 0.01 
12 months 0.58 3.30 1.01 4.89 0.12 0.67 0.21 
24 months 0.67 3.30 1.01 4.98 0.13 0.66 0.20 
UK PPI 1 month 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.91 0.07 
12 months 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.20 0.71 0.24 0.05 
24 months 0.73 0.07 0.02 0.81 0.90 0.09 0.02 
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Table 5.4b: Analysis of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) for output variables 
 
 
Horizon Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) in % Share of monetary shocks 
ISSR Optimism Complexity Total ISSR Optimism Complexity 
UK 
CONSTRUCTION 
OUTPUT 
1 month 4.06 0.00 0.36 4.42 0.92 0.00 0.08 
12 months 4.62 0.02 0.42 5.05 0.91 0.00 0.08 
24 months 4.89 0.03 0.41 5.33 0.92 0.00 0.08 
UK INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION 
1 month 0.56 0.30 1.42 2.28 0.25 0.13 0.62 
12 months 0.69 1.48 1.48 3.65 0.19 0.41 0.40 
24 months 0.72 1.49 1.48 3.68 0.20 0.40 0.40 
UK INDEX OF 
SERVICES 
1 month 0.83 0.83 0.03 1.69 0.49 0.49 0.02 
12 months 1.49 1.16 0.34 2.98 0.50 0.39 0.11 
24 months 1.60 1.16 0.34 3.10 0.52 0.37 0.11 
UK 
MANUFACTURING 
1 month 1.73 0.00 2.50 4.23 0.41 0.00 0.59 
12 months 2.17 0.16 2.74 5.08 0.43 0.03 0.54 
24 months 2.22 0.17 2.74 5.12 0.43 0.03 0.53 
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Table 5.5: Analysis of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) for other select macroeconomic variables 
 
 
Horizon Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) in % Share of monetary shocks 
ISSR Optimism Complexity Total ISSR Optimism Complexity 
UK 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
1 month 0.85 0.00 0.39 1.24 0.69 0.00 0.31 
12 months 1.84 0.02 1.52 3.38 0.55 0.01 0.45 
24 months 5.30 0.14 1.63 7.07 0.75 0.02 0.23 
UK AVERAGE 
WEEKLY 
EARNINGS 
1 month 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.84 0.03 
12 months 0.50 1.31 0.26 2.08 0.24 0.63 0.13 
24 months 3.44 1.99 0.34 5.76 0.60 0.34 0.06 
UK RETAIL SALES 1 month 0.01 0.01 0.83 0.84 0.01 0.01 0.98 
12 months 0.08 1.75 0.51 2.34 0.03 0.75 0.22 
24 months 0.25 2.03 0.46 2.74 0.09 0.74 0.17 
UK BUSINESS 
INVESTMENT 
1 month 0.03 0.01 1.83 1.88 0.02 0.01 0.98 
12 months 0.36 0.03 2.73 3.11 0.11 0.01 0.88 
24 months 0.66 0.04 2.72 3.41 0.19 0.01 0.80 
UK CONSUMER 
CREDIT SUPPLIED 
1 month 0.01 0.17 1.82 2.00 0.01 0.09 0.91 
12 months 0.41 0.18 3.10 3.69 0.11 0.05 0.84 
24 months 1.74 0.15 3.11 5.00 0.35 0.03 0.62 
PSNCR NET 
BORROWING 
1 month 0.20 0.66 0.14 0.99 0.20 0.66 0.14 
12 months 15.00 2.42 2.75 20.18 0.74 0.12 0.14 
24 months 23.41 2.60 2.46 28.47 0.82 0.09 0.09 
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5.5  Conclusion 
Having previously explored how macroeconomic conditions drive the complexity and 
tone of central bank communication, this chapter goes on to explore the effects of central bank 
communication on certain macroeconomic and financial market variables. The chapter uses a 
more traditional FAVAR model which has been used to evaluate macroeconomic policy shocks 
but incorporates two dimensions of communication, namely complexity and optimism, into the 
traditional FAVAR model. We limited our analysis of central bank communication to MPC 
minutes and explored whether these dimensions of communication transmit shocks to the 
financial and macroeconomic environment. We also included a policy variable into our 
FAVAR model to control for changes in the macroeconomic and financial environment that 
may be driven by the BoE’s policy rate. Given the period that we evaluated in which the BoE 
policy rate hit the zero lower bound, we used the international shadow short rate (ISSR) 
developed by Kripnner (2015) as a proxy measure of the policy rate. 
We evaluated the effects of each of the policy variables on other policy variables as 
well as on the various macroeconomic and financial market variables that we explored. In our 
first analysis, our result suggested that shocks to the ISSR would drive down optimism and 
complexity over the short to medium term and also drive down returns in the currency and 
stock markets over the longer term. Bond yield tended to respond to policy rate shocks in 
different ways depending on whether the bonds were corporate bonds or government bonds. 
Shocks to policy rate tend to persistently drive up yields over the medium to longer term (six 
months and beyond) whilst policy rate shocks tend to drive down government bond yields in 
the short term only. Some of these findings, especially the reaction of financial markets and 
corporate bond yields, are consistent with previous work that has explored policy shocks as 
well as with economic theory. Most of the inflationary and output variables we explored also 
showed evidence that shocks to the policy rate slowed down measures of inflation and 
economic activity such as the CPI, RPI, house prices, construction output and industrial 
production over the medium to long term. 
Next, we found that optimism shocks had limited impact on other policy variables but 
had a significant impact on the currency and stock markets as well as on the other 
macroeconomic variables which we explored. We noticed that overall, following shocks to 
optimism in the BoE’s communication, inflation fell, output fell, stock market returns fell and 
the pound rose in value. We found further evidence that optimism shocks reduced credit 
availability, the money supply and retail sales as well as earnings. Finally, government bond 
yields also tended to rise in response to optimism shocks. These results seem to mimic 
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responses to a traditional interest rate shock in a way that is consistent with contractionary 
economic policy, as summarised in Sims (1992). The intuition here is that with increased 
optimism in policy communication, individuals and firms expect a rise in interest rates and they 
respond by making economic decisions in line with this expectation. 
Subsequently, we went beyond tone and explored how shocks to complexity of 
communication impacted on our macroeconomic and financial variables of interest. We noticed 
that shocks to complexity had no impact on the ISSR but tended to sharply drive down 
optimism in the immediate term. Generally, we observed that shocks to clarity tended to reduce 
inflationary pressures, implying that less clarity tended to drive down inflationary pressures. 
The perception here is that when markets are unclear about the direction of policy from the 
central bank, they would hold back on spending and consumption, which will lead to reduced 
inflation. Similarly, we found that clarity shocks tended to cause significant stock and currency 
market declines. The reasoning here is that if the bank is perceived to have more information 
and financial market participants look to the bank for clarity, where the bank becomes more 
unclear about its policy decision, the financial markets react with a selloff of assets that will 
then lead to a stock and currency market decline. Although bond yields also fell following 
shocks to clarity, the dynamics of the bond markets are different from the stock and currency 
markets. We argue that a fall in bond yield here may be driven by the declining inflationary 
pressures that follow clarity shocks. This is because bond investors tend to hold on to bond 
coupon payments when they anticipate inflation will fall as this will push down yield values 
(via increasing demand and bond prices). Lastly, we found mixed evidence on the effects of 
clarity shocks on output and credit availability variables. 
Finally, to evaluate the comparative importance of each of the individual policy shocks 
on our macroeconomic and financial variables, we carried out forecast error variance 
decomposition (FEVD) analysis over a 24-month period. We found that in all of our analyses, 
the combined effects of our policy variables (i.e. ISSR, optimism and tone) tended to 
consistently explain more of the variation in the financial and macroeconomic variables of 
interest over time. For instance, up to 62% of the variations in the short-term corporate bond 
SGI index was explained by a combination of the policy variables by the 24-month mark. 
Generally, the impacts of the policy variables were highest for the bond market, followed by 
the stock market and public sector government borrowing, whose variations were explained by 
the combined policy variables up to 29% and 26% respectively. Other variables explored 
tended to have between 2% and 10% of their variations explained by the combined policy 
variables. 
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For additional clarity, we also explored the relative importance of individual policy 
variables within the combined policy effects. The evidence suggested that ISSR and optimism 
shocks were the key drivers of variability in the currency market over the long term while 
complexity shocks overwhelmingly explained variations in the stock markets in the immediate 
period, although ISSR also became important in the long run. Given that as much as 70% to 
80% of all policy shocks was accounted for by shocks to complexity of communication in the 
immediate period, we suggest that complexity significantly impacts financial markets initially 
but as markets get more clarity over time, the effects of complexity wear out and the intentional 
policy rate takes more of an effect. For the bond markets, we found consistent evidence that 
optimism shocks account for the largest variations in the bond indices in the first few months 
but this falls over time and the ISSR becomes the dominant influence on variations by the 24th 
month, sometimes explaining up to 95% of policy variations as with the 10-year government 
bonds.  
Similarly, optimism shocks accounted for most of the variation in inflation variables 
with the exception of house price indices, which were instead affected by the ISSR. When we 
turned to real output variables, the ISSR became the most significant policy variable, 
explaining variations in unemployment, weekly earnings and public sector borrowing 
significantly more than any of the other policy variables.  
Overall, our key finding in this section is that optimism shocks tend to have a significant 
impact on macroeconomic and financial market variables in a way that is similar to a 
contractionary policy. In addition to this, we found that optimism shocks significantly 
contributed to explaining variations in the key macroeconomic and financial variables in the 
near term, particularly in the currency and bond markets as well as with inflation variables. 
There is some intuition to these findings as these may suggest that optimism drives variables 
that respond much more quickly to policy changes, such as the currency and stock market 
variables, as well as retail sales and consumer credit. Importantly, we also found that shocks to 
complexity of communication overwhelmingly explained the variations in the stock market in 
the immediate term when compared to policy rate (ISSR) shocks and optimism shocks. Given 
that an increasing number of central banks are turning to communication as an alternative 
policy tool to drive short-term expectations and there is still no consensus on what dimensions 
of communication to measure nor how these may quantitatively impact policy as interest rates 
would, our results provide interesting findings to help explain possible solutions. At the zero 
lower bound, where lowering interest rates further may not be feasible, these dimensions of 
164 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
communication may become a viable policy tool through which the central bank may drive 
policy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6.0  CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION AND FINANCIAL MARKET 
VOLATILITY 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the effects of central bank communication on financial market 
volatility. In the previous chapters, we explored the back end of what influences 
communication in the first place and how communication shocks impact macroeconomic 
variables. To get a more complete narrative of the potential role of communication as a central 
bank policy tool, however, it is useful to explore how communication affects volatility in 
financial markets. Blinder (2008) highlights that since central bank communication has become 
increasingly important as a policy tool and that in order to drive transparency, there is a need 
to ensure that communication ‘reduces noise’ and ‘creates news’. Rosa (2011) evaluated the 
effect of the US Fed’s decisions and statements on stock prices and volatility and argued that 
as much as 90% of the explainable variation in the S&P 500 is due to the surprise components 
of the Fed’s communication. It is in this context that exploring volatility in financial markets 
becomes crucial. Our key research question in this chapter, therefore, is whether monetary 
policy communication released by the BoE via MPC minute reduces noise (volatility) in the 
financial markets. 
Although there is extant literature on the extent to which monetary policy as a whole 
affects asset price volatility (e.g. see Rigobon and Sack 2004; Reeves and Sawicki 2007), these 
studies have mostly relied on short-term interest rates driving asset prices. At the zero lower 
bound and given the growing importance of communication and forward guidance as a policy 
tool, these studies therefore are limited in the sense that short-term interest changes may no 
longer be the dominant policy tool used by a central bank. In light of this shortcoming, some 
other studies have attempted to look beyond the interest rate changing behaviour of central 
banks to explore the impact of communication on the financial market. Gurkaynak et al. (2005), 
for instance, explored a two-factor scenario where the effects of both the federal fund rate and 
communication about future policy by the FOMC on financial markets were analysed. Their 
work provides evidence that communication, when used along with federal funds rate changes, 
has a much greater effect on asset prices and the longer-term treasury yield. Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2009) found further evidence to support Gurkaynak et al.’s work and showed that 
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communication about policy via statements had a greater effect on financial market volatility 
than policy rate changes. 
A potential limitation of some of these initial works that explore the impact of central 
bank communication on financial market volatility is that they do so by simply exploring 
financial market volatility on the day the communication is made without an analysis of the 
content of the communications. Kohn and Sack (2003), for instance, found that statements 
released by the FOMC and congressional testimonies by the then FOMC chairman, Alan 
Greenspan, did increase volatility in the financial variables they explored. Some other studies 
such as Hendry (2012) partially explore the content of central bank communication by grouping 
these communications into themes based on their contents, such as oil price communication, 
Canadian dollar communication, GDP communication, labour market communication, balance 
of risk communication and so on. They then evaluate the effects of the release of such 
communications on financial market volatility. Their findings present mixed results, with 
certain communication such as oil price communication, Canadian dollar communication and 
inflation projection all leading to increased volatility in the short-term bond market whilst other 
communication related to GDP, labour and investment all led to reduced volatility in the short-
term bond market. 
Our work in this chapter is more closely related to that of Born et al. (2014), who 
estimated the effects of financial stability reports (FSR) and speeches by 37 central banks on 
financial markets using content analysis of these communications, as well as Jansen (2011b), 
who estimated the effects of Humphrey-Hawking statements on financial market volatility, also 
using content analysis. Similar to our work, Born et al. (2014) used Diction to extract optimism 
scores from FSRs and speeches. Our work is nonetheless unique in the sense that, rather than 
examining FSRs and speeches, we explore monetary policy communications that are created 
following deliberation of policy and are carefully crafted to provide information to financial 
market participants. Our work focuses more on policy communication creating noise or 
otherwise providing news rather than on its role in financial stability. The need to analyse the 
content of such policy communication when exploring volatility becomes more necessary 
given our previous findings that the clarity and tone of central bank communication are affected 
by the macroeconomic conditions in which the communications are made. It is therefore 
important to evaluate if these time-varying characteristics of central bank clarity and tone go 
on to impact financial market volatility and this chapter goes on to analyse that.  
This chapter addresses our research question (iv) on whether monetary policy 
communication via MPC minutes affects volatility in financial markets. We use an E-GARCH 
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methodology to test the impact of our communication variables on the conditional variance of 
our financial market variables. In line with the literature, which suggests that more complex 
communication calms financial markets (e.g. see Geraats 2007, Ehrmann and Fratzcher 
(2007c), we hypothesise that less complexity and more optimism in monetary policy 
communication should reduce volatility in the financial markets. Therefore, our hypothesis is 
that the conditional variance of our financial market variables should be positive. We do not 
propose an a priori for the response of financial market volatility to changes in optimism. 
Contrary to our expectations, our results showed that complexity of communication had a 
largely insignificant effect on the volatility of financial market; however, we found that 
increased optimism reduced the volatility of financial markets. The next sections of this chapter 
elaborate further on our expectations as underpinned by the literature and we detail the 
methodology used to obtain these results as well as our analyses. 
 
6.2 Complexity and tone of communication and financial market volatility 
The role of complexity of communication in central bank policy making has been well 
emphasised in this work. Complexity becomes particularly essential as central bank 
transparency and accountability grow, especially among inflation-targeting central banks. 
There is an emerging strand of literature that argues that central banks do indeed vary the 
complexity of their communication and our chapter on what influences the complexity of 
central bank communication presents further evidence in this regard. Bulir et al. (2013) suggest 
that central banks have the incentive to vary the complexity of their communication to suit their 
policy objectives and some of our findings above show that difficult macroeconomic conditions 
may sometimes increase the complexity with which the BoE communicates. The important 
question here is to what extent does such complexity or otherwise in communication go on to 
affect financial market volatility.  
There are opposing views on how complexity of communication may go on to impact 
financial market volatility. Geraats (2007) argues that financial markets respond strongest to 
signals that are perceived to be clear. She suggest that central banks can mute the volatility of 
financial markets by creating a perception of ambiguity.  
In contrast, Jansen (2011b), exploring Humphrey-Hawkings statements of US Fed 
Chairs, found that it is clearer communications that mute volatility whilst unclear 
communication increases volatility. Born et al. (2014) also present evidence that FSRs reduce 
noise and create news in the financial markets. In addition, Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2007c) 
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argue that additional clarity provided by press conferences following a policy decision reduces 
volatility in financial markets.  There is some reasoning to these latter findings in the sense that 
one would assume that clarity should reduce financial market volatility by allowing economic 
agents to make informed financial decisions from the clear information provided by the bank 
and vice versa. Our hypothesis that reduced complexity of communication should reduce 
financial market volatility is thus derived from the foregoing.  
Although the literature around clarity is more developed, the literature on central bank 
tone, on the other hand, is relatively less developed in terms of the exploration of the effects of 
policy communication on financial markets. The problem is that several dimensions of tone 
can be explored and there is generally no consensus on what specific dimension of tone 
financial markets respond to. The argument for exploring the tone of central bank 
communication is similar to that of clarity and relates to the need for central banks to be 
transparent and accountable. If indeed central banks strive for optimal transparency, as the 
literature suggests (e.g. see Eijffinger and Geraats 2006), then understanding the details of 
every central bank communication becomes important. Where there exists a ‘cacophony of 
voices’, a phenomenon which Blinder et al. (2008) define as central bank policy makers 
speaking with different voices (or tones) on the same matter, then understanding the collective 
tone of policy communication becomes important. Tone is also important because, unlike 
clarity, which is subject to the individual vocabulary of the writer, the same tone can be 
captured across various vocabulary levels. 
Most of the previous research done on the effects of communication tone on financial 
market volatility have mainly focused on corporate tone and stock price volatility (e.g. see 
Price et al. 2012 for a survey). These studies often look at the positive or negative tone of 
managers, the incentives behind this and the eventual effects on stock price volatility. Arslan-
Ayaydin et al. (2015) argue that managers have an incentive to speak with less optimism in a 
manner that is consistent with the so-called leverage effect of negative news on volatility, as 
first presented by the works of Black (1976). The idea is that less optimistic communication 
leads to a negative response of the stock price which then has the effect of increasing the 
debt/equity leverage ratio and the probability of default and finally increased volatility. 
Although these channels are relatively well defined for corporate organisations, the 
incentive for central banks to vary tone with the effect of influencing volatility is less clear. 
Overall, there is limited evidence on the effects of central bank communication on financial 
market volatility; nonetheless, a few studies have attempted to explore the effect of optimism 
tone on volatility. Born et al. (2012) explored the effects of financial stability reports (FSRs) 
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on the financial markets of a select number of emerging market economies. Similar to our 
analysis, they used Diction to capture the optimism scores of FSR communication and speeches 
and their results provide evidence that more optimistic communication tends to reduce 
volatility across the stock indices, the three-month interest rate and the US dollar spot exchange 
rates for these countries. These results corroborate their earlier findings (Born et al. 2011) 
which examined a broader range of 35 countries and also showed that FSR communications 
reduced financial market volatility especially when the contents of the FSRs were more 
optimistic. Using communication from the ECB, Schmeling and Wagner (2016) also showed 
the effect of optimistic tone on option-implied volatility of stock prices. Their findings suggest 
that more positive tone of communication leads to decreasing volatility expectations. Our 
hypotheses that more optimistic and more certain communication should lead to reduced 
volatility in financial markets are largely derived from the foregoing.  
 
6.3  Methodology and data 
To evaluate the effects of BoE monetary policy communications on the volatility of 
financial market variables of interest, we employ Nelson’s (1991) exponential GARCH (E-
GARCH) model to explore how specific dimensions of communication from the BoE affects 
the conditional mean and conditional variance of important financial markets of interest 
Our volatility analysis focuses on three financial markets of interest, which are the stock 
markets, the foreign exchange market and the bond markets. Our rationale for selecting these 
markets is mainly driven by the focus the BoE places on these markets in its communication 
as well as the interest in these markets by economic agents. Specifically, in both MPC minutes 
and inflation reports, the BoE has sections dedicated to its analysis of these key financial 
markets. For the financial markets, we explored returns to four stock market indices, namely 
the FTSE100, the FTSE 250, the FTSE 350 and the FTSE All Share. These were analysed 
separately to capture the effects of the size of the constituent companies, i.e. FTSE 100 
capturing the largest companies whilst the FTSE All Share captures a broader range of 
companies including relatively smaller companies. For the currency markets, we focused on 
the value of the pound (GBP) relative to the US dollar (USD), the euro (UR), the Japanese yen 
(JPY), the Canadian dollar (CAD) and the Australian dollar (AUD). Finally, for the bond 
market, we focus on UK Government bond yields with specific reference to the one-year, three-
year, five-year and ten-year generic note bond yields as well as the more corporate bond aligned 
six-month, two-year, five-year and ten-year Société Générale Index (SGI bond index). 
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The dimensions of communication we explored were similar to those in previous parts 
of this study, mainly covering the complexity and tone of communication. Consistent with 
other parts of our work, we explored complexity using the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level. The 
measure estimates the amount of years of formal education required to understand a text, with 
higher values implying more complexity and vice versa. The Diction software programme, 
which is a widely used piece of content analysis software, was used to quantify the dimensions 
of tone we sought to evaluate, namely optimism and uncertainty from the BoE’s 
communication. 
Our econometric approach used in modelling the effects of the above dimensions of 
central bank communication on financial markets closely follows the works of Born et al. 
(2012) and uses an E-GARCH (1,1) model. Specifically, if we represent the variable of interest 
as 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 and its lag as 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1, the conditional mean equation will be given as: 
 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 =  α + βCom𝑡
𝑖 +  𝛾𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    …. (6.1) 
 
Where Com𝑡
𝑖  captures the dimension of communication we are interested in capturing (i.e. 
clarity or tone – optimism, uncertainty, activity) and εi,t ∼(0, hi,t). 
 
The conditional variance for our E-GARCH (1,1) can be expressed as: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  𝜓 + 𝜔 (|
𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
√ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1
| −  √2 𝜋⁄ ) +  𝜗 (
𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
√ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  ∅log(ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1)  +  λCom𝑡
𝑖 +  𝜃𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑡 
…(6.2) 
 
Where ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the conditional variance of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡, and 𝜀𝑖.𝑡−1 are past innovations. Com𝑡
𝑖  and 𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑡 
are exogenous variables that are incorporated into the conditional variance equation to capture 
the specific volatility movements caused by each of these variables. Specifically, Com𝑡
𝑖  
represents the communication variable of interest while 𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑡 is the FTSE implied volatility 
index which measures the implied volatility of the FTSE 100 over a 30-day period. The 
advantage of employing an E-GARCH model in our analysis is that we can capture both 
asymmetric and magnitude effects of shocks to our financial market variables. This implies 
that both positive and negative shocks may have different effects on the volatility of our 
financial market variables and we did not have to impose a requirement for the coefficient in 
the conditional variance equation to be positive. Section 6.5 below details our results. 
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6.4  Results 
As detailed above, our analysis seeks to explore the effects of two broad dimensions of 
the BoE’s communication, namely complexity and tone (optimism) on the volatility of 
financial markets. Using an E-GARCH (1,1) model we explored if the complexity and 
optimism in the BoE’s communication specifically affects the stock, currency and bond 
markets. Our result tables highlight three main coefficients, namely the coefficient (β) from the 
mean equation, the coefficient (λ) from the variance equation and the coefficient (𝜃) also from 
the variance equation. β measures the response of the financial market variables to unit changes 
in communication while (λ) and (𝜃) capture the effects of communication variables and the 
implied volatility index, respectively, on the volatility of the financial market variables. As 
highlighted above, we included the implied volatility index in our variance equation to control 
for volatility in the financial market that is not caused by communication; therefore, this 
allowed us to capture the isolated effects of communication on volatility. The dependent 
variable in our mean equations is measured in first differences, therefore a 0.01 value for the 
coefficient of the communication variable will signal a 1% change in percentage return. Given 
that our main aim in this chapter is to check whether complexity and tone have an impact on 
volatility, we focus mostly on the evaluation of the effects of λ. For volatility analysis, our 
observation is focused more on the sign of the coefficient, i.e. whether volatility was increased 
or reduced. 
 
6.4.1 Effects of central bank complexity on financial market volatility 
In this section, we explore the effects of complexity of MPC minutes on the volatility 
of the stock markets as measured by the key market indices (FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 250 
and the FTSE All Share), the currency markets as measured by the pound’s value relative to 
four major currencies (the CHF, JPY, EUR, and USD) and the bond markets as measured by a 
number of UK government bond yields as well as the Société Générale UK Bond Index. Tables 
6.1 to 6.3 below show the summary of our analysis of the effects of complexity on financial 
market volatility. 
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Table 6.1 - Effects of central bank complexity on stock market volatility  
Variable Mean (β) Volatility (λ) 
Clarity 
Volatility (𝜃) 
IVI 
Durbin 
Watson 
FTSE 100 0.046 
(2.10) 
0.08 
(0.14) 
0.036*** 
(0.0082) 
1.95 
FTSE 250 0.029 
(1.75) 
-0.16*** 
(0.050) 
0.11* 
(0.068) 
1.84 
 
FTSE 350 0.028 
(0.96) 
0.077 
(0.11) 
0.045*** 
(0.010) 
1.93 
FTSE All Share 0.027 
(0.92) 
0.060 
(0.11) 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
1.92 
 
 
With the stock market in table 6.1above, we found that only the FTSE 250’s volatility 
was significantly affected by the clarity of the BoE’s communication. The evidence suggests 
that more complexity leads to reduced volatility in the FTSE 250 index. This finding is in line 
with Greenspan’s approach that seems to suggest that ambiguity in communication mutes 
market volatility.  
 
Table 6.2 - Effects of central bank complexity on currency market volatility 
 
Variable Mean (β) Volatility (λ) 
Clarity 
Volatility (𝜃) 
IVI 
Durbin 
Watson 
GBP_CHF 0.0073*** 
(0.00072) 
0.37** 
(0.11) 
0.020*** 
(0.0073) 
2.22 
GBP_EUR 0.0008 
(0.0014) 
0.00145  
(0.0092) 
0.088*** 
(0.0025) 
2.12 
GBP_JPY 0.0022 
(0.0095) 
-0.00014 
(0.00037) 
-0.0041 
(0.0029) 
1.90 
GBP_USD -0.0011 
(0.0011) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
0.032*** 
(0.0064) 
1.85 
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As Geraats (2007) identified, the reason for this is that financial markets tend to react 
to communication that they perceive to be clear. Therefore, when signals coming from the 
central bank seem unclear, market participants will hold on to their assets until they perceive 
clearer signals. As expected, increasing implied volatility in the stock market seems to increase 
volatility in all the stock market indices explored. 
Table 6.2 above shows the impact of complexity of communication on the volatility of 
a number of currency market pairs. Once more, we found evidence of limited impact on most 
of the currency pairs with the exception of the GBP_CHF currency pair. The evidence suggests 
that increased complexity seemed to increase volatility in the GBP_CHF currency market pair. 
Similar to the stock markets, implied volatility in the stock markets consistently increased 
volatility in the currency markets as well.  
 
Table 6.3 - Effects of central bank complexity on bond market volatility  
 
Variable Mean (β) Volatility (λ) 
Clarity 
Volatility (𝜃) 
IVI 
Durbin 
Watson 
GOVT BONDS 
1YR 
-0.0075 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.0018) 
-0.00036 
(0.0023) 
1.31 
GOVT BONDS 
3YR 
-0.0062  
(0.017) 
0.000942 
(0.002859) 
0.0034 
(0.012) 
1.47 
GOVT BONDS 
5YR 
-0.0026 
(0.019) 
0.00087 
(0.0029) 
0.0034 
(0.016) 
1.64 
GOVT BONDS 
10YR 
0.0090 
(0.018) 
-0.00015 
(0.0031) 
0.00018 
(0.00021) 
1.93 
SGI BONDS 
 10YR 
0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.0022 
(0.013) 
-0.00051 
(0.0008) 
1.84 
SGI BOND 
5YR 
0.16 
(0.68) 
0.99 
(2.92) 
0.054 
(0.19) 
1.52 
SGI BOND 
2YR   
-0.10 
(0.25) 
-0.14** 
(0.06) 
0.0092** 
(0.0045) 
1.26 
SGI BOND 
6M   
-0.092*** 
(0.033) 
-0.14 
(0.089) 
-0.0013 
(0.0041) 
0.405730 
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As we proposed earlier, one would expect that the effect of increased clarity in the 
BoE’s communication is that financial market participants are able to make informed decisions 
that would hence reduce financial market volatility. This result, therefore, aligns with our 
expectations that more complexity may tend towards increased volatility in financial markets. 
These results are also consistent with the findings of Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2007c), who 
suggest that financial market volatility tends to reduce when central banks communicate more 
clearly. 
Finally, we evaluated the impact of complexity of communication on the volatility of 
our bond market variables of interest. Similar to the stock and currency markets, complexity 
of communication seemed to have limited impact on the volatility of bond markets. We found 
that only the volatility of the SGI Bond index with two years to maturity was impacted by 
complexity of communication. The reaction to this is similar to the stock market result, where 
increasing complexity seemed to reduce volatility. Overall, our analysis of the impact of 
complexity on the stock, currency and bond market provides limited evidence that complexity 
significantly impacts on the volatility of these markets. 
 
6.4.2 Effects of central bank optimism on stock market volatility 
Similar to our analysis of complexity above, we evaluated the impact of changes in the 
level of optimism in central bank communication on the same stock, currency and bond market 
variables. Tables 6.4 to 6.7 below highlight our results. 
 
Table 6.4 - Effects of central bank optimism on stock market volatility  
Variable Mean (β) Volatility (λ) 
Clarity 
Volatility (𝜃) 
IVI 
Durbin 
Watson 
FTSE 100 0.21 
(0.14) 
-0.18*  
(0.10) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
1.94 
FTSE 250 0.30 
(0.22) 
-0.081 
(0.091) 
0.074*** 
(0.015) 
1.81 
 
FTSE 350 0.084*** 
(0.009) 
-0.031*** 
(0.0069) 
0.14** 
(0.067) 
1.97 
FTSE All Share -0.0061*** 
(0.002247) 
-0.00024 
(0.00027) 
0.034*** 
(0.0012) 
1.30 
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 Figure 6.4 above shows the results of the effects of changing optimism on the volatility 
of the stock market variables. We found more consistent evidence that optimism impacted the 
volatility of stock market significantly more than complexity did. Both the FTSE 100 and the 
FTSE 350 indices provide evidence that rising optimism reduces volatility. These findings are 
consistent with our expectations as well as with the findings by Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2015) 
on the relationship between optimism and company stock prices and the findings by Born et 
al. (2012) that increased optimism in central bank communication reduces financial market 
volatility.  
 
Table 6.5 - Effects of central bank optimism on currency market volatility  
 
Variable Mean (β) Volatility (λ) 
Clarity 
Volatility (𝜃) 
IVI 
Durbin 
Watson 
GBP_CHF -0.0036 
(0.0023) 
-0.14** 
(0.064) 
0.018*** 
(0.0052) 
2.16 
GBP_EUR -0.00055 
(0.0011) 
-0.000258 
(0.0072) 
0.013* 
(0.0079) 
1.82 
GBP_JPY 0.061 
(0.042) 
-0.024** 
(0.0095) 
0.0026 
(0.0059) 
1.94 
GBP_USD -0.0011 
(0.0018) 
0.11 
(0.085) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
1.87 
 
 
 The results for stock market were also consistent with those for the currency market 
pairs shown in table 6.5 above, with the exception of the GBP_EUR and GBP_USD currency 
pairs which did not show evidence of have an impact on volatility. As expected, rising implied 
volatility in the stock market consistently increased volatility in the majority of stock market 
indices and currency pairs. 
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Table 6.6 - Effects of central bank optimism on bond market volatility 
 
Variable Mean (β) Volatility (λ) 
Clarity 
Volatility (𝜃) 
IVI 
Durbin 
Watson 
GOVT BONDS 
1YR 
0.018** 
(0.0081) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.0012 
(0.002) 
1.35 
GOVT BONDS 
3YR 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
-0.048 
(0.037) 
0.0011 
(0.0024) 
1.54 
GOVT BONDS 
5YR 
0.031** 
(0.014) 
-0.062 
(0.043) 
0.0006 
(0.0024) 
1.71 
GOVT BONDS 
10YR 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.0032 
(0.0021) 
0.0079 
(0.0089) 
1.99 
SGI BONDS 
 10YR 
-0.017** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0084 
(0.014) 
-0.00077 
(0.00073) 
 
1.88 
SGI BOND 
5YR 
-0.12** 
(0.049) 
-0.011 
(0.021) 
0.109013 
(0.018) 
1.58 
SGI BOND 
2YR 
-0.038 
(0.17) 
-0.019 
(0.062) 
0.0045 
(0.004) 
1.25 
SGI BOND 
6M 
-0.038724 
(0.025) 
-0.034 
(0.041) 
-0.0011 
(0.0044) 
0.39 
 
Finally, figure 6.6 above shows the impact of optimism on the volatility of bond market 
yields. We found no evidence that either optimism or even implied volatility in stock markets 
had an impact on the volatility of bond market yields. It is worth noting, however, that optimism 
had a significant effect on government bond yields, with yield rising between 2% and 3% 
following unit increases in optimism (as measured by Diction). The conclusion here is that 
optimism is important in interpreting bond market yields but not in bond market volatility.  
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6.5 Investigating the existence of reverse causation in our models 
 
Given that our results in chapter four above suggest that communication is impacted by 
currency market returns and in some cases by the financial markets through our financial crisis 
variable, it is therefore important to explore the potential of reverse causation in our models. 
To do this, we examined whether volatility of currency and stock markets had an impact on 
communication. Our approach was to regress our two main measures of communication (i.e. 
complexity and optimism) on their own lags and on the lagged volatility of currency and 
financial market variables measured as the squared residuals from the E-GARCH equations 
above. Our intuition was that if the values of the volatility measures are insignificant, we can 
conclude that although stock and currency returns do impact communication, volatilities in 
these returns do not. In addition to regressing the lagged communication variables on volatility, 
we also included the volatility measures into our original model in equation 4.1 above to test 
whether the volatility variables had any impact in our original models. 
Equation 6.3 below represents our initial analysis, which examines the relationship 
between communication variables and the lagged volatility from the currency and financial 
markets volatility equations. 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   …(6.3) 
 
Where 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the communication variable of interest (complexity or optimism);  𝜉1𝑡 is 
the lagged volatility of the currency market measured as the squared residuals from the 
GBP_USD estimation in the E-GARCH equations above; 𝜉2𝑡  is the lagged volatility of the 
stock market measured as the squared residuals from the FTSE all share estimation in the E-
GARCH equations above. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Table 6.7 below shows a summary of our 
results. 
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Table 6.7 - Effects of lagged volatility on communication variables 
 Effects of lagged volatility 
on complexity 
Effects of lagged volatility 
on optimism 
Constant (𝛼) 7.54*** 
(0.66) 
34.11*** 
(3.63) 
Lagged communication 
(𝐶𝑖𝑡−1) 
0.40*** 
(0.05) 
0.33*** 
(0.073) 
Lagged currency market 
volatility (𝜉𝑖𝑡) 
0.19 
(1.35) 
-0.42 
(1.79) 
Lagged financial market 
volatility (𝜉𝑖𝑡) 
.01233 
(0.51) 
1.27 
(0.94) 
 
R squared 0.161439 0.116877 
Standard error of regression  0.785244 1.208525 
Durbin-Watson 2.53 2.106983 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) in parenthesis 
 
The results above show that both of the coefficients measuring the lagged volatility in 
the currency market and financial markets are insignificant. Therefore, this may suggest that 
volatility of currency financial markets does not impact communication and therefore there is 
no evidence of reverse causation in the ways in which our models are structured. To further 
support this argument, we input the lagged volatility measures used above into our original 
equation 4.1 to test whether these lagged volatility measures were significant in our original 
equation. Similar to our analysis above, we found no evidence of either the lagged volatility in 
currency or financial markets impacting both complexity and optimism. The results of this 
analysis are presented in appendix C. 
 
6.6  Conclusion 
 
 This chapter explored the effects of the BoE’s MPC communication (via its minutes) 
on financial market volatility. The chapter addresses our research question (iv) as to whether 
volatility of financial market variables is impacted by complexity and tone of communication. 
Specifically, we explored how the complexity and optimism in the MPC minutes affects the 
volatility of the stock markets, the currency markets and the bond markets. Our results seem to 
suggest that overall, complexity of communication has very limited effects on the volatility of 
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the stock, currency and bond markets. We did find some evidence of complexity impacting 
financial market variables but these are not consistent enough to depict a clear picture. For 
example, the FTSE 250 and the SGI 2yr Bond index both show evidence of reduced volatility 
as complexity of communication increased while the GBP_CHF currency pair showed 
evidence of reduced volatility when complexity of communication increased.  
Our most significant finding in this section is that rising optimism in communication 
does indeed reduce volatility in the stock market and currency market. We found that a 
significant number of our stock market and currency market variables showed reduced 
volatility with increased optimism. This result is consistent with our expectations as well as 
with findings in the literature such as those of Born et al. (2012) who found that rising optimism 
reduced volatility in financial markets. An alternative argument for this relationship is that 
increased optimism raises the incentive for investors to hold on to stock and currency market 
assets thereby reducing uncertainty and, subsequently, volatility in these markets. Some of the 
evidence from the corporate sector also corroborates the idea that optimism in CEO speeches 
tended to reduce volatility in the stock prices of the company (e.g. see Li et al. 2008). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that although not central to our research question, we 
found evidence that rising optimism seemed to consistently increase government bond yields 
across all maturities, although neither optimism nor complexity had any significant impact on 
bond market volatility. The conclusion from the above is that bond market volatility is 
generally not impacted by central bank monetary policy communication. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7.0 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents a summary of our work and ties together our research questions, 
hypotheses, analyses and results. Our work is based on two fundamental premises. First, that 
given the increasing demands for accountability and transparency, central bank communication 
may be impacted by the varying macroeconomic conditions in which the communication is 
made. Second, that central bank communication may also transmit some onward effects to 
financial and economic variables. Using standard textual analysis software and methodologies, 
we explored two main dimensions of communication, namely the complexity and the tone of 
communication, to assess communication released by the Bank of England in the form of 
monetary policy committee (MPC) minutes and quarterly inflation reports. To this end our 
work sought to address four specific research questions: 
i. Given the increased need for accountability and transparency by the Bank of England, 
to what extent has the trend of complexity and tone of the bank’s communication 
changed over our sample period (i.e.1997 to 2015)? 
ii. Are the varying levels of complexity and tone of communication associated with the 
prevailing macroeconomic conditions in which the communication is made? 
iii. Does central bank communication transmit shocks to key macroeconomic and market 
variables environment when they are made? 
iv. Does central bank communication significantly impact volatility in financial markets 
when these communications are made? 
We explored a unique communication regime in the BoE’s history which covered 
September 1997, when the bank gained full independence, and July 2015 when the bank 
significantly changed its communication practices in response to recommendations from the 
Warsh report (2014). Using standard computerised textual analysis aided by Diction software 
and the Flesch-Kincaid readability methodology, we captured tone and complexity data for 215 
MPC Minutes and 75 Inflation Reports. Chapter three of our work details the textual analysis 
process used in extracting and obtaining the data used in our analysis.  
In exploring these aspects of the BoE’s communications, our work sought to contribute 
to the literature in three main ways. First, by exploring whether the bank’s clarity and tone are 
influenced by the macroeconomic conditions during which the communication is made, we are 
able to extend the burgeoning literature on what drives central bank communication in the first 
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place and we expand on the research in this area, building on studies such as Bulir et al. (2013). 
Secondly, by exploring whether communication shocks are transmitted to key macroeconomic 
variables using the FAVAR model, we are able to determine how communication shocks 
impact the macro economy and provide a possible framework for communication as a policy 
tool. Finally, by exploring volatility transmission from central bank communication to the 
financial markets, we are able to determine how the clarity and tone used in communication 
transmit volatility onto the financial markets. A summary of our research questions, expected 
findings and thesis findings are summarised in Appendix E below. 
With regard to our first two research questions, our expectations were that given the 
increasing demands on accountability and transparency and in line with recent findings in the 
literature, the BoE’s communication should be clearer and less complex over our sample 
period. We also followed the argument that if the BoE is faced with more challenging 
macroeconomic conditions, which we mainly defined as a significant rise in inflation 
accompanied by widening inflation gaps and falling sterling values, it may tend to 
communicate with more complexity, less optimism and less certainty. We noted that this 
behaviour may be as a result of the BoE itself being unclear and uncertain about the 
macroeconomic headwinds that it faced but the need for accountability and transparency 
required it to communicate those unclear and uncertain scenarios in its policy documents. In 
essence, our study therefore sought to test whether central banks conform to this hypothesised 
behaviour, which can be defined as follows: 
 
i. Null hypothesis (1)– H0: there is no change in the trend of complexity and tone of the 
BoE’s communication over our sample period. (see equation 4.1) 
 
𝐻0: 𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝑇𝑖𝑡 ≠ 0 
 
Where 𝑇𝑖𝑡 refers to the trend variable in our model in equation 4.1 above. 
 
ii. Null hypothesis (2) – H0: There is no association between complexity and tone and 
prevailing macroeconomic conditions (see equation 4.1).  
 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝜋 = 𝛽𝜋𝑐  =  𝛽𝜋𝑒 =  𝛽𝛾 = 0 
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𝐻1: 𝐻0 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
 
Where, 𝜋 represents the current inflation rate, 𝜋𝑐 represents the contemporaneous inflation gap, 
𝜋𝑒 represents forward-looking inflation gap and 𝛾 represents the pound/dollar exchange rate 
in equation 4.1 above.  
 
In line with our first research question and hypothesis, we found evidence that the 
complexity of MPC minutes published by the bank decreased over our sample period. By 
suggesting that clarity is an important precondition to transparency, this finding is in line with 
recent suggestions in the literature that central banks are employing every means they can to 
increase transparency. We did not, however, find evidence of the same decrease in the 
complexity of inflation reports as our trend variable turns out insignificant. When we explored 
tone of communication, we found evidence that the level of uncertainty reflected in the bank’s 
inflation reports also reduced, signifying that the bank had grown more assured in its inflation 
report communications. We did not find evidence of any other trends in the tone of 
communication reflected in the bank’s inflation reports.  
We also documented interesting results in line with our second research question and 
hypothesis above. In this model, our macroeconomic data mainly included variables that 
captured inflationary pressures and exchange rate pressures, namely inflation rate, the 
contemporaneous inflation gap, the forward-looking (ex-ante) inflation gap and exchange rate. 
We further included the financial crisis dummy variable to control for the significant period of 
the 2008 financial crisis. We then expressed our macroeconomic variables as a function of each 
of these dimensions of communication. We tested whether there was any association between 
the communication made and the macroeconomic conditions at the time of making the 
communication. We found significant evidence to show that macroeconomic conditions had a 
sizeable impact on the complexity and tone of the bank’s communication.  
Our core finding in this section of our work is that when the bank is faced with some 
of the challenging macroeconomic conditions described above, both the complexity of MPC 
minutes and inflation reports tended to rise significantly. We found that falling pound values 
tended to impact complexity of communication the most with MPC minutes requiring a further 
1.3 years of formal education to comprehend the text and inflation reports requiring 2.5 years 
of formal education for every unit 10p fall in value of the sterling. Generally, inflationary 
pressures seemed to be a dominant driver of complexity and tone across both MPC minutes 
and inflation reports. A rising inflation rate was observed to reduce optimism in MPC minutes 
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and increase uncertainty in inflation reports. Furthermore, we found consistent evidence that 
as inflation deviated further from the inflation target both MPC minutes and inflation reports 
were significantly less optimistic.  
We further hypothesised that a transparent central bank may communicate with more 
complexity, less optimism and more uncertainty if it is indeed faced with a scenario that is 
more complex. In line with this, these findings may also partly support the notion that the BoE 
exhibited elements of transparency by largely conforming to this hypothesised behaviour. It 
may also be useful to explore challenging macroeconomic conditions using the period of the 
2008 financial crisis as a sample. To this effect, our work also explored the role that the 
existence of a financial crisis played in influencing the complexity and tone of communication. 
In doing this, we found evidence that the 2008 financial crisis significantly increased the level 
of uncertainty observed in MPC minutes but there seemed to be no impact on other measures 
of complexity and tone across MPC minutes and inflation reports. This suggests that the bank’s 
complexity and tone of communication were more impacted by changing inflationary and 
exchange rate environments than by the existence of a full-blown financial crisis.  
The next chapter of our work (chapter 5) addressed our research question (iii) and 
sought to explore the transmission of shocks from communication to select macroeconomic 
and financial market variables. The chapter used a more traditional FAVAR model which has 
been used to evaluate macroeconomic policy shocks but incorporated two dimensions of 
communication, namely complexity and optimism, into the traditional FAVAR model. Here, 
we limited our analysis of central bank communication to MPC minutes and explored whether 
these dimensions of communication transmitted shocks to certain financial and macroeconomic 
variables. To control for the intended effects of policy that may be driven by the bank’s policy 
rate, we included the international shadow short rate (ISSR) developed by Kripnner (2015) as 
a proxy measure of the policy rate given the presence of the zero lower bound in our sample 
period. 
Our initial analysis explored shocks to the ISSR and found that this drove down returns 
in the currency and stock markets over the longer term. Bond yield tended to respond to policy 
rate shocks in different ways depending on whether the bonds were corporate bonds (measured 
by the SGB bond index) or government bonds. Shocks to ISSR tended to drive up corporate 
yields persistently over the medium to longer term (six months and beyond) and drive down 
government bond yield in the short term only. Some of these findings, especially the reaction 
of financial markets and corporate bond yields are consistent with previous work that has 
explored policy shocks as well as with economic theory. Most of the inflationary and output 
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variables we explored also showed evidence that shocks to the policy rate slowed down 
measures of inflation and economic activity such as the CPI, RPI, house prices, construction 
output and industrial production over the medium to long term. 
Of more interest to our work is the response of these variables to optimism and 
complexity shocks. First, we noted that overall, following shocks to optimism in the bank’s 
communication, inflation, output and stock market returns all fell and the pound rose in value. 
We found further evidence that optimism shocks reduced credit availability, the money supply, 
and retail sales as well as earnings. Finally, government bond yields also tended to rise in 
response to optimism shocks. These results seem to mimic responses to a traditional interest 
rate shock in a way that is consistent with contractionary economic policy. We argue that with 
increased optimism in policy communication, individuals and firms expect interest rates to rise 
and they respond by making economic decisions in line with this. Next, we explored how 
shocks to complexity of communication impacts on our macroeconomic and financial variables 
of interest. Generally, we observed that shocks to complexity tended to reduce inflationary 
pressures and caused significant stock and currency market declines as well as a fall in bond 
yields. We found mixed evidence regarding the effects of complexity shocks on output and 
credit availability variables. 
Finally, to evaluate the comparative importance of each of the individual policy shocks 
on our macroeconomic and financial variables, we carried out forecast error variance 
decomposition (FEVD) analysis over a 24-month period. We found that in all of our analyses, 
the combined effects of our policy variables (i.e. ISSR, optimism and tone) tended to 
consistently explain more of the variation in the financial and macroeconomic variables of 
interest over time. For instance, up to 62% of the variations in the short-term corporate bond 
SGI index was explained by a combination of the policy variables by the 24-month mark. 
Generally, the impacts of the policy variables were highest for the bond market, followed by 
the stock market and public sector government borrowing, which had up to 29% and 26% 
(respectively) of their variations explained by the combined policy variables. Other variables 
explored tended to have between 2% and 10% of their variations explained by the combined 
policy variables. 
Individually, the evidence suggests that the ISSR and optimism shocks were the key 
drivers of variability in the currency market, with ISSR having more impact in the immediate 
term and optimism often having a larger impact in the longer term. A significant observation 
in the stock market is that as much as 70% to 80% of all policy shocks were accounted for by 
shocks to complexity of communication in the immediate period. We suggest that complexity 
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significantly impacts financial markets in the immediate term but as markets get more clarity 
over time, the effects of complexity wear out and the intentional policy rate takes more of an 
effect. For the bond markets, we found consistent evidence that optimism shocks accounted for 
the largest variations in the bond indices in the first few months but this fell over time and the 
ISSR became the dominant influence on variations by the 24th month, sometimes explaining 
up to 95% of policy variations as with the 10-year government bonds. Similarly, optimism 
shocks accounted for most of the variation in inflation variables with the exception of house 
price indices, which were instead affected by the ISSR (ISSR essentially being the policy rate). 
When we turned to real output variables the ISSR became the most significant policy variable 
explaining variations in unemployment, weekly earnings and public sector borrowing 
significantly more than any of the other policy variables.  
Our key findings in this section of our work were that optimism shocks tended to have 
a significant impact on macroeconomic and financial market variables in a way that was similar 
to a contractionary policy. In addition to this, we found that relative to the policy rate, optimism 
shocks explained more of the variations in many macroeconomic and financial variables in the 
near term, particularly in the currency and bond markets as well as with inflation variables. 
There is some reasoning to these findings as these may suggest that optimism drives variables 
that respond more quickly to policy changes such as the currency and bond market variables 
as well as retail sales and consumer credit variables. Similarly, we also found that shocks to 
complexity of communication overwhelmingly explained the variations in the stock market in 
the immediate term when compared to policy rate (ISSR) shocks and optimism shocks.  
Finally, the sixth chapter of our work addressed our fourth research question and sought 
to examine whether the complexity and optimism in the bank’s communication had an impact 
on the volatility of financial market variables. Specifically, we explored the impact of these 
communication variables on the volatility of the stock markets, the currency markets and the 
bond markets. Our most significant finding in this section was that rising optimism in 
communication reduced volatility in the stock market and currency market. We found that a 
significant number of our stock market and currency market variables showed reduced 
volatility with increased optimism. Some of the evidence from the corporate sector does indeed 
corroborate the idea that optimism in CEO speeches tends to reduce volatility in the stock prices 
of the company (e.g. see Li et al. 2008).  Our results seem to suggest that largely, complexity 
of communication has very limited effects on the volatility of the stock, currency and bond 
markets. 
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Overall, each of the three key analytical chapters provide interesting results that 
contribute to the literature and have significant implications for policy. The next section of our 
work details some policy implications of our work as well as areas for further research. 
 
 
7.1 Implications for policy 
 
The three main chapters of our research provide significant empirical findings that are 
potentially useful for central banks as well as for other policy making institutions. In our first 
analysis, we explored how communication via MPC minutes and inflation reports are 
influenced by the macroeconomic conditions in which the BoE is making that communication. 
Here, our findings provide very useful information for central banks in helping them 
understand what drives the clarity and tone with which they make policy communication. 
Although the manner in which central banks often communicates in response to the 
macroeconomic conditions may be unintentional on the part of the banks, the evidence suggests 
that their communications is significantly influenced by the macroeconomic conditions 
prevailing at the time of the communication. Therefore, our findings have significant policy 
implications for central banks in that they can consciously adjust the clarity and tone of 
communication ex-ante, in response to the existing macroeconomic conditions.  
Particular emphasis can be placed on improving clarity by reducing the complexity of 
texts used in communication where there are economic environments with significantly rising 
inflation, widening inflation gaps and falling sterling values. In many cases, in such difficult 
conditions, the bank itself may be unclear as to how to communicate; however, by eliminating 
the tendency to communicate with increased complexity, and by using more clearly written 
language, communication will be more transparent. Being aware of the tendency for 
communication to be unclear in such periods as our evidence suggests will indeed help the 
bank improve its transparency practices.  
In our second analysis, we explored whether communication shocks driven by clarity 
and optimism have the ability to impact the macroeconomic environment and in what direction. 
Given that an increasing number of central banks are turning to communication as an 
alternative policy tool to drive short-term expectations, and there is still no consensus on what 
dimensions of communication to measure and how these may quantitatively impact the 
macroeconomic environment as interest rates would, our results here are very interesting, In 
this study, we provide evidence that the clarity and tone of communication impacts key 
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macroeconomic variables and may thus be used to drive policy expectations. Specifically, 
optimism in policy communication seemed to drive macroeconomic and financial variables in 
a similar manner to how traditional policy rate would, while complexity shocks have the effects 
of calming inflation and output but also depressing stock and currency markets. The idea that 
optimism shocks impact the economy similar to a contractionary policy presents policy 
alternatives to central banks. Particularly, at the zero lower bound where further lowering 
interest rates may not be viable, optimism in communication (as well as complexity) may 
become a viable policy tool with which the central bank may drive policy. 
Finally, our third analytical chapter explores the role that communication plays in 
transmitting volatility by exploring the effects of communication on the volatility of financial 
markets. Although we are unable to infer the effects of complexity of communication on 
volatility, we found consistent evidence that across most of the financial market variables that 
we explored, more optimistic communication tended to drive down market volatility. Given 
the foregoing, it can be argued that using more optimistic language may be a way for the central 
banks to dampen market volatility where possible.  
 
 
 
7.3 Limitations  
 
Although our research provides useful insights into the relatively new research area of 
central bank communication, it is important to highlight the limitations of our study. First, and 
in common with foregoing research into central bank communication, is the limitations of 
quantifying text as data. For our measures of tone, despite the advancement and extremely large 
corpus of the computerised textual analysis software used, it is still challenging to capture text 
within the right context. Although Diction allows for some assisted machine learning where 
some words are adapted to suit the context of the entire text, it is nonetheless still limited in its 
ability to recognise the context of word use; for instance,, the use of the words ‘doves’ and 
‘hawks’ in central banking are examples of this. Indeed, Loughran and McDonald (2016) 
identify that a number of the words used by Diction for text classification are likely to be 
misclassified.  
Furthermore, our measure of complexity, which used a combination of word length and 
sentence length to quantify the opacity of a text, may sometimes identify simple sentences that 
have long words as being complex. Some studies have found that the various readability 
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statistics produce different results when used to quantify clarity of the same text. Studies such 
as Mailloux et al. (1995) suggested that the way to overcome this limitation was to take an 
average of a number of readability statistics as this tends to provide a more reliable measure. 
Importantly, our study identified this limitation from the outset and employed up to six 
readability statistics for our initial analysis; however, we found these statistics to be very highly 
correlated and therefore reported only the Flesch-Kincaid scores.   
Finally, there should be some caveat to interpreting communication coming from 
central banks as some of these communications may not be as deliberate as researchers make 
them out to be. Particularly where we evaluate minutes and inflation reports, some of the tone 
and clarity we observed may be significantly driven by the writing style of the publishing team 
rather than the deliberate actions of the bank’s monetary policy committee. Overall, research 
into central bank communication requires some caution as not all communication documents 
may fully reflect the thinking of policy makers. 
 
 
7.4  Future research 
 
 Our research into what drives the clarity and tone of MPC minutes and inflation reports 
released by the Bank of England, as well as the onward effects of these communications on the 
macro and financial environment, has produced some very interesting results. It is therefore 
important to extend this analysis within a wider framework to test the consistency of our 
findings across other communication channels such as speeches and interviews. It would be 
useful to explore if carefully crafted communication such as MPC minutes and inflation reports 
impact the macro economy in the same way as less crafted or off-the=cuff statements in 
interviews and speeches.   
Additionally, given that a number of leading central banks have continued to turn to 
communication as an integral part of their policy tool, it will again be useful to explore if these 
results hold for other central banks as well. Although some work has been done on leading 
central banks, such as the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, there are aspects of 
our work that are unique and will provide useful insights for these other central banks. In 
particular, our analysis of sentiments using Diction is relatively new to the literature. 
Finally, as leading economies move away from the zero lower bound environment and 
interest rates begin to rise, it is important that future research explore the role of communication 
and the role of interest rate changes comparatively within a non-zero lower bound environment. 
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Given that communication and forward guidance are now very integral to central banks’ policy 
tool kits, partly due to the zero lower bound interest rates, it is important to re-evaluate the 
continued relevance of communication as a policy tool in the absence of the zero lower bound. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Non-linear analysis of the relationship between complexity/tone and the 
macroeconomic environment. 
As per our analysis of the linear relationship between the complexity and tone of the 
Bank of England’s communication and existing macroeconomic conditions, we propose the 
model below similar to that of Bulir et al. (2013): 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋𝑐|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| + 𝛽𝜋𝑒|𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
| + 𝛽𝛾𝛾𝑡 +  𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅 +
 𝛽𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐶 + 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
           … (A1) 
Where 𝐶𝑖𝑡 denotes the relevant measure of complexity or tone of MPC minutes and 
inflation reports (i representing either of those). The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score is used 
to measure complexity of communication, with higher values implying communication that is 
more complex and one in which a reader will require more years of formal education to 
comprehend. Diction is used to obtain values for optimism and uncertainty tones, with higher 
values of the optimism score implying a more optimistic communication and a higher value of 
the certainty score implying less uncertainty.  
𝜋𝑡 represents the current month-on=month growth rate of inflation and seeks to capture 
the inflationary pressures from inflation growth. The contemporaneous inflation gap is 
captured by the covariate |𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| and captures inflationary pressures from deviating further 
away from the inflation target in current period t and this is measured in absolute terms. 
|𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
| captures the forward-looking (ex-ante) inflation gap, which is the difference 
between the four-quarters-ahead inflation forecast and the inflation target 𝛾𝑡 is the value of the 
pound relative to the US dollar; 𝐷𝐼𝑅 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in a month 
when inflation reports are released in addition to MPC communication and 0 otherwise.  
In the above model, we assume that there is a linear relationship between complexity 
and tone of communication and the macroeconomic conditions in which these communications 
are made. For robustness, however, we propose a number of non-linear scenarios and explore 
whether this would improve the fit of our model and provide us with more information.  
A useful starting point is making assumptions as to the behaviour of an inflation-
targeting central bank under an accountability framework. Specifically, given that the Bank of 
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England (via its governor) is required to write a letter to the chancellor when |𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| > 17, 
therefore as |𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| approaches 1, there is a tendency for the bank to be more concerned 
about breaching this threshold. As such, our expectations are that there is an increased incentive 
for communication to be increasingly impacted as the contemporaneous inflation gap 
approaches the threshold. Beyond this point, however, since the threshold is already reached, 
the incentive to alter communication may not be as much as the pre-threshold period. In fact, 
the bank may experience a disincentive to alter communication the further away |𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| 
moves beyond the threshold, as the bank may see altering communication further as an 
ineffective approach. We therefore expect the relationship between 𝐶𝑖𝑡 and |𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| to be 
more of a concave rather than linear relationship. To this effect, we introduce the non-linear 
form of the contemporary inflation gap - |𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗|2 into equation 8.1 above.8 
Furthermore, we make assumptions as to the interactions between inflation pressures 
and exchange rate pressures. We propose that the magnitude of the impact of inflationary 
pressures on the bank’s communication depends on the performance of sterling. Specifically, 
if the pound has depreciated, increasing inflationary pressures will tend to have a more 
significant impact on communication. Therefore, we argue that inflation impacts 
communication through its interaction with exchange. To model this relationship, we include 
an interaction variable 𝜋𝑡𝛾𝑡 that captures the interaction between inflation rate and exchange 
rate. Our non-linear model therefore takes the form below: 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋𝑐|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| + 𝛽𝜋𝑒|𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
| + 𝛽𝛾𝛾𝑡 +  𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅 +
 𝛽𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐶 + 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝜋𝑝|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗|2 +  𝛽𝜋𝛾𝜋𝑡𝛾𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      … (A2) 
 
Where |𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗|2 is a polynomial of the contemporaneous inflation gap and 𝜋𝑡𝛾𝑡 
captures the interaction of the inflation rate and the exchange rate variable. The results of 
equation 8.2 above are presented in table 8.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 Note that the contemporaneous inflation gap is measured in absolute values. In reality this value will take a 
negative or positive form depending on which direction inflation is moving in. 
8 This variable has a maximum value that is capped |𝜋𝑡
∗ ± 3| which is the inflation target plus or minus 3%. We 
arbitrarily assume that |𝜋𝑡
∗ ± 3| as the inflection point whereby the bank would have no incentive to 
significantly alter communication any further.  
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Table A1: Impacts of macroeconomic variables on complexity and tone of MPC Minutes 
(including non-linear variables) 
  
Model 1 
(Complexity of 
communication) 
  
Model 2: 
(Tone of 
communication) 
Model 3: 
(Tone of 
communication) 
Dependent 
Variable - 
Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level 
Dependent 
Variable - 
Optimism 
Dependent 
Variable - 
Certainty 
Constant 13.95*** 
(2.04) 
43.79***  
(2.59)      
52.53*** 
(3.98)      
Current inflation rate (𝜋𝑡)  0.97    
(0.79)      
0.22** 
(0.10)         
−0.16 
(0.14)        
Contemporaneous inflation 
gap (|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗) 
−0.12 
(0.27) 
  
0.45 
(0.40)      
−0.73 
(0.77)     
Forward-looking inflation 
gap (𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
) 
12.57 
(11.81)       
50.81 
(44.13)          
50.56 
(46.05)       
Exchange rate (𝛾𝑡) −1.01 
(1.26)      
4.40 
(3.56)       
−0.31 
(2.31)     
Inflation report dummy 
(𝐷𝐼𝑅) 
0.22**      
(0.10)      
0.03 
(0.13)      
−0.28 
(0.35)     
Financial crisis (𝐹𝐶) −0.48 
(0.46)     
−0.017 
(0.30)     
−1.08 
(0.81)    
Time trend (𝑇) 0.0014 
(0.0012)    
0.00058 
(0.0016)    
−0.0025 
(0.0030)   
Non-linear 
contemporaneous inflation 
gap (𝛽𝜋𝑝|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗|2) 
0.28 
(0.27)      
−0.13 
(0.15) 
0.39       
0.37      
Inflation-exchange 
interaction (𝜋𝑡𝛾𝑡) 
0.0014 
(0.094)     
0.048 
(0.043) 
0.0029 
(0.0041) 
     
SE of regression 0.773176 1.197906 2.259200 
R squared  0.210068    0.057511    0.047442    
Durbin Watson 1.459928 1.441446 1.892173 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) in parenthesis 
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 Our results show that with the exception of one (current inflation rate in model 2), none 
of the parameter estimates in the models returns a statistically significant value. When 
compared to our linear models, we find that the above models, although slightly more 
sophisticated, do not provide us with more information than our current model. Ramsey’s 
RESET test carried out in the main body of the work also confirms that our linear model should 
perform better than our non-linear versions. 
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Appendix B: Subsample analysis of the MPC communication regimes 
 
Subsample analysis: communication regime A (1997:09 – 2004:12) 
 Given that there was a change in the Bank of England’s communication regime from 
January 2005 onwards, whereby the annexe section of the MPC was removed, we suggest that 
there might be a need to independently explore the sub-period from independence in 1997 to 
the withdrawal of the annexe in 2005. We should highlight that when we carried out a structural 
break analysis of the core MPC over our entire sample period using the January 2005 point as 
a break point, we found that our core MPC data did not exhibit a structural break in the time 
series. Nonetheless, we carried out a subsample analysis to see if these sub-periods added any 
additional information to our core analysis.  
 One of the key motivations for analysing the communication regime in the period 
between when the bank became independent in 1997 and the withdrawal of the annexe section 
in January 2005 is that the inclusion of the annexe section was argued to provide additional 
information used by the bank in deliberation at the MPC minutes. We therefore sought to 
explore two key issues as they relate to the inclusion of the annexe section in MPC minutes. 
First is whether this annexe section had any additional impact on clarity and tone of 
communication and second is whether our core research questions (i) and (ii), on the behaviour 
of the bank’s communication in light of macroeconomic conditions, held for this sub-period as 
well. Recall that our research questions sought to address whether (i) there was a noticeable 
trend in the complexity and tone of MPC minutes and inflation reports given the increased 
demand for transparency and accountability and (ii) whether the prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions had an impact on the complexity and tone of the bank’s communication. 
 As highlighted below in figure B1, the inclusion of the annexe section in our MPC 
minutes does depict that complexity of the text is reduced when this section is included. We 
should note, however, that this is somewhat expected given that most of the focus of the annexe 
is on presenting quantitative data which can be more succinct than deliberations. The time 
series data for the tone of optimism and uncertainty does not show any noticeable difference 
when we compare the pre-2005 communication regime and the longer time series; nonetheless 
we carried out pre-2005 analyses for these as well so as to check whether there were any 
noticeable differences in tone between the different communication regimes.  
 
 
195 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
Figure B1: Complexity of MPC minutes with annexe (pre-2005) 
 
 
 Our model for analysing the sub-period is similar to that used in equation 4.1 in the 
main text, as is shown below: 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋𝑐|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| + 𝛽𝜋𝑒|𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
| + 𝛽𝛾𝛾𝑡 +  𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅 +
 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           … (B1) 
 
The variables used in the model in equation B1 above and what they represent are 
similar to those in equation 4.1 and are well described in chapter four of the main body of our 
work. However, our time series for this analysis is shorter and only covers the period between 
September 1997 and December 2004. Additionally, given that this period does not cover the 
global financial crises of 2008, we eliminated the financial crisis variable. The results of our 
regression analysis are displayed in table B1 below.  
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Table B1: Impacts of macroeconomic variables on complexity and tone of MPC Minutes 
(September 1997 to December 2004) 
  
Model 1 
(Complexity of 
communication) 
  
Model 2: 
(Tone of 
communication) 
Model 3: 
(Tone of 
communication) 
Dependent 
Variable - 
Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level 
Dependent 
Variable - 
Optimism 
Dependent 
Variable - 
Certainty 
Constant 9.71***      
(0.78) 
55.61***     
(3.13)      
56.15*** 
(2.47)     
Current inflation rate (𝜋𝑡) 1.89**      
(0.79)       
−9.3***      
(0.35)       
−11.49***  
(2.77)      
Contemporaneous inflation 
gap (|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗) 
0.22     
(0.13)      
−6.40***      
(1.81)      
−1.43 
(0.57)    
Forward-looking inflation 
gap (𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
) 
−5.57     
(9.53)      
(12.0)***       
(3.2)        
2.42     
(39.22)       
Exchange rate (𝛾𝑡) 0.061  
(0.48)      
−2.39      
(1.86)      
−0.69     
(1.37)     
Inflation report dummy 
(𝐷𝐼𝑅) 
0.33***     
(0.12)      
−0.12     
(0.26)     
−0.42     
(0.48)    
Time trend (𝑇) - 0.023***    
(0.0028) 
0.029***    
(0.009)    
−0.011    
(0.010) 
     
SE of regression 0.53 1.48 2.07 
R squared  0.67   0.16 0.18   
Durbin Watson 1.5 1.66 1.90 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) in parenthesis 
 
When we compared our results from the pre-2005 communication regime, as shown in 
table B1 above, to those of the entire sample period, we found that the behaviour of complexity 
of communication over this period was largely similar to that of the entire sample period. 
Complexity of communication showed a downward trend over the period whilst rising inflation 
and the release of inflation reports in the same month were found to lead to more complex 
communication. The only difference in the results between the periods was that exchange rate 
did not significantly impact complexity of communication in the pre-2005 period. The reasons 
197 
 
Sensitivity: Public 
for exchange rate not affecting communication in these periods are likely to be connected to 
the relative calm and stability of the pound relative to the dollar in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. 
Similarly, when we explored optimism in communication over the two periods, we 
found that optimism was impacted in a comparable manner. Rising inflation and widening 
contemporaneous inflation gap were found to reduce optimism while widening future inflation 
gaps seemed to increase optimism. The only difference across the time periods was that there 
was evidence that optimism rose over the pre-2005 time period, as the time trend variable in 
our equation is significant. Finally, we found that drivers in uncertainty in communication were 
explained better in the pre-2005 period as here we observed that rising inflation reduced 
certainty in communication. This is unlike the results of the entire sample period which showed 
that macroeconomic conditions, with the exception of a financial crisis, generally have no 
impact on the level of uncertainty in communication. 
Overall, in this sub-sample period our results are largely consistent with those of the 
entire sample period. The only significant exceptions are exchange rate losing its significance 
in relation to its effects on complexity of communication and inflation driving uncertainty in 
communication. It may therefore be safe to conclude that the withdrawal of the annexe section 
from the minutes had no significant impact on the manner in which the Bank’s communication 
were made. 
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Appendix C – Macroeconomic variable inputs to the FAVAR Model 
 
Transformatio
n code 
Slow/Fast 
Moving (1/0) 
UK Industrial Production MoM SA                                                  5 1 
UK Industrial Production YoY SA                                                  5 1 
UK Manufacturing Production MoM SA        5 1 
UK Manufacturing Production YoY SA                                               5 1 
RICS England & Wales Housing Market Survey Price 
Balance SA                      
5 1 
UK Trade Balance in Goods SA                                                     5 1 
UK Trade Balance Value of Trade Balance SA                                       5 1 
UK Construction Output Total New Work Constant 
Prices SA MoM 
5 1 
Bank of England/TNS Inflation Expectation Survey 
Inflation Next 12 Mths 
1 0 
UK CPI EU Harmonized MoM NSA 5 1 
UK CPI EU Harmonized YoY NSA 5 1 
UK CPI Ex Energy Food Alcohol & Tobacco YoY 5 1 
UK RPI All Items NSA 5 1 
UK RPI MoM NSA 5 1 
UK RPI YoY NSA 5 1 
UK RPI Less Mortgage Interest PayMents YoY NSA 5 1 
UK PPI Input Prices Materials & Fuels Purchased 
Manufacturing MoM NSA            
5 1 
UK PPI Input Prices Materials & Fuels Purchased 
Manufacturing YoY NSA 
5 1 
UK PPI Manufactured Products MoM NSA 5 1 
UK PPI Output Prices Ex Food Beverages Tobacco & 
Petroleum YoY NSA 
5 1 
UK House Price Index - Average Price for All Dwellings 
YoY                       
5 1 
UK Claimant Count Rate SA 4 1 
UK Unemployment Claimant Count Monthly Change SA 1 1 
Average Weekly Earnings 3 Month Avg Growth Whole 
Economy YoY 
5 1 
UK AWE Regular Pay Whole Economy 3M Avg YoY 
SA 
5 1 
UK Unemployment ILO Unemployment Rate SA 4 1 
UK Labour Force Employment Change 1 1 
UK Retail Sales All Retailing Sales Ex Automotive Fuel 
Chained Volume MoM SA 
5 1 
UK Retail Sales All Retailing Sales Ex Automotive Fuel 
Chained Volume YoY SA 
5 1 
UK Retail Sales Volume Including Automotive Fuel 
MoM 
5 1 
UK Retail Sales Volume Including Automotive Fuel 
YoY 
5 1 
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UK PSNCR Public Sector Net Cash Requirement 5 1 
UK Cent Govt Net Cash Requirement ex.Northern Rock 
Asset Mgmt & Bradford&Bingley 
5 1 
UK PSNCR Net Borrowing 5 1 
CBI MTE Full Volume of Total Order Book Balance                                  5 1 
CBI MTE Full Average Selling Prices Next 3 Months 
Balance 
5 1 
UK Consumer Credit Supplied (Ex SLC) SA 5 1 
UK Lending to Individuals Net Lending Secured On 
Dwellings in Billions 
5 1 
Bank of England UK Mortgage Approvals 5 1 
UK Money Supply M4 MoM SA 5 1 
UK Money Supply M4 YoY SA 5 1 
GFK UK Consumer Confidence Indicator 4 1 
UK IOS Index Total Service Industries MoM                                        5 1 
UK IOS Index Total Service Industries 3 Mth/3 Mth 5 1 
UK Business Investment Chained QoQ SA 5 1 
UK Business Investment Chained YoY SA 5 1 
UK Total Unit Labour Costs YoY 5 1 
CBI ITS Q1 Quarterly Optimism Balance                                            4 0 
GBP-USD 5 0 
GBP-EUR 5 0 
GBP-GPY 5 0 
GBP - CHF 5 0 
GBP-CAD 5 0 
GBP -AUD 5 0 
GBP-SEK 5 0 
FTSE 100 5 0 
FTSE 250 5 0 
FTSE 350 5 0 
FTSE ALL Share 5 0 
UK Govt Bonds 10 Year Note Generic Bid Yield 1 0 
UK Govt Bonds 1 Year Note Generic Bid Yield 1 0 
UK Govt Bonds 5 Year Note Generic Bid Yield 1 0 
UK Govt Bonds 3 Year Note Generic Bid Yield 1 0 
GDP  5 1 
UK New Car Registrations YoY                                                     5 1 
UK Official Reserves Changes in Net Reserves                                     5 1 
BRC KPMG Retail Sales Monitor Like For Like Sales 
YoY                            
5 1 
SGI Bond GBP 6M 5 0 
SGI 2Y Bond GBP 5 0 
SGI 5Y Bond GBP 5 0 
SGI 10Y Bond GBP 5 0 
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Appendix D: Impact of lagged volatility variables on communication  
 
This section supports our examination of possible reverse causation as explained in 
section 6.6 of our work. In the main body of the work, we tested the effects of the lagged 
volatility of currency and stock markets as measured by the squared residuals from the E-
GARCH equations on our measures of communication. Our analysis used a model that 
regressed our two main measures of communication (i.e. complexity and optimism) on their 
own lags and the lagged volatility of currency and financial market variables measured as the 
squared residuals. We found that neither currency and financial market volatilities had any 
impact on any of the measures of communication. 
This section takes that analysis further by inserting these lagged volatilities into our 
original model in equation 4.1 to test whether these had any impact on communication. Our 
revised model therefore takes the form below:9 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝜋𝑐|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗| + 𝛽𝜋𝑒|𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
| + 𝛽𝛾𝛾𝑡 +  𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑅 +
 𝛽𝐹𝑐𝐹𝐶 + 𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
           … (D.1) 
 
 Where the newly included variables 𝜉1𝑡  and 𝜉2𝑡  are the lagged volatility of the currency 
and bond market respectively, measured as the squared residuals from the E-GARCH equations 
in chapter 6. Table C1 below shows a summary of our results 
 
Table D1 - Effects of lagged volatility on communication variables using original models. 
  
Model 1 
(Complexity of 
communication) 
 
Model 2: 
(Tone of 
communication) 
Dependent 
Variable - 
Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level 
Dependent 
Variable - 
Optimism 
Constant 15.96*** 
(0.79) 
50.25*** 
(1.16) 
Current inflation rate (𝜋𝑡) 9.95* 
(5.99) 
-19.17* 
(10.31) 
                                               
9 Note that we excluded the time trend variable from this model as it did not present any additional information. 
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Contemporaneous inflation 
gap (|𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗) 
-0.0064 
(0.096) 
-0.0059 
(0.16) 
Forward-looking inflation 
gap (𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+4) −  𝜋𝑡
∗
) 
-4.61 
(2.58) 
1.78 
(3.78) 
Exchange rate (𝛾𝑡) -2.17*** 
(0.49) 
0.58 
(0.72) 
Inflation report dummy 
(𝐷𝐼𝑅) 
0.24** 
(0.11) 
0.0023 
(0.14) 
Financial crisis (𝐹𝐶) −0.36 
(0.26) 
−0.46 
(0.30) 
Lagged currency market 
volatility (𝜉𝑖𝑡) 
1.55 
(1.65) 
-0.32 
(2.01) 
Lagged financial market 
volatility (𝜉𝑖𝑡) 
-0.00029 
(0.00049) 
1.55 
(1.03) 
    
SE of regression 0.77 1.21 
R squared  0.22 0.041 
Durbin Watson 1.50 1.43 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 4 (Bartlett kernel) in parenthesis 
 
As with our previous analysis in the main body of the work, our results show that lagged 
currency and financial market volatilities had no impact on both the complexity and optimism 
of communication. These results support the previous findings in suggesting that there is no 
evidence of reverse causation in our models. 
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Appendix E: Summary of research questions, expected findings and thesis findings 
 
Research question (i) Hypothesis/Expected findings Thesis findings 
Given the increased demand for 
transparency and accountability, is there 
an observable trend in the complexity 
and tone of Bank of England’s 
communication over our sample period? 
 
Null hypothesis:  
H0: There is no statistically significant trend 
in the complexity and tone of the Bank of 
England’s communication over our sample 
period. 
 
𝐻0: 𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝑇𝑖𝑡 ≠ 0 
 
Where Tit is the linear time trend variable in 
equation 4.1 of our work.  
 
Expected findings: 
The evidence in the literature suggests that 
inflation-targeting central banks have 
become increasingly transparent over the 
past decade. In the case of the Bank of 
England, there is also an increased demand 
for accountability from the oversight of the 
Treasury Select Committee. Our 
expectations are therefore for communication 
to reflect less complexity over our sample 
period.  
 
We found evidence that the complexity 
of MPC minutes published by the bank 
did indeed decrease over our sample 
period. By suggesting that clarity is an 
important precondition to transparency 
and accountability, this finding is in line 
with recent conclusions in the literature 
that central banks are employing every 
means they can to increase transparency. 
We did not, however, find evidence of 
the same decrease in the complexity of 
inflation reports as our trend variable 
turns out insignificant. 
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Research question (ii) Hypothesis/Expected findings Thesis findings 
Are the varying levels of complexity 
and tone of communication associated 
with the prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions in which the communication 
is made? 
 
Null hypothesis: 
H0: No association between complexity and 
tone and prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions. 
 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝜋 = 𝛽𝜋𝑐  =  𝛽𝜋𝑒 =  𝛽𝛾 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝐻0 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
 
Where, 𝜋 represents current inflation rate, 𝜋𝑐 
represents the contemporaneous inflation 
gap, 𝜋𝑒 represents forward looking inflation 
gap and 𝛾 represents the pound/dollar 
exchange rate.  
 
Expected findings: 
Our expectations were that the complexity 
and tone of communication should be 
impacted by the prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions at the time of communication. 
Specifically, as an inflation-targeting central 
bank is required to explain significant 
deviations of its policy actions from its 
inflation target, our expectations are that the 
bank may be ‘less clear, less certain and less 
optimistic’ when macroeconomic 
environments are unfavourable. We suggest 
that unfavourable conditions are those where 
We found significant evidence that 
macroeconomic conditions have a 
sizeable impact on the complexity and 
tone of the Bank of England’s 
communication.  
Our core finding is that rising inflation 
and falling pound values both tended to 
increase the complexity of MPC minutes 
and inflation reports. Generally, 
inflationary pressures seemed to be the 
dominant driver of complexity and tone 
across both MPC minutes and inflation 
reports. Rising inflation rate was 
observed to reduce optimism in MPC 
minutes and increase uncertainty in 
inflation reports. Furthermore, we found 
consistent evidence that as inflation 
deviated further from the inflation target 
both MPC minutes and inflation reports 
were significantly less optimistic. 
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prevailing inflation is rising and is further 
away from its target and exchange rate 
pressures are leading to the depreciation of 
the pound. 
Research question (iii) Hypothesis/Expected findings Thesis findings 
Does central bank communication 
transmit shocks to key macroeconomic 
and market variables environment?  
 
Null hypothesis: 
𝐻0: There is no shock transmission from 
complexity and optimism of the bank’s 
communication to key macroeconomic and 
market variables. 
 
Expected findings: 
Our expectations are for shocks from the 
complexity and optimism in communication 
to be transmitted to core financial and 
macroeconomic variables. Although there 
are suggestions in the literature (e.g. see 
Hansen and McMahon, 2016) that 
communication shocks barely impact real 
macroeconomic variables. we propose that 
rising optimism in central bank 
communication may be perceived by the 
public as leading to a contractionary policy 
and may impacts variables as such. Our 
expectations for the direction of complexity 
shocks are very much exploratory. 
 
 
We found that overall, following shocks 
to optimism in the Bank of England’s 
communication, inflation, output, and 
stock market returns fell and the pound 
rose in value. We found further evidence 
that optimism shocks reduced credit 
availability, the money supply, retail 
sales and as earnings. Finally, 
government bond yields also tended to 
rise in response to optimism shocks. 
These results seem to mimic responses 
to a traditional interest rate shock in a 
way that is consistent with 
contractionary economic policy. These 
findings are in line with our argument 
that with increased optimism in policy 
communication, individuals and firms 
expect a rise in interest rate and they 
respond by making economic decisions 
in line with this expectation. 
 
We observed that complexity shocks 
tended to reduce inflationary pressures 
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and caused significant stock and 
currency market declines as well as a 
fall in bond yields. We found mixed 
evidence on the effects of complexity 
shocks on output and credit availability 
variables. 
 
In addition to this, we found that relative 
to the policy rate, optimism shocks 
explained more of the immediate 
variations in many macroeconomic and 
financial variables especially the 
currency markets, bond markets and 
inflation variables. Notably, shocks to 
complexity of communication 
overwhelmingly explained the variations 
in the stock market in the immediate 
term when compared to the policy rate 
and optimism shocks. Overall, however, 
the policy rate explained most of the 
variations in the majority of the 
variables over the longer term. 
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Research question (iv) Hypothesis/Expected findings Thesis findings 
Does central bank communication 
significantly impact volatility in 
financial markets?  
 
Null hypothesis: 
𝐻0: Complexity and optimism of the Bank of 
England’s communication have no impact on 
the volatility of financial market variables. 
 
 
Expected findings: 
For complexity of communication, our 
expectations here are aligned with the strand 
of the literature which suggests that more 
complex communication calms financial 
markets (e.g. see Geraats 2007, Ehrmann and 
Fratzcher (2007c). This idea that ambiguity 
calms markets also has support within central 
banking practice, with leading central 
bankers such as Alan Greenspan suggesting 
that ambiguity is useful in calming financial 
markets with his suggestion that ‘mumbling 
with great incoherence’ is an effective tool 
in central banking. 
 
For optimism, we follow some of the 
arguments in the corporate literature which 
suggest that CEO and company 
communications reduce stock market 
volatility by instilling confidence in markets 
Our results seem to suggest that largely, 
complexity of communication has very 
limited effects on the volatility of the 
stock, currency and bond markets. We 
did, however, find that rising optimism 
in communication reduced volatility in 
the stock market and currency market. 
In line with our expectations, we found 
that a significant number of our stock 
market and currency market variables 
show reduced volatility with increased 
optimism. 
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(e.g. see Li et al. 2008). Our expectations 
therefore are for increased optimism to lead 
to reduced volatility in the financial markets. 
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